From: Yuho Choi <oss.patchbox@gmail.com>
To: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrew Lunn <andrew+netdev@lunn.ch>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Jeremi Piotrowski <jpiotrowski@linux.microsoft.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Yuho Choi <oss.patchbox@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH net-next v1] ptp: kvm: x86: Leak clock_pair page if changing its encryption fails
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 11:43:08 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261105164324.23501-2-oss.patchbox@gmail.com> (raw)
In a confidential guest, kvm_arch_ptp_init() shares the clock_pair page
with the host using set_memory_decrypted(), and kvm_arch_ptp_exit()
makes it private again with set_memory_encrypted() before freeing it.
The untrusted host can make either call fail and leave the page shared.
Both paths still free the page: the init error path with __free_page(),
and kvm_arch_ptp_exit() after only a WARN_ON(). The page allocator can
then hand a page the host can still access to an unrelated user.
Leak the page in both cases instead, as was done for the same situation
in commit b9fa16949d18 ("dma-direct: Leak pages on dma_set_decrypted()
failure") and commit 03f5a999adba ("Drivers: hv: vmbus: Leak pages if
set_memory_encrypted() fails").
Fixes: 6365ba64b4dbe ("ptp: kvm: Use decrypted memory in confidential guest on x86")
Signed-off-by: Yuho Choi <oss.patchbox@gmail.com>
---
This was found with a static analysis tool from ongoing, not yet
published research, and confirmed by code inspection. Compile-tested
only (x86_64 with KVM_GUEST, AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT and INTEL_TDX_GUEST, W=1);
I do not have a confidential guest to test it on.
drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c | 7 ++++---
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c
index 6cea4fe39bcfe..811758bd8b0de 100644
--- a/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c
+++ b/drivers/ptp/ptp_kvm_x86.c
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ int kvm_arch_ptp_init(void)
clock_pair = page_address(p);
ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)clock_pair, 1);
if (ret) {
- __free_page(p);
+ /* The page may be left shared, so leak it. */
clock_pair = NULL;
goto nofree;
}
@@ -68,8 +68,9 @@ int kvm_arch_ptp_init(void)
void kvm_arch_ptp_exit(void)
{
if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
- WARN_ON(set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)clock_pair, 1));
- free_page((unsigned long)clock_pair);
+ /* Leak the page if it cannot be made private again. */
+ if (!WARN_ON(set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)clock_pair, 1)))
+ free_page((unsigned long)clock_pair);
clock_pair = NULL;
}
}
base-commit: 0822d2fe38262e8b55c5ea55c970022bca8dd2a9
--
2.43.0
reply other threads:[~2026-11-05 16:43 UTC|newest]
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