From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Daniel J Walsh Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/6][v2] audit: implement multicast socket for journald Date: Wed, 23 Apr 2014 11:52:20 -0400 Message-ID: <5357E1B4.2030705@redhat.com> References: <20140422.161904.1187535812839850973.davem@davemloft.net> <26389161.vp9iWSVLPX@x2> <1398225475.750.7.camel@localhost> <5357C2D2.5060700@redhat.com> <1398264152.2596.25.camel@flatline.rdu.redhat.com> <5357DE12.7040905@redhat.com> <1398267458.2562.0.camel@flatline.rdu.redhat.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, jamal@mojatatu.com, davem@davemloft.net To: Eric Paris Return-path: In-Reply-To: <1398267458.2562.0.camel@flatline.rdu.redhat.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: linux-audit-bounces@redhat.com List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org Meaning looking at the journal would be equivalent to looking at /var/log/audit/audit.log. On 04/23/2014 11:37 AM, Eric Paris wrote: > On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 11:36 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: >> I guess the problem would be that the sysadm_t would be able to look at >> the journal which would now contain the audit content. > right. so include it in the sysadm_secadm bool > >> On 04/23/2014 10:42 AM, Eric Paris wrote: >>> On Wed, 2014-04-23 at 09:40 -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: >>>> Here are the capabilities we currently give to sysadm_t with >>>> sysadm_secadm 1.0.0 Disabled >>>> >>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { chown dac_override >>>> dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable >>>> net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner >>>> sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice >>>> sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write setfcap } ; >>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot } >>>> >>>> allow sysadm_t sysadm_t : capability2 { syslog block_suspend } ; >>>> >>>> cap_audit_write might be a problem? >>> cap_audit_write is fine. >>> >>> syslogd_t (aka journal) is going to need the new permission >>> cap_audit_read. Also, as steve pointed out, someone may be likely to >>> want to be able to disable that permission easily. >>> >>> -Eric >>> > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > >