[PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Venkat Yekkirala]

This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.

This also now keeps track of the peersid thru the establishment
of a connection on the server (tracking peersid on the client
is covered later in this patch set).

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
---
 security/selinux/hooks.c        |  148 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 security/selinux/include/xfrm.h |   11 +-
 security/selinux/xfrm.c         |   66 +++++--------
 3 files changed, 150 insertions(+), 75 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 5a66c4c..fc65cc7 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -3449,8 +3449,12 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(s
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(sock_sid, port_sid,
 				   sock_class, recv_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
 
+	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sock_sid, skb, ad);
+
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3489,10 +3493,6 @@ static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(s
 		goto out;
 
 	err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, &ad);
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
-
-	err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
 out:	
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3505,7 +3505,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_str
 	u32 scontext_len;
 	struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
-	u32 peer_sid = 0;
+	u32 peer_sid;
 
 	isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
 
@@ -3516,8 +3516,10 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_str
 	}
 	else if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
 		peer_sid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_stream(sock);
-		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
-			peer_sid = selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(sock->sk);
+		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
+			peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
+		}
 		if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
 			err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
 			goto out;
@@ -3550,7 +3552,8 @@ out:	
 	return err;
 }
 
-static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+				struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
 {
 	u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
 	int err = 0;
@@ -3559,8 +3562,12 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgr
 		selinux_get_inode_sid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
 	else if (skb) {
 		peer_secid = selinux_netlbl_socket_getpeersec_dgram(skb);
-		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
-			peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+		if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			if (selinux_compat_net)
+				peer_secid = selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(skb);
+			else
+				peer_secid = skb->secmark;
+		}
 	}
 
 	if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
@@ -3626,19 +3633,24 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(str
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
-	BUG_ON(err);
+	if (selinux_compat_net) {
+		err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &peersid, 0);
+		BUG_ON(err);
 
-	if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
-		req->secid = sksec->sid;
-		return 0;
-	}
+		if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
+			req->secid = sksec->sid;
+			req->peer_secid = 0;
+			return 0;
+		}
+	} else
+		peersid = skb->secmark;
 
 	err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
 	req->secid = newsid;
+	req->peer_secid = peersid;
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -3648,6 +3660,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struc
 	struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
 
 	newsksec->sid = req->secid;
+	newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
 	/* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
 	   new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
 	   So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
@@ -3662,6 +3675,66 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(co
 	fl->secid = req->secid;
 }
 
+static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
+{
+	u32 xfrm_sid;
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
+	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
+	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
+	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
+	 */
+	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
+		return 1;
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
+	BUG_ON(err);
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	if (xfrm_sid)
+		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+
+	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
+
+out:
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+};
+
+static int selinux_skb_flow_out(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 nf_secid)
+{
+	int err;
+
+	if (selinux_compat_net)
+		return 1;
+
+	if (!skb->secmark) {
+		u32 xfrm_sid;
+
+		selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
+
+		if (xfrm_sid)
+			skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+		else if (skb->sk) {
+			struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
+			skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+		}
+	}
+
+	err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, nf_secid, SECCLASS_PACKET,
+				PACKET__FLOW_OUT, NULL);
+
+	return err ? 0 : 1;
+}
+
 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	int err = 0;
@@ -3700,7 +3773,8 @@ out:
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
 
-static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct net_device *dev,
+static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+					    struct net_device *dev,
 					    struct avc_audit_data *ad,
 					    u16 family, char *addrp, int len)
 {
@@ -3710,6 +3784,9 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 	struct inode *inode;
 	struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 
+	if (!sk)
+		goto out;
+
 	sock = sk->sk_socket;
 	if (!sock)
 		goto out;
@@ -3768,7 +3845,11 @@ static int selinux_ip_postroute_last_com
 
 		err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, port_sid, isec->sclass,
 				   send_perm, ad);
+		if (err)
+			goto out;
 	}
+
+	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(isec->sid, skb, ad);
 out:
 	return err;
 }
@@ -3782,17 +3863,9 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 {
 	char *addrp;
 	int len, err = 0;
-	struct sock *sk;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = *pskb;
 	struct avc_audit_data ad;
 	struct net_device *dev = (struct net_device *)out;
-	struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
-
-	sk = skb->sk;
-	if (!sk)
-		goto out;
-
-	sksec = sk->sk_security;
 
