Netdev List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Juan Agustin Niccolini <juanagusnicco@gmail.com>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
	Neal Cardwell <ncardwell@google.com>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] tcp_metrics: hash the destination address with SipHash
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 01:46:24 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261112064624.15245-1-juanagusnicco@gmail.com> (raw)

The tcp_metrics bucket is derived from a fold of the peer address.
For IPv4 the fold is ipv4_addr_hash(), which returns the address
unchanged. For IPv6 it is ipv6_addr_hash(), which XORs the four
32-bit words of the address. net_hash_mix() is only XORed in after
that fold, so two addresses of either family with the same fold share
a bucket in every netns.

A host owning an IPv6 /64 can thus compute, without knowing
net_hash_mix(), addresses that collide with a chosen IPv4 or IPv6 peer:

  w3 = w2 ^ p0 ^ p1 ^ target    /* p0, p1: prefix, w2: free */

A bucket holds six entries and the seventh insert replaces the oldest.
An off-path host can fill a peer's bucket with its own entries and
later tell whether one was evicted, because tcp_init_metrics() seeds
the initial RTO from the cached RTT. This reveals whether that peer,
or another address in the same bucket, connected in the meantime.
XOR and multiply is not a PRF, so net_hash_mix() can be recovered the
same way, after which evictions leak about 14 bits of any client's
address, depending on the number of buckets.

Hash the address with SipHash and a random key instead, as commit
2ee66e948717 ("inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash")
did for inet_peer. net_hash_mix() and hash_32() are kept, to separate
namespaces and to reduce the result to the table size.

Fixes: 51c5d0c4b169 ("tcp: Maintain dynamic metrics in local cache.")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Juan Agustin Niccolini <juanagusnicco@gmail.com>
---
This can be exploited remotely to recover a client's IPv4 address.
A single host narrows the address to about 262 thousand candidates,
and because each netns keys the hash differently, intersecting buckets
extracted from multiple hosts converges quickly into one candidate;
3-5 are enough. The net_hash_mix() value only needs to be extracted
once per boot per host.

Many common cases facilitate this. For instance, a browser loading
one page connects to several hosts within the same second. That
supplies the buckets needed to converge, and the shared timing shows
they belong to the same client.

I reproduced the bug on a QEMU guest running mainline (2a500a04d6f9) and
against Ubuntu 24.04 over the internet. With the patch applied, the
reproducer no longer finds addresses that share a bucket. The
reproducer is available on request.

For stable: 5.10 and 5.15 lack siphash_aligned_key_t;
"static siphash_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly __aligned(16);" can
be used there.

This bug was discovered during an LLM-based code review.

 net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/tcp.h>
 #include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/siphash.h>
 #include <linux/tcp_metrics.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
 
@@ -94,6 +95,23 @@
 
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_metrics_lock);
 static DEFINE_SEQLOCK(fastopen_seqlock);
+
+static siphash_aligned_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly;
+
+static u32 tcpm_addr_hash(const struct inetpeer_addr *a)
+{
+	net_get_random_once(&tcpm_hash_key, sizeof(tcpm_hash_key));
+
+	if (a->family == AF_INET)
+		return siphash_2u32((__force u32)a->a4.addr, a->a4.vif,
+				    &tcpm_hash_key);
+
+	return siphash_4u32((__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[0],
+			    (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[1],
+			    (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[2],
+			    (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[3],
+			    &tcpm_hash_key);
+}
 
 static void tcpm_suck_dst(struct tcp_metrics_block *tm,
 			  const struct dst_entry *dst,
@@ -270,13 +288,13 @@
 	case AF_INET:
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_loc_addr);
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr);
-		hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr);
+		hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
 		break;
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	case AF_INET6:
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_loc_addr);
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
-		hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr);
+		hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
 		break;
 #endif
 	default:
@@ -310,18 +328,18 @@
 	if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) {
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr);
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
-		hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
+		hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
 	}
 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
 	else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) {
 		if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) {
 			inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr);
 			inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
-			hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr);
+			hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
 		} else {
 			inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr);
 			inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr);
-			hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&sk->sk_v6_daddr);
+			hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr);
 		}
 	}
 #endif
@@ -818,7 +836,7 @@
 	if (a) {
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v4(addr, nla_get_in_addr(a));
 		if (hash)
-			*hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v4(addr));
+			*hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	a = info->attrs[v6];
@@ -828,7 +846,7 @@
 		in6 = nla_get_in6_addr(a);
 		inetpeer_set_addr_v6(addr, &in6);
 		if (hash)
-			*hash = ipv6_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v6(addr));
+			*hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr);
 		return 0;
 	}
 	return optional ? 1 : -EAFNOSUPPORT;

             reply	other threads:[~2026-11-12  6:46 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-12  6:46 Juan Agustin Niccolini [this message]
2026-11-17  0:36 ` [PATCH net] tcp_metrics: hash the destination address with SipHash Kuniyuki Iwashima

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20261112064624.15245-1-juanagusnicco@gmail.com \
    --to=juanagusnicco@gmail.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@kernel.org \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=kuniyu@google.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=ncardwell@google.com \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox