public inbox for netdev@vger.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
To: Hannes Frederic Sowa <hannes@stressinduktion.org>
Cc: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>,
	David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
	netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC] tcp: randomize TCP source ports
Date: Sat, 09 Nov 2013 19:16:10 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <527E7BEA.1070904@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20131109044724.GB1963@order.stressinduktion.org>

On 11/09/2013 05:47 AM, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 08, 2013 at 07:11:18AM -0800, Eric Dumazet wrote:
>> On Fri, 2013-11-08 at 15:28 +0100, Hannes Frederic Sowa wrote:
>>
>>> What do you think about using a timer to keep the reseed out of fast-path
>>> and switch to the non-arch get_random_bytes instead?
>>
>> Well, the initial seed value is get_random_bytes(). I felt that using a
>> xor with the _arch() version would be safe enough.
>>
>> For the timer, I do not think its worth the pain : Do you want a per cpu
>> timer, or a global one ?
>
> This untested diff came to my mind (it is based on the random tree). I
> actually consider to propose something like this for 3.13. UDP port
> randomization is really critical.
>
> In 3.14 timeframe I suggest abandon net_random and use prandom_u32
> directly so code gets easier to audit.
>
> Would it hurt to use "proper" get_random_byte calls for port randomization?
>
> diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
> index cdf4cfb..e9d0136 100644
> --- a/drivers/char/random.c
> +++ b/drivers/char/random.c
> @@ -657,9 +657,11 @@ retry:
>   	r->entropy_total += nbits;
>   	if (!r->initialized && nbits > 0) {
>   		if (r->entropy_total > 128) {
> -			if (r == &nonblocking_pool)
> +			if (r == &nonblocking_pool) {
>   				pr_notice("random: %s pool is initialized\n",
>   					  r->name);
> +				prandom_reseed();
> +			}
>   			r->initialized = 1;
>   			r->entropy_total = 0;
>   		}
> diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
> index 6312dd9..4f878c0 100644
> --- a/include/linux/random.h
> +++ b/include/linux/random.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ unsigned long randomize_range(unsigned long start, unsigned long end, unsigned l
>   u32 prandom_u32(void);
>   void prandom_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
>   void prandom_seed(u32 seed);
> +void prandom_reseed(void);
>
>   u32 prandom_u32_state(struct rnd_state *);
>   void prandom_bytes_state(struct rnd_state *state, void *buf, int nbytes);
> diff --git a/lib/random32.c b/lib/random32.c
> index 52280d5..1ee611f 100644
> --- a/lib/random32.c
> +++ b/lib/random32.c
> @@ -174,11 +174,31 @@ static int __init prandom_init(void)
>   }
>   core_initcall(prandom_init);
>
> +static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare);
> +static DEFINE_TIMER(seed_timer, __prandom_timer, 0, 0);
> +
> +static void __prandom_timer(unsigned long dontcare)
> +{
> +	u32 entropy;
> +	get_random_bytes(&entropy, sizeof(entropy));
> +	prandom_seed(entropy);
> +	seed_timer.expires = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
> +	add_timer(&seed_timer);
> +}
> +
> +static int prandom_start_seed_timer(void)

       ^^^^^^ __init

> +{
	prandom_reseed();

What are the objectives against initializing prandom here in
the late initcall [instead of doing so in drivers/char/random.c]
as it was the case before?

Probably for security reasons, I think you actually don't want
anyone (incl. external 3rd party modules) to call prandom_reseed()
again after this has been done once initially. So I think it
would be better to make this function not visible to anyone
outside of random32.c.

> +	seed_timer.expires = jiffies + 60 * HZ;
> +	add_timer(&seed_timer);
> +	return 0;
> +}
> +late_initcall(prandom_start_seed_timer);
> +
>   /*
>    *	Generate better values after random number generator
>    *	is fully initialized.
>    */
> -static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
> +void prandom_reseed(void)
>   {
>   	int i;
>
> @@ -196,4 +216,3 @@ static int __init prandom_reseed(void)
>   	}
>   	return 0;
>   }
> -late_initcall(prandom_reseed);
>
> Greetings,
>
>    Hannes

  parent reply	other threads:[~2013-11-09 18:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-11-08  0:54 [RFC] tcp: randomize TCP source ports Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08  1:07 ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08  2:04   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 23:26     ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08 23:42       ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 23:57         ` Rick Jones
2013-11-08 13:02 ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-08 14:03   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 14:28     ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-08 15:11       ` Eric Dumazet
2013-11-08 17:39         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-09  4:47         ` Hannes Frederic Sowa
2013-11-09 15:26           ` Loganaden Velvindron
2013-11-09 18:16           ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2013-11-09 20:54             ` Hannes Frederic Sowa

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=527E7BEA.1070904@redhat.com \
    --to=dborkman@redhat.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=eric.dumazet@gmail.com \
    --cc=hannes@stressinduktion.org \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox