Netdev List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@ziepe.ca>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rafael@kernel.org>,
	Danilo Krummrich <dakr@kernel.org>,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>,
	Andrew Lunn <andrew@lunn.ch>,
	Heiner Kallweit <hkallweit1@gmail.com>,
	Russell King <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>,
	"Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Suravee Suthikulpanit <suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com>,
	Vasant Hegde <vasant.hegde@amd.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>,
	Lu Baolu <baolu.lu@linux.intel.com>,
	Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>,
	Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.dentz@gmail.com>,
	Nipun Gupta <nipun.gupta@amd.com>,
	Nikhil Agarwal <nikhil.agarwal@amd.com>,
	Pieter Jansen van Vuuren <pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, driver-core@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-input@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, linux-usb@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs
Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2026 21:06:51 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261105190651.GH8298@unreal> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261105170203.GC663069@ziepe.ca>

On Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 01:02:03PM -0400, Jason Gunthorpe wrote:
> On Thu, Nov 05, 2026 at 01:42:23PM +0200, Leon Romanovsky wrote:
> > +		(RW) The requested trust policy for the device. The initial
> > +		value may be selected by the bus before the device is
> > +		registered; otherwise it is "default". The policy is resolved
> > +		to an active trust level before the device is probed.
> > +
> > +		The values are "default", "disabled", "adversary", and
> > +		"full". "default" lets the bus select the active trust level.
> > +		"disabled" prevents a functional driver from binding.
> 
> For making this more general:
> 
> "disabled" prevents a driver from binding and informs the kernel to
> provide containment of the device. For example a PCIe device should be
> unable to DMA to memory.
> 
> > +		"adversary" requests operation with the restrictions that the
> > +		bus and DMA layers can enforce for a potentially malicious
> > +		device; it does not isolate DMA by itself. "full" requests
> > +		normal operation.
> 
> 
> "adversary" informs the kernel that the userspace wants to opt into
> any security defenses the kernel may have to restrict and further
> validate interactions with the device. This may have a performance or
> functional cost compared to "full". As an example the DMA API and
> IOMMU layers will avoid exposing unrelated nearby memory to the device
> during DMA.
> 
> > +		Successful resolution to an allowed level commits policy
> > +		and operating level before driver or DMA setup. Both remain
> 
> "before driver startup"
> 
> > +		fixed for the device object's lifetime, including through
> > +		failed or deferred probes, unbind, reset, and driver reload.
> > +		Later binds must resolve to the same level, including when
> > +		the policy is "default". A resolver error or disabled result
> > +		before commitment leaves the policy's writability unchanged.
> 
> Not sure what "resolver error" is.

The bus can provide custom logic for handling default policies through the
->trust_resolve() callback. This is "resolver".

Thanks

> 
> Jason

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-05 19:06 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-05 11:42 [PATCH 00/17] driver core: Authorize device trust before driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 01/17] Input: gameport - attach manual drivers through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 02/17] Input: serio " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:05   ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 19:19     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:34       ` Dmitry Torokhov
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 03/17] net: phy: Attach generic PHY " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:50   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:35     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 15:33   ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 18:45     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 04/17] wifi: mac80211_hwsim: lock device for manual driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 05/17] USB: Lock registered interfaces during " Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 17:24   ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 18:44     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 20:04       ` Alan Stern
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 06/17] PNP: Attach card devices through the driver core Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 07/17] cdx: Propagate DMA configuration errors Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 08/17] driver core: Allow userspace to detect EPROBE_DEFER when using sysfs drivers_probe Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 09/17] driver core: Introduce a generic device trust level Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 10/17] driver core: Expose device trust authorization through sysfs Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:10   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:27     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:40       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:59         ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 14:03           ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:17             ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 14:26             ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 15:45               ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:06           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 14:43           ` Andrew Lunn
2026-11-05 14:59             ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:09             ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 13:42       ` Robin Murphy
2026-11-05 17:02   ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 19:06     ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 11/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy on the kernel command line Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 12/17] driver core: Accept device trust policy by driver name Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 13/17] driver core: Preserve trust commitment beyond driver binding Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 14/17] driver core: Add a global initial device trust policy Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 15/17] driver core: Cover trust authorization and binding with KUnit Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 16/17] driver core: Document trust admission and initrd authorization Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 11:42 ` [PATCH 17/17] PCI: Replace untrusted state with device trust Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:12   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 13:18     ` Leon Romanovsky
2026-11-05 13:26       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 14:03       ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 15:43         ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-11-05 16:26           ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-05 18:26           ` Leon Romanovsky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261105190651.GH8298@unreal \
    --to=leon@kernel.org \
    --cc=andrew@lunn.ch \
    --cc=baolu.lu@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=bhelgaas@google.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dakr@kernel.org \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com \
    --cc=driver-core@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=dwmw2@infradead.org \
    --cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=hkallweit1@gmail.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=jgg@ziepe.ca \
    --cc=johan@kernel.org \
    --cc=johannes@sipsolutions.net \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-acpi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-pci@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-usb@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux@armlinux.org.uk \
    --cc=luiz.dentz@gmail.com \
    --cc=marcel@holtmann.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=nikhil.agarwal@amd.com \
    --cc=nipun.gupta@amd.com \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=pieter.jansen-van-vuuren@amd.com \
    --cc=rafael@kernel.org \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=robin.murphy@arm.com \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=suravee.suthikulpanit@amd.com \
    --cc=vasant.hegde@amd.com \
    --cc=will@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox