From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Paul Moore Subject: Re: [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK packet Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 17:24:50 -0400 Message-ID: <2921619.mqaHl5PnPI@sifl> References: <1725553.maWFXblPLa@sifl> <3505145.vfXt1x4t0P@sifl> <20130408.171512.973275376690340387.davem@davemloft.net> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Cc: eric.dumazet@gmail.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, mvadkert@redhat.com, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: David Miller Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20130408.171512.973275376690340387.davem@davemloft.net> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Monday, April 08, 2013 05:15:12 PM David Miller wrote: > From: Paul Moore > Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 17:10:43 -0400 > > > On Monday, April 08, 2013 02:32:00 PM Paul Moore wrote: > >> On Monday, April 08, 2013 02:12:01 PM Paul Moore wrote: > >> > On Monday, April 08, 2013 10:47:47 AM Eric Dumazet wrote: > >> > > On Mon, 2013-04-08 at 13:40 -0400, Paul Moore wrote: > >> > > > Sort of a similar problem, but not really the same. Also, > >> > > > arguably, > >> > > > there is no real associated sock/socket for a RST so orphaning the > >> > > > packet makes sense. In the case of a SYNACK we can, and should, > >> > > > associate the packet with a sock/socket. > >> > > > >> > > What is the intent ? > >> > > >> > We have to do a number of painful things in SELinux because we aren't > >> > allowed a proper security blob (void *security) in a sk_buff. One of > >> > those things ... > >> > >> Actually, I wonder if this problem means it is a good time to revisit the > >> no- security-blob-in-sk_buff decision? The management of the blob would > >> be hidden behind the LSM hooks like everything else and it would have a > >> number of advantages including making problems like we are seeing here > >> easier to fix or avoid entirely. It would also make life much easier for > >> those of working on LSM stuff and it would pave the way for including > >> network access controls in the stacked-LSM stuff Casey is kicking around. > > > > No comment, or am I just too anxious? > > There is no way I'm putting LSM overhead into sk_buff, it's already > too big. If the void pointer is wrapped by a #ifdef (plenty of precedence for that) and the management of that pointer is handled by LSM hooks why is it a concern? I apologize for pushing on the issue, but I'm having a hard time reconciling the reason for the "no" with the comments/decisions about the regression fix; at present there seems to be a level of contradiction between the two. > I didn't comment because it wasn't worth a comment, but since you're > pushing me on the issue, I'll make the no explicit. -- paul moore security and virtualization @ redhat