From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/2] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices
Date: Wed, 05 Dec 2012 14:17:30 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <50BEE6FA.1080507@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20121204152420.GJ7499@redhat.com>
On 12/04/2012 11:24 PM, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 04, 2012 at 09:24:43PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
>> On Monday, December 03, 2012 11:22:29 AM Paul Moore wrote:
>>> On Monday, December 03, 2012 06:15:42 PM Jason Wang wrote:
>>>> On 11/30/2012 06:06 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>> This patch corrects some problems with LSM/SELinux that were introduced
>>>>> with the multiqueue patchset. The problem stems from the fact that the
>>>>> multiqueue work changed the relationship between the tun device and its
>>>>> associated socket; before the socket persisted for the life of the
>>>>> device, however after the multiqueue changes the socket only persisted
>>>>> for the life of the userspace connection (fd open). For non-persistent
>>>>> devices this is not an issue, but for persistent devices this can cause
>>>>> the tun device to lose its SELinux label.
>>>>>
>>>>> We correct this problem by adding an opaque LSM security blob to the
>>>>> tun device struct which allows us to have the LSM security state, e.g.
>>>>> SELinux labeling information, persist for the lifetime of the tun
>>>>> device.
>>> ...
>>>
>>>>> -static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
>>>>> +static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
>>>>>
>>>>> {
>>>>>
>>>>> + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
>>>>>
>>>>> struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
>>>>> u32 sid = current_sid();
>>>>> int err;
>>>>>
>>>>> + /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here ...
>>>>>
>>>>> err = avc_has_perm(sid, sksec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
>>>>>
>>>>> TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
>>>>>
>>>>> if (err)
>>>>>
>>>>> return err;
>>>>>
>>>>> - err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
>>>>> + err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
>>>>>
>>>>> TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
>>>>>
>>>>> if (err)
>>>>>
>>>>> return err;
>>>>>
>>>>> - sksec->sid = sid;
>>>>> + sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
>>>>> + sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
>>>> I'm not sure whether this is correct, looks like we need to differ between
>>>> TUNSETQUEUE and TUNSETIFF. When userspace call TUNSETIFF for persistent
>>>> device, looks like we need change the sid of tunsec like in the past.
>>> It may be that I'm misunderstanding TUNSETQUEUE and/or TUNSETIFF. Can you
>>> elaborate as to why they should be different?
>> If I understand correctly, before multiqueue patchset, TUNSETIFF is used to:
>>
>> 1) Create the tun/tap network device
>> 2) For persistent device, re-attach the fd to the network device / socket. In
>> this case, we call selinux_tun_dev_attch() to relabel the socket sid (in fact
>> also the device's since the socket were persistent also) to the sid of process
>> that calls TUNSETIFF.
>>
>> So, after the changes of multiqueue, we need try to preserve those policy. The
>> interesting part is the introducing of TUNSETQUEUE, it's used to attach more
>> file descriptors/sockets to a tun/tap device after at least one file descriptor
>> were attached to the tun/tap device through TUNSETIFF. So I think maybe we
>> need differ those two ioctls. This patch looks fine for TUNSETQUEUE, but for
>> TUNSETIFF, we need relabel the tunsec to the process that calling TUNSETIFF
>> for persistent device?
> Basically, it looks like currently once you get a tun fd,
> you can attach it to any device even if normally
> selinux would prevent you from accessing it.
Yes some checking during TUNSETQUEUE is missed.
> If we reuse selinux_tun_dev_attach, we won't need to
> change selinux policy, with a new capability we will need to change it
> to allow libvirt to do TUNSETQUEUE.
>
Also needed for qemu too since it may call TUNSETQUEUE when guest wants
to change the number of queues.
>> btw. Current code does allow calling TUNSETQUEUE to a persistent tun/tap
>> device with no file attached. It should be a bug and need to be fixed.
> Is this a problem? You can always
> attach
> set queue
> detach
>
> and it would be hard to prevent this ...
Currently, the following steps is allowed:
1. fd1 = open("/dev/net/tun");
2. tunsetiff(fd1, "tap0");
3. tunsetpersistent("tap0");
4. close(fd1);
5. fd2 = open("/dev/net/tun");
6. tunsetqueue(fd2, "tap0);
Looks like step 6 should be forbidden since:
- no fd/sockets were attached to the device, we need use TUNSETIFF
instead to keep the API as we used do in single queue tun
- we need update the security information in tun_struct just like what
we discussed in this mail
- it may also miss checks in TUNSETIFF
>>> One thing that I think we probably should change is the relabelto/from
>>> permissions in the function above (selinux_tun_dev_attach()); in the case
>>> where the socket does not yet have a label, e.g. 'sksec->sid == 0', we
>>> should probably skip the relabel permissions since we want to assign the
>>> TUN device label regardless in this case.
>> I'm not familiar with the selinux, have a quick glance of the code, looks like
>> the label has been initialized to SECINITSID_KERNEL in
>> selinux_socket_post_create().
>>
>> Thanks
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2012-12-05 6:17 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 20+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2012-11-29 22:06 [RFC PATCH 0/2] Fix some multiqueue TUN problems Paul Moore
2012-11-29 22:06 ` [RFC PATCH 1/2] tun: correctly report an error in tun_flow_init() Paul Moore
2012-12-05 16:02 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-06 3:35 ` Jason Wang
2012-11-29 22:06 ` [RFC PATCH 2/2] tun: fix LSM/SELinux labeling of tun/tap devices Paul Moore
2012-12-03 10:15 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-03 16:22 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-04 13:24 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-04 15:24 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-05 6:17 ` Jason Wang [this message]
2012-12-05 11:43 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-05 13:45 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-04 16:18 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-04 17:36 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-04 18:17 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-05 6:19 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-05 11:44 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2012-12-05 14:01 ` Jason Wang
2012-12-05 16:00 ` Paul Moore
2012-12-05 5:44 ` Jason Wang
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