From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@trustedcs.com
Subject: [PATCH 1/3] secid reconciliation-v01
Date: Thu, 24 Aug 2006 12:50:51 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <44EDE6FB.2060501@trustedcs.com> (raw)
Currently a packet accumulates multiple security identifiers, each of a
different class, as it enters the system. This patch set reconciles these
identifiers into a single identifier while also allowing LSM (SELinux is
addressed in this patch set) to impose flow control checks based on the
identifiers.
The reconciliation steps for SELinux are explained in the Labeled Networking
document at:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=linux-netdev&m=115136637800361&w=2
with the change that SELinux transition rules are used when available
to arrive at the new secid.
The following are the identifiers handled here:
1. secmark on the skb
2. xfrm security identifier associated with the skb if it used any xfrms,
a zero secid otherwise.
This patch: Add new flask definitions to SELinux
Adds a new avperm "come_thru" to arbitrate among the identifiers on the
inbound (input/forward). Also adds a new avperm "go_thru" to enable flow
control checks on the outbound (output/forward), addressed in a later
patch.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h | 2 ++
security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h | 2 ++
2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
--- net-2.6.19.orig/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-08-24 09:19:13.000000000 -0500
+++ net-2.6.19.sid1/security/selinux/include/av_permissions.h 2006-08-24 09:43:09.000000000 -0500
@@ -962,6 +962,8 @@
#define PACKET__SEND 0x00000001UL
#define PACKET__RECV 0x00000002UL
#define PACKET__RELABELTO 0x00000004UL
+#define PACKET__FLOW_IN 0x00000008UL
+#define PACKET__FLOW_OUT 0x00000010UL
#define KEY__VIEW 0x00000001UL
#define KEY__READ 0x00000002UL
--- net-2.6.19.orig/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-08-24 09:19:13.000000000 -0500
+++ net-2.6.19.sid1/security/selinux/include/av_perm_to_string.h 2006-08-24 09:43:09.000000000 -0500
@@ -245,6 +245,8 @@
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, "send")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RECV, "recv")
S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, "relabelto")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_IN, "flow_in")
+ S_(SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, "flow_out")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, "view")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__READ, "read")
S_(SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__WRITE, "write")
reply other threads:[~2006-08-24 17:51 UTC|newest]
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