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From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
To: "David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
	Ido Schimmel <idosch@nvidia.com>, Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Subject: [PATCH net] inet: frags: bound the wmem charge of the socket completing a reassembly
Date: Tue,  3 Nov 2026 10:29:57 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261103092957.4164530-1-edumazet@kernel.org> (raw)

When a socket owned fragment completes a reassembly queue,
inet_frag_reasm_prepare() and inet_frag_reasm_finish() charge the
truesize of all other fragments to its sk_wmem_alloc. These fragments
were orphaned when queued, and might have been sent by someone else,
for instance padded TUN packets.

Commit 3ae20e4697eb ("inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly
queue") bounds this charge to INT_MAX / 2 per queue, but a socket can
complete several queues while the reassembled skbs are still alive,
for instance held in a qdisc. sk_wmem_alloc can then go past INT_MAX,
refcount_add() saturates it with a WARN, and the socket is leaked.

This is reachable from an unprivileged user/network namespace, by
raising ipfrag_high_thresh.

Refuse the reassembly if the charge would push sk_wmem_alloc above
2 * sk_sndbuf, the bound ip_append_data() uses, plus 4MB of slack for
fragments inflated by a refragmentation with a small MTU.
SO_SNDBUFFORCE requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the init user namespace,
so an unprivileged user can not raise sk_sndbuf above 2 * wmem_max.

The check is done before inet_frag_reasm_prepare() modifies the queue.
All callers already kill the queue when it returns NULL.

Fixes: 18685451fc4e ("inet: inet_defrag: prevent sk release while still in use")
Reported-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/24feda7d-ae49-45af-9596-2cc5f149f28e@redhat.com/
Cc: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>
---
 net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 22 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
index 0b8d22ffafca69b2bccd98eca3d4bda93ebb816a..c11d7e976dfa534b773f99f33f47fcc562ed569b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_fragment.c
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 #include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
 #include <linux/slab.h>
 #include <linux/rhashtable.h>
+#include <linux/sizes.h>
 
 #include <net/sock.h>
 #include <net/inet_frag.h>
@@ -519,6 +520,25 @@ int inet_frag_queue_insert(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(inet_frag_queue_insert);
 
+/* When a socket owned fragment completes a queue, the truesize of all
+ * other fragments is charged to its sk_wmem_alloc, although they were
+ * orphaned when queued and possibly sent by someone else.
+ * Bound this like ip_append_data() bounds the memory a socket can
+ * allocate (2 * sk_sndbuf), plus slack for fragments inflated by a
+ * refragmentation using a small MTU. Otherwise, several reassembled skbs
+ * alive at the same time can saturate sk_wmem_alloc, and leak the socket.
+ */
+#define INET_FRAG_WMEM_SLACK	SZ_4M
+
+static bool inet_frag_wmem_ok(const struct inet_frag_queue *q,
+			      const struct sock *sk)
+{
+	u64 limit = 2ULL * READ_ONCE(sk->sk_sndbuf) + INET_FRAG_WMEM_SLACK;
+	u64 wmem = (u64)refcount_read(&sk->sk_wmem_alloc) + q->truesize;
+
+	return wmem <= min_t(u64, limit, INET_FRAG_MAX_TRUESIZE);
+}
+
 void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			      struct sk_buff *parent)
 {
@@ -530,6 +550,8 @@ void *inet_frag_reasm_prepare(struct inet_frag_queue *q, struct sk_buff *skb,
 	int delta;
 
 	if (sk && is_skb_wmem(skb)) {
+		if (!inet_frag_wmem_ok(q, sk))
+			return NULL;
 		/* TX: skb->sk might have been passed as argument to
 		 * dst->output and must remain valid until tx completes.
 		 *
-- 
2.53.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-03  9:30 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-03  9:29 Eric Dumazet [this message]
2026-11-03  9:33 ` [PATCH net] inet: frags: bound the wmem charge of the socket completing a reassembly netdev-bot+sinfo
2026-11-04  9:30 ` netdev-bot+sashiko
2026-11-04  9:51   ` Eric Dumazet

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