From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Oliver Hartkopp Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] CAN: Use inode instead of kernel address for /proc file Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2010 14:39:19 +0100 Message-ID: <4D189707.5000708@hartkopp.net> References: <1293382493.9764.54.camel@Dan> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Urs Thuermann , "David S. Miller" , netdev@vger.kernel.org, security@kernel.org To: Dan Rosenberg Return-path: Received: from mo-p00-ob.rzone.de ([81.169.146.162]:23090 "EHLO mo-p00-ob.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753777Ab0L0NjV (ORCPT ); Mon, 27 Dec 2010 08:39:21 -0500 In-Reply-To: <1293382493.9764.54.camel@Dan> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 26.12.2010 17:54, Dan Rosenberg wrote: > Since the socket address is just being used as a unique identifier, its > inode number is an alternative that does not leak potentially sensitive > information. > > CC-ing stable because MITRE has assigned CVE-2010-4565 to the issue. > > Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg > Cc: stable Acked-by: Oliver Hartkopp Thanks Dan > --- > net/can/bcm.c | 4 ++-- > 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/net/can/bcm.c b/net/can/bcm.c > index 6faa825..bc51b56 100644 > --- a/net/can/bcm.c > +++ b/net/can/bcm.c > @@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ struct bcm_sock { > struct list_head tx_ops; > unsigned long dropped_usr_msgs; > struct proc_dir_entry *bcm_proc_read; > - char procname [20]; /* pointer printed in ASCII with \0 */ > + char procname [32]; /* inode number in decimal with \0 */ > }; > > static inline struct bcm_sock *bcm_sk(const struct sock *sk) > @@ -1521,7 +1521,7 @@ static int bcm_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int len, > > if (proc_dir) { > /* unique socket address as filename */ > - sprintf(bo->procname, "%p", sock); > + sprintf(bo->procname, "%lu", sock_i_ino(sk)); > bo->bcm_proc_read = proc_create_data(bo->procname, 0644, > proc_dir, > &bcm_proc_fops, sk); > >