From: Justin Iurman <justin.iurman@gmail.com>
To: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>,
Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>,
davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v5 6/7] ipv6: Enforce Extension Header ordering
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2026 19:07:13 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <31232399-4cf4-49ea-b769-84aceca61dc9@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <willemdebruijn.kernel.19061eebdb902@gmail.com>
On 1/29/26 06:18, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
> Tom Herbert wrote:
>> RFC8200 highly recommends that different Extension Headers be send in
>> a prescibed order and all Extension Header types occur at most once
>> in a packet with the exception of Destination Options that may
>> occur twice. This patch enforces the ordering be folowed in received
>> packets.
>>
>> The allowed order of Extension Headers is:
>>
>> IPv6 header
>> Hop-by-Hop Options header
>> Destination Options before the Routing Header
>> Routing header
>> Fragment header
>> Authentication header
>> Encapsulating Security Payload header
>> Destination Options header
>> Upper-Layer header
>>
>> Each Extension Header may be present only once in a packet.
>>
>> net.ipv6.enforce_ext_hdr_order is a sysctl to enable or disable
>> enforcement of xtension Header order. If it is set to zero then
>
> [e]xtension. There are a few more typos in the various commit
> messages.
>
>> Extension Header order and number of occurences is not checked
>> in receive processeing (except for Hop-by-Hop Options that
>> must be the first Extension Header and can only occur once in
>> a packet.
>
> RFC 8200 also states
>
> "IPv6 nodes must accept and attempt to process extension headers in
> any order and occurring any number of times in the same packet,
> except for the Hop-by-Hop Options header, which is restricted to
> appear immediately after an IPv6 header only. Nonetheless, it is
> strongly advised that sources of IPv6 packets adhere to the above
> recommended order until and unless subsequent specifications revise
> that recommendation."
>
> A case of be strict in what you send, liberal in what you accept.
>
> This new sysctl has a chance of breaking existing users.
Willem,
Note that RFC8200 does not use normative language, which is part of the
problem. It could theoretically break existing users, but I don't think
it will in reality. For that, you would need users to beginning with
(joke aside, I like EHs). Anyway, if the order is enforced at sending,
why would any receiver accept a different order? In this case, being
liberal in what we accept might be a security risk (see below).
> The series as a whole is framed as a security improvement. Does
> enforcing order help with that?
IMHO, any packet with EHs in a different order than the one specified in
RFC8200 looks suspicious. So, yes.
Justin
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Herbert <tom@herbertland.com>
>> ---
>> include/net/netns/ipv6.h | 1 +
>> include/net/protocol.h | 14 +++++++++++++
>> net/ipv6/af_inet6.c | 1 +
>> net/ipv6/exthdrs.c | 2 ++
>> net/ipv6/ip6_input.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> net/ipv6/reassembly.c | 1 +
>> net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c | 7 +++++++
>> net/ipv6/xfrm6_protocol.c | 2 ++
>> 8 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
>> index 34bdb1308e8f..2db56718ea60 100644
>> --- a/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
>> +++ b/include/net/netns/ipv6.h
>> @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct netns_sysctl_ipv6 {
>> u8 fib_notify_on_flag_change;
>> u8 icmpv6_error_anycast_as_unicast;
>> u8 icmpv6_errors_extension_mask;
>> + u8 enforce_ext_hdr_order;
>> };
>>
>> struct netns_ipv6 {
>> diff --git a/include/net/protocol.h b/include/net/protocol.h
>> index b2499f88f8f8..0f1676625570 100644
>> --- a/include/net/protocol.h
>> +++ b/include/net/protocol.h
>> @@ -50,6 +50,19 @@ struct net_protocol {
>> };
>>
>> #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> +
>> +/* Order of extension headers as prescribed in RFC8200. The ordering and
>> + * number of extension headers in a packet can be enforced in IPv6 receive
>> + * processing.
