From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] tcp: randomize TCP source ports
Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2013 19:16:10 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <527E7BEA.1070904@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131109044724.GB1963@order.stressinduktion.org>
On 11/09/2013 05:47 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 08, 2013 at 07:11:18AM -0800, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> On Fri, 2013-11-08 at 15:28 +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>
>>> What do you think about using a timer to keep the reseed out of fast-path
>>> and switch to the non-arch get_random_bytes instead?
>>
>> Well, the initial seed value is get_random_bytes(). I felt that using a
>> xor with the _arch() version would be safe enough.
>>
>> For the timer, I do not think its worth the pain : Do you want a per cpu
>> timer, or a global one ?
>
> This untested diff came to my mind (it is based on the random tree). I
> actually consider to propose something like this for 3.13. UDP port
> randomization is really critical.
>
> In 3.14 timeframe I suggest abandon net_random and use prandom_u32
> directly so code gets easier to audit.
>
> Would it hurt to use "proper" get_random_byte calls for port randomization?
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index cdf4cfb..e9d0136 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -657,9 +657,11 @@ retry:
> r->entropy_total += nbits;
> if (!r->initialized && nbits > 0) {
> if (r->entropy_total > 128) {
> - if (r == &nonblocking_pool)
> + if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
> pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n",
> r->name);
> + prandom_reseed();
> + }
> r->initialized = 1;
> r->entropy_total = 0;
> }
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index 6312dd9..4f878c0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned l
> u32 prandom_u32(void);
> void prandom_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
> void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
> +void prandom_reseed(void);
>
> u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *);
> void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, int nbytes);
> diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
> index 52280d5..1ee611f 100644
> --- a/lib/random32.c
> +++ b/lib/random32.c
> @@ -174,11 +174,31 @@ static int __init prandom_init(void)
> }
> core_initcall(prandom_init);
>
> +static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
> +static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
> +
> +static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
> +{
> + u32 entropy;
> + get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
> + prandom_seed(entropy);
> + seed_timer.expires = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
> + add_timer(&seed_timer);
> +}
> +
> +static int prandom_start_seed_timer(void)
^^^^^^ __init
> +{
prandom_reseed();
What are the objectives against initializing prandom here in
the late initcall [instead of doing so in drivers/char/random.c]
as it was the case before?
Probably for security reasons, I think you actually don't want
anyone (incl. external 3rd party modules) to call prandom_reseed()
again after this has been done once initially. So I think it
would be better to make this function not visible to anyone
outside of random32.c.
> + seed_timer.expires = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
> + add_timer(&seed_timer);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +late_initcall(prandom_start_seed_timer);
> +
> /*
> * Generate better values after random number generator
> * is fully initialized.
> */
> -static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
> +void prandom_reseed(void)
> {
> int i;
>
> @@ -196,4 +216,3 @@ static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
> }
> return 0;
> }
> -late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
>
> Greetings,
>
> Hannes
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-11-09 18:16 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-11-08 0:54 [RFC] tcp: randomize TCP source ports Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 1:07 ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08 2:04 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 23:26 ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08 23:42 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 23:57 ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08 13:02 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-08 14:03 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 14:28 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-08 15:11 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 17:39 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-09 4:47 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-09 15:26 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2013-11-09 18:16 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2013-11-09 20:54 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
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