From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Zach Brown Subject: Re: [RFC 1/4] kevent: core files. Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2006 12:01:28 -0700 Message-ID: <44CA5F08.3080500@oracle.com> References: <20060709132446.GB29435@2ka.mipt.ru> <20060724.231708.01289489.davem@davemloft.net> <44C91192.4090303@oracle.com> <20060727205806.GD16971@kvack.org> <44C933D2.4040406@oracle.com> <20060727220238.GE16971@kvack.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: David Miller , Evgeniy Polyakov , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org Return-path: Received: from tetsuo.zabbo.net ([207.173.201.20]:5099 "EHLO tetsuo.zabbo.net") by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1161239AbWG1TB3 (ORCPT ); Fri, 28 Jul 2006 15:01:29 -0400 To: Benjamin LaHaise In-Reply-To: <20060727220238.GE16971@kvack.org> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org > Things were like that at one point in time, but file descriptors turn out > to introduce a huge gaping security hole with SUID programs. The problem > is that any event context is closely tied to the address space of the > thread issuing the syscalls, and file descriptors do not have this close > binding. Can you go into that hole in more detail? > Except that you're not usually pulling a full ring worth of events at a > time, more often just one. OK, but then to wait for it you were already sleeping in the kernel, right? Clearly we should port httpd to kevents and take some measurements :) - z