 	AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
 	ad.u.net.netif = dev->name;
@@ -3803,16 +3876,25 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute
 		goto out;
 
 	if (selinux_compat_net)
-		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(sk, dev, &ad,
+		err = selinux_ip_postroute_last_compat(skb->sk, skb, dev, &ad,
 						       family, addrp, len);
-	else
-		err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
-				   PACKET__SEND, &ad);
+	else {
+		if (!skb->secmark) {
+			u32 xfrm_sid;
 
-	if (err)
-		goto out;
+			selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
 
-	err = selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
+			if (xfrm_sid)
+				skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
+			else if (skb->sk) {
+				struct sk_security_struct *sksec =
+						skb->sk->sk_security;
+				skb->secmark = sksec->sid;
+			}
+		}
+		err = avc_has_perm(skb->secmark, SECINITSID_UNLABELED,
+				   SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FLOW_OUT, &ad);
+	}
 out:
 	return err ? NF_DROP : NF_ACCEPT;
 }
@@ -4719,6 +4801,8 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
 	.inet_conn_request =		selinux_inet_conn_request,
 	.inet_csk_clone =		selinux_inet_csk_clone,
 	.req_classify_flow =		selinux_req_classify_flow,
+	.skb_flow_in =			selinux_skb_flow_in,
+	.skb_flow_out =			selinux_skb_flow_out,
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
 	.xfrm_policy_alloc_security =	selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index 81eb598..b1e8425 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -38,9 +38,9 @@ int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 sid, s
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
 int selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad);
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk);
 u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb);
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid);
 #else
 static inline int selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(u32 isec_sid, struct sk_buff *skb,
 			struct avc_audit_data *ad)
@@ -54,11 +54,6 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_postroute
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	return SECSID_NULL;
-}
-
 static inline int selinux_socket_getpeer_dgram(struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	return SECSID_NULL;
@@ -68,6 +63,10 @@ static inline int selinux_xfrm_decode_se
 	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
 	return 0;
 }
+static inline void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+}
 #endif
 
 #endif /* _SELINUX_XFRM_H_ */
diff --git a/security/selinux/xfrm.c b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
index 3e742b8..aae9f8f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/xfrm.c
+++ b/security/selinux/xfrm.c
@@ -155,7 +155,8 @@ int selinux_xfrm_flow_state_match(struct
 }
 
 /*
- * LSM hook implementation that determines the sid for the session.
+ * LSM hook implementation that checks and/or returns the xfrm sid for the
+ * incoming packet.
  */
 
 int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall)
@@ -193,6 +194,32 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct s
 }
 
 /*
+ * LSM hook implementation that returns the xfrm sid for the outgoing packet.
+ */
+
+void selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid)
+{
+	struct dst_entry *dst;
+
+	*sid = SECSID_NULL;
+
+	dst = skb->dst;
+	if (dst) {
+		struct dst_entry *dst_test;
+		for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
+			dst_test = dst_test->child) {
+			struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
+
+			if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
+				struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
+				*sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+/*
  * Security blob allocation for xfrm_policy and xfrm_state
  * CTX does not have a meaningful value on input
  */
@@ -391,43 +418,8 @@ void selinux_xfrm_state_free(struct xfrm
 }
 
