From: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@trustedcs.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Cc: jmorris@namei.org, sds@tycho.nsa.gov, chanson@trustedcs.com
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Enforcement for SELinux
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2006 11:50:58 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <45019F72.2050708@trustedcs.com> (raw)
This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks.
Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
security/selinux/hooks.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------
security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 5 +
security/selinux/ss/mls.c | 2
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 2
security/selinux/xfrm.c | 28 ++++++
5 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a66c4c..044e452 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3449,8 +3449,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
}
+ err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
+
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3489,10 +3493,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
goto out;
err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3626,13 +3626,16 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
return 0;
}
- err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
- BUG_ON(err);
+ if (selinux_compat_net) {
+ err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
+ BUG_ON(err);
- if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
- req->secid = sksec->sid;
- return 0;
- }
+ if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+ req->secid = sksec->sid;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ } else
+ peersid = skb->secmark;
err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
if (err)
@@ -3662,6 +3665,78 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
fl->secid = req->secid;
}
+static int selinux_skb_policy_check(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
+{
+ u32 xfrm_sid, trans_sid;
+ int err;
+
+ if (selinux_compat_net)
+ return 1;
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
+ BUG_ON(err);
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (xfrm_sid) {
+ err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+ }
+
+ /* See if CIPSO can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+
+out:
+ return err ? 0 : 1;
+};
+
+static int selinux_skb_netfilter_check(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 nf_secid)
+{
+ u32 xfrm_sid;
+ u32 trans_sid;
+ int err;
+
+ if (selinux_compat_net)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!skb->secmark && skb->sk) {
+ struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+ skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+ }
+
+ selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, xfrm_sid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (xfrm_sid) {
+ err = security_transition_sid(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, &trans_sid);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ skb->secmark = trans_sid;
+ }
+
+ err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+ PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+out:
+ /* Signal postroute_last that we are done with this skb */
+ skb->secmark = SECSID_WILD;
+
+ return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
int err = 0;
@@ -3700,7 +3775,8 @@ out:
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct net_device *dev,
struct avc_audit_data *ad,
u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
{
@@ -3710,6 +3786,9 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
struct inode *inode;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
+ if (!sk)
+ goto out;
+
sock = sk->sk_socket;
if (!sock)
goto out;
@@ -3768,7 +3847,11 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
send_perm, ad);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
}
+
+ err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, ad);
out:
return err;
}
@@ -3782,18 +3865,13 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
{
char *addrp;
int len, err = 0;
- struct sock *sk;
struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
- struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
- sk = skb->sk;
- if (!sk)
+ if (!selinux_compat_net && skb->secmark == SECSID_WILD)
goto out;
- sksec = sk->sk_security;
-
AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
ad.u.net.family = family;
@@ -3803,16 +3881,11 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
goto out;
if (selinux_compat_net)
- err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
+ err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(skb->sk, skb, dev, &ad,
family, addrp, len);
else
- err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
- PACKET__SEND, &ad);
-
- if (err)
- goto out;
-
- err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+ err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+ SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
out:
return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
}
@@ -4719,6 +4792,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
.inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
.req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
+ .skb_policy_check = selinux_skb_policy_check,
+ .skb_netfilter_check = selinux_skb_netfilter_check,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 81eb598..ed07f92 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
#else
static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct avc_audit_data *ad)
@@ -68,6 +69,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
*sid = SECSID_NULL;
return 0;
}
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
#endif
#endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index 119bd60..c551def 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -548,6 +548,8 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct context *scon
}
}
}
+ else if (tclass == SECCLASS_PACKET)
+ return mls_copy_context(newcontext, scontext);
/* Fallthrough */
case AVTAB_CHANGE:
if (tclass == SECCLASS_PROCESS)
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index 27ee28c..f9cd484 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -832,6 +832,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
if (!ss_initialized) {
switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PACKET:
case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
*out_sid = ssid;
break;
@@ -876,6 +877,7 @@ static int security_compute_sid(u32 ssid
/* Set the role and type to default values. */
switch (tclass) {
+ case SECCLASS_PACKET:
case SECCLASS_PROCESS:
/* Use the current role and type of process. */
newcontext.role = scontext->role;
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3e742b8..3a68723 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct
}
/*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks/returns the xfrm sid for the incoming packet.
*/
int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -193,6 +193,32 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
}
/*
+ * LSM hook implementation that returns the xfrm sid for the outgoing packet.
+ */
+
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+ *sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+ dst = skb->dst;
+ if (dst) {
+ struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+ for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+ dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+ struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+ if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+ struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+ *sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
* CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
*/
next reply other threads:[~2006-09-08 16:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2006-09-08 16:50 Venkat Yekkirala [this message]
2006-09-18 18:37 ` [PATCH 7/7] secid reconciliation-v02: Enforcement for SELinux James Morris
2006-09-18 18:55 ` James Morris
2006-09-18 22:26 ` Paul Moore
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2006-09-18 19:15 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-20 21:08 Venkat Yekkirala
2006-09-20 22:46 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=45019F72.2050708@trustedcs.com \
--to=vyekkirala@trustedcs.com \
--cc=chanson@trustedcs.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@tycho.nsa.gov \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).