From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] Security: Add prctl(PR_{GET,SET}_NETWORK) interface. (v2)
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 23:43:58 -0500
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References: <20091218030056.GC3047@heat>
            <20091218032957.GA23514@heat>
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Cc: Mark Seaborn <mrs@mythic-beasts.com>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, David Lang <david@lang.hm>,
	Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@gmail.com>,
	Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>,
	"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@cscott.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Bernie Innocenti <bernie@codewiz.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>,
	=?iso-8859-1?Q?Am=E9rico?= Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>
To: Michael Stone <michael@laptop.org>
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On Thu, 17 Dec 2009 22:29:57 EST, Michael Stone said:
> Daniel Bernstein has observed [1] that security-conscious userland processes
> may benefit from the ability to irrevocably remove their ability to create,
> bind, connect to, or send messages except in the case of previously connected
> sockets or AF_UNIX filesystem sockets. We provide this facility by implementing
> support for a new prctl(PR_SET_NETWORK) flag named PR_NETWORK_OFF.

Dan does indeed have a point - but is this better achieved via either
the already-existing LSM interfaces (opening the stacking-LSM can of worms
again), or the SECCOMP framework?  We already have 2 other ways to turn off
stuff, do we really want a third way?

Alternatively, could a more generalized prctl interface be leveraged to handle
SECCOMP, and/or other targeted things that want to stack with LSM?


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