 /*
- * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a connected
- * (sk->sk_state == TCP_ESTABLISHED) TCP socket based on its security
- * association used to connect to the remote socket.
- *
- * Retrieve via getsockopt SO_PEERSEC.
- */
-u32 selinux_socket_getpeer_stream(struct sock *sk)
-{
-	struct dst_entry *dst, *dst_test;
-	u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
-
-	if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED)
-		goto out;
-
-	dst = sk_dst_get(sk);
-	if (!dst)
-		goto out;
-
- 	for (dst_test = dst; dst_test != 0;
-      	     dst_test = dst_test->child) {
-		struct xfrm_state *x = dst_test->xfrm;
-
- 		if (x && selinux_authorizable_xfrm(x)) {
-	 	 	struct xfrm_sec_ctx *ctx = x->security;
-			peer_sid = ctx->ctx_sid;
-			break;
-		}
-	}
-	dst_release(dst);
-
-out:
-	return peer_sid;
-}
-
-/*
  * SELinux internal function to retrieve the context of a UDP packet
- * based on its security association used to connect to the remote socket.
+ * based on its security association.
  *
  * Retrieve via setsockopt IP_PASSSEC and recvmsg with control message
  * type SCM_SECURITY.

Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Paul Moore]

Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
> This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
> as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.
> 
> This also now keeps track of the peersid thru the establishment
> of a connection on the server (tracking peersid on the client
> is covered later in this patch set).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
> 
> {snip}
>
> +static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
> +{
> +	u32 xfrm_sid;
> +	int err;
> +
> +	if (selinux_compat_net)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
> +	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
> +	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
> +	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
> +	 */
> +	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
> +		return 1;
> +
> +	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
> +	BUG_ON(err);

Just a quick question that has been nagging me for awhile - any
particular reason why this is a BUG_ON() and not an "if (err) goto out;"?

> +	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
> +					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto out;
> +
> +	if (xfrm_sid)
> +		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
> +
> +	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
> +
> +out:
> +	return err ? 0 : 1;
> +};

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Stephen Smalley]

On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 12:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
> > This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
> > as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.
> > 
> > This also now keeps track of the peersid thru the establishment
> > of a connection on the server (tracking peersid on the client
> > is covered later in this patch set).
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
> > 
> > {snip}
> >
> > +static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
> > +{
> > +	u32 xfrm_sid;
> > +	int err;
> > +
> > +	if (selinux_compat_net)
> > +		return 1;
> > +
> > +	/*
> > +	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
> > +	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
> > +	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
> > +	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
> > +	 */
> > +	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
> > +		return 1;
> > +
> > +	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
> > +	BUG_ON(err);
> 
> Just a quick question that has been nagging me for awhile - any
> particular reason why this is a BUG_ON() and not an "if (err) goto out;"?

It appears that selinux_xfrm_decode_session() can only legitimately
return an error if the last argument (ckall) is non-zero.
security_skb_classify_flow() was doing the same thing prior to this
patch series.  It would be clearer if there were two separate interfaces
that internally use the same helper, with one of the functions returning
void.

> > +	err = avc_has_perm(xfrm_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
> > +					PACKET__FLOW_IN, NULL);
> > +	if (err)
> > +		goto out;
> > +
> > +	if (xfrm_sid)
> > +		skb->secmark = xfrm_sid;
> > +
> > +	/* See if NetLabel can flow in thru the current secmark here */
> > +
> > +out:
> > +	return err ? 0 : 1;
> > +};
> 
-- 
Stephen Smalley
National Security Agency

Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[James Morris]

On Mon, 2 Oct 2006, Stephen Smalley wrote:

> It appears that selinux_xfrm_decode_session() can only legitimately
> return an error if the last argument (ckall) is non-zero.
> security_skb_classify_flow() was doing the same thing prior to this
> patch series.  It would be clearer if there were two separate interfaces
> that internally use the same helper, with one of the functions returning
> void.

Ok, this can be a followup patch request (and not block merging).

