From: Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>
To: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow
Date: Tue, 02 Nov 2010 21:16:54 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4CD071B6.7030202@hartkopp.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1288727605.2504.21.camel@dan>
On 02.11.2010 20:53, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
>
>> Why is this bad? Can the addresses of CAN-BCM sock structs be used for
>> anything from userspace?
>>
>> For me they are just intended to be unique numbers ...
>>
>
> This is a bad idea because it makes exploiting other kernel
> vulnerabilities easier. Exposing the address of an object in a slab
> cache, especially an object that unprivileged users have some level of
> control of, is just an invitation to use that structure when writing
> exploits, for heap overflows or otherwise.
The "level of control of" is just creating a socket or not. None of the data
in the created struct can be influenced by an unprivileged user.
Btw. i can generally follow your concerns after this explanation.
I'm going to check the kernel src for other approaches to display unique
numbers in procfs and will send a patch that takes care.
Thanks,
Oliver
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2010-11-02 20:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2010-11-02 18:28 [SECURITY] CAN info leak/minor heap overflow Dan Rosenberg
2010-11-02 19:43 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-02 19:53 ` Dan Rosenberg
2010-11-02 19:57 ` [Security] " Linus Torvalds
2010-11-02 20:19 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-02 20:16 ` Oliver Hartkopp [this message]
2010-11-05 18:33 ` [PATCH] Fix " Urs Thuermann
2010-11-09 7:52 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-09 17:05 ` David Miller
2010-11-10 6:52 ` Oliver Hartkopp
2010-11-10 17:51 ` David Miller
2010-11-10 22:10 ` Oliver Hartkopp
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