From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1794247120; b=5B3Qy1naoX8Qc3m/I9oS3J9s2K9GsS9rAj/l+p76sCsFYqaKWdqH0E3WOVWsFwdd5rpE yUgMZo7DZaS2zELzULh0cxkmRzry7uhUT4hK0FgrtbPpVVfXD1sWxkKfXTmxwmx/IN5J5 ozl0MyYKCQheo4cV01ICKCMJXNLyLeeOXgzGEsNR5FRGPRFJI5VK4akniayjy0xa9sOyR 1FBgdMTBLkDDAfNdjeeoAfTVunE60Ll/VJufA4Lko0VjsXJaFLmzh1SfQ7qL4Ry9hHMD4 oRoV31zqHw3+k2vBmey5AN4pXBvn3ZNGArzOHMK1XDaTjoFbLiAPcSZsteK4ZMju7gw== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1794247120; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=rPOvzWkUJq/t5Js23tuescAerfdO09GtRFy1lT5bZOE=; b=Qy7/s9URjUh8Y/0q045pd9/sjiNGkgys87X5Or4drHTAxyzHrolY+PNibPHhXLhR4HpH dCa0FDTTWbMuD6D9D5VpFAIMK1240OIOUsMRxn2mi+O6yb/nrC/IT8BuSuURwmestw8hU 7usaggunGHziLhkX39HDLx4bCU4xKmUDmCX1mRw4xDObih5NhOrZZvm6WxHH1/u3p0o9Z POm2Ep15uGtwz7TdPLLke5kXZHLlyrRaBf8booTw0SBms6vBNxwsrv+NlIZ8lSK7YoHMV rQ3SCxhMKFTrrpMNszH1maLCVCJTtvFmOKRBmlk3bzhZjw1NEKvs0jS9HQt6T6RtUtA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=TuISpUT5; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C09C3606A325; Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:58:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=TuISpUT5 Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4E7C01F008A7; Mon, 9 Nov 2026 17:58:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1794247119; bh=rPOvzWkUJq/t5Js23tuescAerfdO09GtRFy1lT5bZOE=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=TuISpUT5QsQj5oHdR4GvZWSNGhLdkV/cfCpr4YUgdPUq80WRtMmfyK9NwWL/okrIP KNBDvd4nuHkdKtwz+VamZpFPFin8fQhWcZ1TSveezj33nGdAi0VuSsStH7RBk3wAcG f2+Wmnq7k3CxtqbGh9oF+LYUVbYR1tRtlftNe61/O0uBdNpUufFiTlUXQqd2jqlbL4 7UrzhM7A0c9muY3ZS+QG1Vpw2s2POoAW/OvlucI8+7zOBbJQbF333s5YB1IsMV+UJd IhklI70kiQ72kKwlfCchA5t/oruTQR3Sn4y5jTxDWstNRKVuhL5ITmFVmfKW0uBh5x iUq47cbi49Eug== From: Jakub Kicinski To: davem@davemloft.net Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, edumazet@google.com, pabeni@redhat.com, andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, horms@kernel.org, sd@queasysnail.net, shuah@kernel.org, cel@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, Jakub Kicinski Subject: [PATCH net 2/5] tls: Consume empty data records in tls_sw_splice_read() Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 09:58:33 -0800 Message-ID: <20261109175836.1246840-3-kuba@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261109175836.1246840-1-kuba@kernel.org> References: <20261109175836.1246840-1-kuba@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Chuck Lever A zero-length application_data record decrypts to full_len == 0, so tls_sw_splice_read() splices zero bytes and returns zero. A zero return from a splice read means EOF, and the caller tears down a connection that is still live. Consume the record and fetch the next one, as tls_sw_read_sock() does. The cap on consecutive empty records bounds the loop. When an empty record precedes a close_notify, splice(2) now returns -EINVAL from the control-record test instead of a false EOF. A splice that reaches an alert record already reports -EINVAL. Fixes: c46234ebb4d1 ("tls: RX path for ktls") Reported-by: Sabrina Dubroca Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/akaoXcfamBp8_mYe@krikkit/ Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski --- Jakub: - rewrite as a loop to avoid the non-error-handling goto --- net/tls/tls_sw.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c index adf3b26b8a75..b05b9e76bd25 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c @@ -2044,32 +2044,40 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos, if (err) goto splice_read_end; - if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { - skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); - } else { - struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; + for (;;) { + if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) { + skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list); + } else { + struct tls_decrypt_arg darg; - err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, true, false); - if (err <= 0) - goto splice_read_end; + err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, true, false); + if (err <= 0) + goto splice_read_end; - memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); + memset(&darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs)); - err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); - if (err < 0) - goto splice_read_end; + err = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, &darg); + if (err < 0) + goto splice_read_end; - tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); - skb = darg.skb; - } + tls_rx_rec_done(ctx); + skb = darg.skb; + } - rxm = strp_msg(skb); - tlm = tls_msg(skb); + rxm = strp_msg(skb); + tlm = tls_msg(skb); - /* splice does not support reading control messages */ - if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { - err = -EINVAL; - goto splice_requeue; + /* splice does not support reading control messages */ + if (tlm->control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) { + err = -EINVAL; + goto splice_requeue; + } + + /* Splicing zero bytes would read as EOF */ + if (rxm->full_len) + break; + + consume_skb(skb); } chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len); -- 2.56.0