>> + */
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_HOP BIT(0)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST_BEFORE_RH BIT(1)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_ROUTING BIT(2)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_FRAGMENT BIT(3)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_AUTH BIT(4)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_ESP BIT(5)
>> +#define IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST BIT(6)
>> +
>> struct inet6_protocol {
>> int (*handler)(struct sk_buff *skb);
>>
>> @@ -61,6 +74,7 @@ struct inet6_protocol {
>>
>> unsigned int flags; /* INET6_PROTO_xxx */
>> u32 secret;
>> + u32 ext_hdr_order;
>> };
>>
>> #define INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY 0x1
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
>> index bd29840659f3..43097360ce64 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/af_inet6.c
>> @@ -980,6 +980,7 @@ static int __net_init inet6_net_init(struct net *net)
>> net->ipv6.sysctl.max_dst_opts_len = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_DST_OPTS_LEN;
>> net->ipv6.sysctl.max_hbh_opts_len = IP6_DEFAULT_MAX_HBH_OPTS_LEN;
>> net->ipv6.sysctl.fib_notify_on_flag_change = 0;
>> + net->ipv6.sysctl.enforce_ext_hdr_order = 1;
>> atomic_set(&net->ipv6.fib6_sernum, 1);
>>
>> net->ipv6.sysctl.ioam6_id = IOAM6_DEFAULT_ID;
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
>> index 6925cfad94d2..4ab94c8cddb9 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/exthdrs.c
>> @@ -845,11 +845,13 @@ static int ipv6_rthdr_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> static const struct inet6_protocol rthdr_protocol = {
>> .handler = ipv6_rthdr_rcv,
>> .flags = INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY,
>> + .ext_hdr_order = IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_ROUTING,
>> };
>>
>> static const struct inet6_protocol destopt_protocol = {
>> .handler = ipv6_destopt_rcv,
>> .flags = INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY,
>> + .ext_hdr_order = IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST,
>> };
>>
>> static const struct inet6_protocol nodata_protocol = {
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
>> index 168ec07e31cc..ab921c0a94af 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/ip6_input.c
>> @@ -355,6 +355,27 @@ void ipv6_list_rcv(struct list_head *head, struct packet_type *pt,
>> ip6_sublist_rcv(&sublist, curr_dev, curr_net);
>> }
>>
>> +static u32 check_dst_opts_before_rh(const struct inet6_protocol *ipprot,
>> + u32 ext_hdrs)
>> +{
>> + /* Check if Destination Options before the Routing Header are
>> + * present.
>> + */
>> + if (ipprot->ext_hdr_order != IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_ROUTING ||
>> + !(ext_hdrs | IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST))
>> + return ext_hdrs;
>> +
>> + /* We have Destination Options before the Routing Header. Set
>> + * the mask of recived extension headers to reflect that. We promote
>> + * the bit from indicating just Destination Options present to
>> + * Destination Options before the Routing Header being present
>> + */
>> + ext_hdrs = (ext_hdrs & ~IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST) |
>> + IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_DEST_BEFORE_RH;
>> +
>> + return ext_hdrs;
>> +}
>> +
>> INDIRECT_CALLABLE_DECLARE(int tcp_v6_rcv(struct sk_buff *));
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -366,6 +387,7 @@ void ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr,
>> const struct inet6_protocol *ipprot;
>> struct inet6_dev *idev;
>> unsigned int nhoff;
>> + u32 ext_hdrs = 0;
>> SKB_DR(reason);
>> bool raw;
>>
>> @@ -427,6 +449,26 @@ void ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr,
>> goto discard;
>> }
>> }
>> +
>> + if (ipprot->ext_hdr_order &&
>> + READ_ONCE(net->ipv6.sysctl.enforce_ext_hdr_order)) {
>> + /* The protocol is an extension header and EH ordering
>> + * is being enforced. Discard packet if we've already
>> + * seen this EH or one that is lower in the order list
>> + */
>> + if (ipprot->ext_hdr_order <= ext_hdrs) {
>> + /* Check if there's Destination Options
>> + * before the Routing Header
>> + */
>> + ext_hdrs = check_dst_opts_before_rh(ipprot,
>> + ext_hdrs);
>> + if (ipprot->ext_hdr_order <= ext_hdrs)
>> + goto discard;
>> + }
>> +