- James
-- 
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>

Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Paul Moore]

Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On Mon, 2006-10-02 at 12:12 -0400, Paul Moore wrote:
> 
>>Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
>>
>>>This defines SELinux enforcement of the 2 new LSM hooks as well
>>>as related changes elsewhere in the SELinux code.
>>>
>>>This also now keeps track of the peersid thru the establishment
>>>of a connection on the server (tracking peersid on the client
>>>is covered later in this patch set).
>>>
>>>Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
>>>
>>>{snip}
>>>
>>>+static int selinux_skb_flow_in(struct sk_buff *skb, unsigned short family)
>>>+{
>>>+	u32 xfrm_sid;
>>>+	int err;
>>>+
>>>+	if (selinux_compat_net)
>>>+		return 1;
>>>+
>>>+	/*
>>>+	 * loopback traffic already labeled and
>>>+	 * flow-controlled on outbound. We may
>>>+	 * need to flow-control on the inbound
>>>+	 * as well if there's ever a use-case for it.
>>>+	 */
>>>+	if (skb->dev == &loopback_dev)
>>>+		return 1;
>>>+
>>>+	err = selinux_xfrm_decode_session(skb, &xfrm_sid, 0);
>>>+	BUG_ON(err);
>>
>>Just a quick question that has been nagging me for awhile - any
>>particular reason why this is a BUG_ON() and not an "if (err) goto out;"?
>  
> It appears that selinux_xfrm_decode_session() can only legitimately
> return an error if the last argument (ckall) is non-zero.
> security_skb_classify_flow() was doing the same thing prior to this
> patch series.  It would be clearer if there were two separate interfaces
> that internally use the same helper, with one of the functions returning
> void.

My immediate concern is not really what selinux_xfrm_decode_session()
returns, but how to handle it, or rather errors in general, in
selinux_skb_flow_in().  I'm in the process of creating a patch to add
the missing NetLabel support to the secid patches and I am wondering if
I should BUG_ON() for an error condition or simply jump to "out".
Jumping seems a bit cleaner to me, although perhaps harder to debug, so
I was just wondering what the reasoning was behind the use of BUG_ON().

I honestly don't care at this point, it's a rather minor detail, I'd
just like to "do the right thing" with the NetLabel patch.

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp

RE: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Venkat Yekkirala]

> My immediate concern is not really what selinux_xfrm_decode_session()
> returns, but how to handle it, or rather errors in general, in
> selinux_skb_flow_in().  I'm in the process of creating a patch to add
> the missing NetLabel support to the secid patches and I am 
> wondering if
> I should BUG_ON() for an error condition or simply jump to "out".
> Jumping seems a bit cleaner to me, although perhaps harder to 
> debug, so
> I was just wondering what the reasoning was behind the use of 
> BUG_ON().

It's more a "code integrity" check that I have sought to enforce
via BUG_ON (meaning the function isn't expected to fail under any
circumstances). Whether this is a severe enough error (possible as
a result of a bug in decode_session or a corrupted kernel) that we
should panic the system at that point is probably debatable. In particular
I would be interested to know how similar situations are currently
treated in the kernel.

My recommendation would be to be consistent with the rest of the code
and do a BUG_ON. As for other errors, you could jump out like the rest
of the code already does (if that meets your needs that is).

Re: [PATCH 7/9] secid reconciliation-v04: Enforcement for SELinux

[Paul Moore]

Venkat Yekkirala wrote:
>>My immediate concern is not really what selinux_xfrm_decode_session()
>>returns, but how to handle it, or rather errors in general, in
>>selinux_skb_flow_in().  I'm in the process of creating a patch to add
>>the missing NetLabel support to the secid patches and I am 
>>wondering if
>>I should BUG_ON() for an error condition or simply jump to "out".
>>Jumping seems a bit cleaner to me, although perhaps harder to 
>>debug, so
>>I was just wondering what the reasoning was behind the use of 
>>BUG_ON().
> 
> 
> It's more a "code integrity" check that I have sought to enforce
> via BUG_ON (meaning the function isn't expected to fail under any
> circumstances). Whether this is a severe enough error (possible as
> a result of a bug in decode_session or a corrupted kernel) that we
> should panic the system at that point is probably debatable. In particular
> I would be interested to know how similar situations are currently
> treated in the kernel.
> 
> My recommendation would be to be consistent with the rest of the code
> and do a BUG_ON. 

That was how I was leaning and for the same reasons, I'll go that route
and if we need we can always change it later.

> As for other errors, you could jump out like the rest
> of the code already does (if that meets your needs that is).

-- 
paul moore
linux security @ hp