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From: Tomas Carnecky <tom@dbservice.com>
To: linux-os@analogic.com
Cc: Bill Davidsen <davidsen@tmr.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>,
	Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>,
	Bryan Fulton <bryan@coverity.com>,
	netdev@oss.sgi.com, netfilter-devel@lists.netfilter.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Coverity] Untrusted user data in kernel
Date: Fri, 17 Dec 2004 20:18:15 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <41C330F7.4000806@dbservice.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.61.0412171108340.4216@chaos.analogic.com>

linux-os wrote:
> On Fri, 17 Dec 2004, Bill Davidsen wrote:
> 
>> James Morris wrote:
>>
>>> On Fri, 17 Dec 2004, Patrick McHardy wrote:
 >>>
>>> That's what I meant, you need the capability to do anything bad :-)
>>
>>
>> Are you saying that processes with capability don't make mistakes? 
>> This isn't a bug related to untrusted users doing privileged 
>> operations, it's a case of using unchecked user data.
>>
> 
> But isn't there always the possibility of "unchecked user data"?
> I can, as root, do `cp /dev/zero /dev/mem` and have the most
> spectacular crask you've evet seen. I can even make my file-
> systems unrecoverable.
> 

But the difference between you example (cp /dev/zero /dev/mem) and 
passing unchecked data to the kernel is... you _can_ check the data and 
do something about it if you discover that the data is not valid/within 
a range/whatever even if the user has full permissions.
No same person would do a 'cp /dev/zero /dev/mem', but passing bad data 
is more likely to happen, badly written userspace configuration tools etc.

tom

  parent reply	other threads:[~2004-12-17 19:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <1103247211.3071.74.camel@localhost.localdomain>
2004-12-17  5:15 ` [Coverity] Untrusted user data in kernel James Morris
2004-12-17  5:25   ` Patrick McHardy
2004-12-17  6:45     ` James Morris
2004-12-17 13:18       ` Tomas Carnecky
2004-12-17 19:16         ` David S. Miller
2004-12-17 19:34           ` Tomas Carnecky
2004-12-17 19:30             ` David S. Miller
2004-12-17 15:47       ` Bill Davidsen
2004-12-17 16:11         ` linux-os
2004-12-17 16:31           ` Oliver Neukum
2004-12-17 18:37           ` Bill Davidsen
2004-12-17 19:18           ` Tomas Carnecky [this message]
2004-12-17 19:30             ` Oliver Neukum
2004-12-17 19:39               ` Tomas Carnecky
2004-12-18  1:42           ` Horst von Brand
2004-12-17 15:10   ` Pavel Machek
2004-12-17 15:38     ` James Morris

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