>> + ext_hdrs |= ipprot->ext_hdr_order;
>> + }
>> +
>> if (!(ipprot->flags & INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY)) {
>> if (!xfrm6_policy_check(NULL, XFRM_POLICY_IN, skb)) {
>> SKB_DR_SET(reason, XFRM_POLICY);
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
>> index 25ec8001898d..91dba72c5a3c 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/reassembly.c
>> @@ -414,6 +414,7 @@ static int ipv6_frag_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
>> static const struct inet6_protocol frag_protocol = {
>> .handler = ipv6_frag_rcv,
>> .flags = INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY,
>> + .ext_hdr_order = IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_FRAGMENT,
>> };
>>
>> #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c
>> index d2cd33e2698d..543b6acdb11d 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/sysctl_net_ipv6.c
>> @@ -213,6 +213,13 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv6_table_template[] = {
>> .proc_handler = proc_doulongvec_minmax,
>> .extra2 = &ioam6_id_wide_max,
>> },
>> + {
>> + .procname = "enforce_ext_hdr_order",
>> + .data = &init_net.ipv6.sysctl.enforce_ext_hdr_order,
>> + .maxlen = sizeof(u8),
>> + .mode = 0644,
>> + .proc_handler = proc_dou8vec_minmax,
>> + },
>> };
>>
>> static struct ctl_table ipv6_rotable[] = {
>> diff --git a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_protocol.c b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_protocol.c
>> index ea2f805d3b01..5826edf67f64 100644
>> --- a/net/ipv6/xfrm6_protocol.c
>> +++ b/net/ipv6/xfrm6_protocol.c
>> @@ -197,12 +197,14 @@ static const struct inet6_protocol esp6_protocol = {
>> .handler = xfrm6_esp_rcv,
>> .err_handler = xfrm6_esp_err,
>> .flags = INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY,
>> + .ext_hdr_order = IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_ESP,
>> };
>>
>> static const struct inet6_protocol ah6_protocol = {
>> .handler = xfrm6_ah_rcv,
>> .err_handler = xfrm6_ah_err,
>> .flags = INET6_PROTO_NOPOLICY,
>> + .ext_hdr_order = IPV6_EXT_HDR_ORDER_AUTH
>> };
>>
>> static const struct inet6_protocol ipcomp6_protocol = {
>> --
>> 2.43.0
>>
>
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-29 18:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-26 19:48 [PATCH net-next v5 0/7] ipv6: Address ext hdr DoS vulnerabilities Tom Herbert
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 1/7] ipv6: Check of max HBH or DestOp sysctl is zero and drop if it is Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 17:49 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-27 17:50 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 2/7] ipv6: Cleanup IPv6 TLV definitions Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 17:51 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-29 5:30 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-01-29 18:13 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-29 19:01 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-01-30 17:22 ` Tom Herbert
2026-02-01 8:48 ` Justin Iurman
2026-02-02 22:37 ` Tom Herbert
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 3/7] ipv6: Add case for IPV6_TLV_TNL_ENCAP_LIMIT in EH TLV switch Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 17:52 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-29 5:31 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 4/7] ipv6: Set HBH and DestOpt limits to 2 Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 17:55 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 5/7] ipv6: Document defaults for max_{dst|hbh}_opts_number sysctls Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 17:57 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 6/7] ipv6: Enforce Extension Header ordering Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 19:48 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-29 5:18 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-01-29 18:07 ` Justin Iurman [this message]
2026-01-29 19:05 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-01-29 20:13 ` Justin Iurman
2026-01-30 17:06 ` Tom Herbert
2026-01-31 17:24 ` Willem de Bruijn
2026-02-02 22:21 ` Tom Herbert
2026-01-26 19:48 ` [PATCH net-next v5 7/7] ipv6: Document enforce_ext_hdr_order sysctl Tom Herbert
2026-01-27 18:00 ` Justin Iurman
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