From: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
To: Marcelo Ricardo Leitner <marcelo.leitner@gmail.com>,
Xin Long <lucien.xin@gmail.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@kernel.org>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev,
Elkin Cruz <elkin@google.com>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Subject: [PATCH net] sctp: initialize new_value in custom proc_dointvec sysctl handlers
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 09:03:42 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261119170342.1508789-1-irogers@google.com> (raw)
proc_sctp_do_rto_min(), proc_sctp_do_rto_max(), proc_sctp_do_auth(),
proc_sctp_do_udp_port(), and proc_sctp_do_probe_interval() point
tbl.data at an uninitialized stack variable new_value on writes before
calling proc_dointvec().
proc_dointvec() can return 0 without writing to tbl.data, for example on
a zero-length write (*lenp == 0) or on a write at a non-zero file offset
ignored by proc_first_pos_non_zero_ignore() (such as pwrite(fd, "1\n",
2, 1) or a split write where the trailing newline is written separately).
When that happens:
- proc_sctp_do_auth() unconditionally stores the uninitialized stack int
into net->sctp.auth_enable and sctp_sk(sk)->ep->auth_enable, both
corrupting SCTP authentication state and leaking 4 bytes of kernel
stack memory back on subsequent sysctl reads.
- proc_sctp_do_rto_min(), proc_sctp_do_rto_max(),
proc_sctp_do_udp_port(), and proc_sctp_do_probe_interval() validate
the uninitialized value and overwrite the netns setting whenever stack
bytes happen to fall within range.
- proc_sctp_do_udp_port() also stops and restarts the UDP encapsulation
socket even when the port number did not change.
Initialize new_value to the current netns setting before calling
proc_dointvec() (matching proc_dobool()), and skip tearing down and
restarting the UDP encapsulation socket in proc_sctp_do_udp_port() when
new_value equals net->sctp.udp_port.
Found by enabling Clang's -Wconditional-uninitialized on an x86_64
allyesconfig build, with AI coding assistant help to audit the warning
and prepare the fix. Build-tested with Clang; not runtime-tested.
Fixes: 4f3fdf3bc59c ("sctp: add check rto_min and rto_max in sysctl")
Fixes: b14878ccb7fa ("net: sctp: cache auth_enable per endpoint")
Fixes: 046c052b475e ("sctp: enable udp tunneling socks")
Fixes: d1e462a7a5f3 ("sctp: add probe_interval in sysctl and sock/asoc/transport")
Signed-off-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
---
net/sctp/sysctl.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/sctp/sysctl.c b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
index 2b94c211427d..0c33f05fa532 100644
--- a/net/sctp/sysctl.c
+++ b/net/sctp/sysctl.c
@@ -425,8 +425,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_rto_min(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net, sctp.rto_min);
unsigned int min = *(unsigned int *) ctl->extra1;
unsigned int max = *(unsigned int *) ctl->extra2;
+ int new_value = net->sctp.rto_min;
struct ctl_table tbl;
- int ret, new_value;
+ int ret;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
@@ -453,8 +454,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_rto_max(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net, sctp.rto_max);
unsigned int min = *(unsigned int *) ctl->extra1;
unsigned int max = *(unsigned int *) ctl->extra2;
+ int new_value = net->sctp.rto_max;
struct ctl_table tbl;
- int ret, new_value;
+ int ret;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
@@ -489,8 +491,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_auth(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
{
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net, sctp.auth_enable);
+ int new_value = net->sctp.auth_enable;
struct ctl_table tbl;
- int new_value, ret;
+ int ret;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
@@ -522,8 +525,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net, sctp.udp_port);
unsigned int min = *(unsigned int *)ctl->extra1;
unsigned int max = *(unsigned int *)ctl->extra2;
+ int new_value = net->sctp.udp_port;
struct ctl_table tbl;
- int ret, new_value;
+ int ret;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
@@ -541,18 +545,20 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_udp_port(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
return -EINVAL;
mutex_lock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
- net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
- sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
- if (new_value) {
- ret = sctp_udp_sock_start(net);
- if (ret)
- net->sctp.udp_port = 0;
+ if (new_value != net->sctp.udp_port) {
+ net->sctp.udp_port = new_value;
+ sctp_udp_sock_stop(net);
+ if (new_value) {
+ ret = sctp_udp_sock_start(net);
+ if (ret)
+ net->sctp.udp_port = 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Update the value in the control socket */
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
+ release_sock(sk);
}
-
- /* Update the value in the control socket */
- lock_sock(sk);
- sctp_sk(sk)->udp_port = htons(net->sctp.udp_port);
- release_sock(sk);
mutex_unlock(&sctp_sysctl_mutex);
}
@@ -564,8 +570,9 @@ static int proc_sctp_do_probe_interval(const struct ctl_table *ctl, int write,
{
struct net *net = container_of(ctl->data, struct net,
sctp.probe_interval);
+ int new_value = net->sctp.probe_interval;
struct ctl_table tbl;
- int ret, new_value;
+ int ret;
memset(&tbl, 0, sizeof(struct ctl_table));
tbl.maxlen = sizeof(unsigned int);
--
2.56.1.708.g77570a6a1d-goog
reply other threads:[~2026-11-19 17:03 UTC|newest]
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