Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 2/4] xen-netfront: drop skb when skb->len > 65535

[annie li <annie.li@oracle.com>]

On 2013-3-18 18:35, Wei Liu wrote:
> The `size' field of Xen network wire format is uint16_t, anything bigger than
> 65535 will cause overflow.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>
> ---
>   drivers/net/xen-netfront.c |   12 ++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
> index 5527663..8c3d065 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netfront.c
> @@ -547,6 +547,18 @@ static int xennet_start_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
>   	unsigned int len = skb_headlen(skb);
>   	unsigned long flags;
>   
> +	/*
> +	 * wire format of xen_netif_tx_request only supports skb->len
> +	 * < 64K, because size field in xen_netif_tx_request is
> +	 * uint16_t.
> +	 */
> +	if (unlikely(skb->len > (uint16_t)(~0))) {
> +		net_alert_ratelimited(
> +			"xennet: skb->len = %d, too big for wire format\n",
> +			skb->len);
> +		goto drop;
> +	}
> +

Maybe it is better to do some segmentation for packets(>15536) which 
support segments, and drop those which do not support segment.
This can also be implemented in another patch(Just like what i did for 
packets which requires slots larger than SKB_MAX_FRAGS).

Thanks
Annie
>   	slots = DIV_ROUND_UP(offset + len, PAGE_SIZE) +
>   		xennet_count_skb_frag_slots(skb);
>   	if (unlikely(slots > MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1)) {