From: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
To: Alexander Aring <alex.aring@gmail.com>,
Stefan Schmidt <stefan@datenfreihafen.org>,
Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>,
linux-wpan@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
Phoebe Buckheister <phoebe.buckheister@itwm.fraunhofer.de>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
lvc-project@linuxtesting.org, stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] mac802154: remove redundant security_enabled assignment
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 13:52:34 +0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261116065235.27348-1-petrvaganoff@gmail.com> (raw)
During fuzz testing, the following issue was discovered:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:54 [inline]
ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa62/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
__sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:51 [inline]
ieee802154_hdr_push+0xa5b/0xb20 net/ieee802154/header_ops.c:108
ieee802154_header_create+0xa83/0xd20 net/mac802154/iface.c:396
wpan_dev_hard_header include/net/cfg802154.h:525 [inline]
dgram_sendmsg+0xc6d/0x15d0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:677
ieee802154_sock_sendmsg+0x8f/0xd0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:96
sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:711 [inline]
__sock_sendmsg+0x2f3/0x360 net/socket.c:726
____sys_sendmsg+0x960/0xc30 net/socket.c:2581
___sys_sendmsg+0x285/0x3e0 net/socket.c:2635
__sys_sendmmsg+0x33c/0x950 net/socket.c:2724
__do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2751 [inline]
__se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2748 [inline]
__x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xc6/0x150 net/socket.c:2748
x64_sys_call+0x12a8/0x3cf0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:47 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xd9/0x1c0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:78
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Commit f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
introduced mac802154_set_header_security() as the sole function
responsible for enabling frame-level security: it sets both
hdr->fc.security_enabled = 1 and initializes hdr->sec together,
maintaining the invariant that security_enabled = 1 implies hdr->sec
is initialized.
However, ieee802154_header_create() was left with a pre-existing
assignment:
hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
This assignment can set security_enabled = 1 (from a stale cb->secen)
even when mac802154_set_header_security() returns 0 without initializing
hdr.sec, violating that invariant. ieee802154_hdr_push_sechdr() then
reads uninitialized hdr.sec fields.
The stale value in cb->secen arises from a specific setsockopt()
sequence: calling WPAN_SECURITY_ON (secen_override=1, secen=1) and
then WPAN_SECURITY_DEFAULT (secen_override=0, secen unchanged at 1).
This undocumented combination likely explains why the bug was rarely
triggered.
Remove the redundant assignment; mac802154_set_header_security() is the
only correct place to set security_enabled.
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=60a66d44892b66b56545
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?id=23f21e76e9d2d1ed587cb5e71515260d6d025b63
Fixes: f30be4d53cad ("mac802154: integrate llsec with wpan devices")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Petr Vaganov <petrvaganoff@gmail.com>
---
net/mac802154/iface.c | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/mac802154/iface.c b/net/mac802154/iface.c
index f437b8daa00d..7b7332805ecc 100644
--- a/net/mac802154/iface.c
+++ b/net/mac802154/iface.c
@@ -368,7 +368,6 @@ static int ieee802154_header_create(struct sk_buff *skb,
memset(&hdr.fc, 0, sizeof(hdr.fc));
hdr.fc.type = cb->type;
- hdr.fc.security_enabled = cb->secen;
hdr.fc.ack_request = cb->ackreq;
hdr.seq = atomic_inc_return(&dev->ieee802154_ptr->dsn) & 0xFF;
--
2.55.0
reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 6:52 UTC|newest]
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