public inbox for netdev@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
	"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>,
	Samasth Norway Ananda <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
	Matthieu Buffet <matthieu@buffet.re>,
	Mikhail Ivanov <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
	konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com,
	Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>,
	Alyssa Ross <hi@alyssa.is>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Tahera Fahimi <fahimitahera@gmail.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 1/5] lsm: Add hook unix_path_connect
Date: Sat, 10 Jan 2026 11:45:03 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4bc22faa-2927-4ef9-b5dc-67a7575177e9@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260110143300.71048-4-gnoack3000@gmail.com>

On 1/10/26 09:32, Günther Noack wrote:
> From: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
>
> Adds an LSM hook unix_path_connect.
>
> This hook is called to check the path of a named unix socket before a
> connection is initiated.
>
> Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
> ---
>  include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h |  4 ++++
>  include/linux/security.h      | 11 +++++++++++
>  net/unix/af_unix.c            |  9 +++++++++
>  security/security.c           | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
>  4 files changed, 44 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> index 8c42b4bde09c..1dee5d8d52d2 100644
> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
> @@ -317,6 +317,10 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, post_notification, const struct cred *w_cred,
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, watch_key, struct key *key)
>  #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY && CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_path_connect, const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
>  LSM_HOOK(int, 0, unix_stream_connect, struct sock *sock, struct sock *other,
>  	 struct sock *newsk)
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 83a646d72f6f..382612af27a6 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -1931,6 +1931,17 @@ static inline int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>  }
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags);
> +
> +#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +static inline int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +{
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
>  int security_ib_pkey_access(void *sec, u64 subnet_prefix, u16 pkey);
>  int security_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *sec, const char *name, u8 port_num);
> diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> index 55cdebfa0da0..3aabe2d489ae 100644
> --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> @@ -1226,6 +1226,15 @@ static struct sock *unix_find_bsd(struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr, int addr_len,
>  	if (!S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode))
>  		goto path_put;
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * We call the hook because we know that the inode is a socket
> +	 * and we hold a valid reference to it via the path.
> +	 */
> +	err = security_unix_path_connect(&path, type, flags);
> +	if (err)
> +		goto path_put;
> +
> +	err = -ECONNREFUSED;
>  	sk = unix_find_socket_byinode(inode);
>  	if (!sk)
>  		goto path_put;
> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
> index 31a688650601..0cee3502db83 100644
> --- a/security/security.c
> +++ b/security/security.c
> @@ -4731,6 +4731,26 @@ int security_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk)
>  
>  #endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
>  
> +#if defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH)
> +/*
> + * security_unix_path_connect() - Check if a named AF_UNIX socket can connect
> + * @path: path of the socket being connected to
> + * @type: type of the socket
> + * @flags: flags associated with the socket
> + *
> + * This hook is called to check permissions before connecting to a named
> + * AF_UNIX socket.
> + *
> + * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
> + */
> +int security_unix_path_connect(const struct path *path, int type, int flags)
> +{
> +	return call_int_hook(unix_path_connect, path, type, flags);
> +}
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_unix_path_connect);
> +
> +#endif	/* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK && CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH */
> +
>  #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_INFINIBAND
>  /**
>   * security_ib_pkey_access() - Check if access to an IB pkey is allowed
Just for awareness,

I'm considering renaming this hook to unix_socket_path_lookup, since as Günther
pointed out this hook is not just hit on connect, but also on sendmsg.

Justin

  reply	other threads:[~2026-01-10 16:45 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-01-10 14:32 [PATCH v2 0/5] landlock: Pathname-based UNIX connect() control Günther Noack
2026-01-10 14:32 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] lsm: Add hook unix_path_connect Günther Noack
2026-01-10 16:45   ` Justin Suess [this message]
2026-01-11  9:55     ` Günther Noack
2026-01-13 22:51     ` Paul Moore
2026-01-13 23:30       ` Paul Moore
2026-01-13  9:34   ` Christian Brauner
2026-01-13 23:27     ` Paul Moore
2026-01-15 10:10       ` Günther Noack
2026-01-15 21:24         ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-15 22:32           ` Günther Noack
2026-01-15 21:46         ` Paul Moore
2026-01-12 16:08 ` [PATCH v2 0/5] landlock: Pathname-based UNIX connect() control Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-12 20:53   ` Günther Noack
2026-01-17 18:57     ` Justin Suess
2026-01-18 17:44       ` Günther Noack

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=4bc22faa-2927-4ef9-b5dc-67a7575177e9@gmail.com \
    --to=utilityemal77@gmail.com \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=demiobenour@gmail.com \
    --cc=fahimitahera@gmail.com \
    --cc=gnoack3000@gmail.com \
    --cc=hi@alyssa.is \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=m@maowtm.org \
    --cc=matthieu@buffet.re \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com \
    --cc=serge@hallyn.com \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox