From: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevich@gmail.com>
To: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-sctp@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions
Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2014 22:23:33 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <53C9D6A5.6040209@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <53C9A7B8.1020504@redhat.com>
On 07/18/2014 07:03 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
> On 07/19/2014 12:13 AM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>> On 07/18/2014 11:59 PM, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>> On 07/18/2014 03:17 PM, Daniel Borkmann wrote:
>>>> On 07/18/2014 04:38 PM, Vlad Yasevich wrote:
>>>> ...
>>>>> Why is the original value of asoc->peer.auth_capable = 0?
>>>>> In case of collision, asoc is the old association that
>>>>> existed on the system. That association was created as part of
>>>>> sending the INIT. If it is processing a duplicate COOKIE-ECHO
>>>>> as you say, then it has already processed the INIT-ACK and
>>>>> should have determined that the peer is auth capable.
>>>>>
>>>>> Thus the capability of the new and the old associations should
>>>>> be same if we are in fact processing case B (collision).
>
> What I can see is the following that leads to this situation:
>
> 1) asoc A sends the INIT, goes from CLOSED into COOKIE_WAIT
> 2) asoc B receives it, calls into sctp_sf_do_5_1B_init() where it
> actually creates asoc B, responds with INIT_ACK, goes from CLOSED
> into COOKIE_WAIT
I think this is a race. asoc B doesn't exist yet. we have a listening
socket that responds normally to the INIT-ACK. The next thing that happens
is the app initiates a connection thus creating asoc B and triggering INIT.
> 3) asoc A receives INIT, thus collision, calls into sctp_sf_do_5_2_1_siminit()
> 3.1) asoc A calls into sctp_sf_do_unexpected_init(), creates a temp asoc,
> does sctp_process_init() on the temp asoc (auth_cap=1, random etc set),
> replies w/ temp asoc with INIT_ACK
> 4) asoc B gets INIT_ACK, calls sctp_sf_do_5_1C_ack (and thus SCTP_PEER_INIT
> via interpreter), sees auth_cap=1, stores random etc; asoc B transitions
> from COOKIE_WAIT into COOKIE_ECHOED
> 5) asoc A calls into sctp_sf_do_5_2_4_dupcook(), does the tietag compare,
> finds action B, creates temp asoc calls sctp_process_init() on it
> sees auth_cap=1, random etc; then we call into sctp_assoc_update()
> and migrate all params; what I see there is that random, chunks, hmac
> migrate from NULL each to the new values stored in the temp asoc
> (and thus we'd need auth_cap as well to be correct); after that, I
> see that asoc A goes from COOKIE_WAIT into ESTABLISHED (which seems
> to be in accordance to the RFC: "The endpoint should stay in or enter
> the ESTABLISHED state but it MUST ...")
I see.
> 6) later on, asoc B goes from COOKIE_ECHOED into ESTABLISHED
>
> So that led me to the resolution of transferring 'caps' over via
> sctp_assoc_update(). In that case, asoc A transitions from 0 -> 1
> as previous 'caps' haven't been stored in the actual asoc. It stayed
> so far always in a temp asoc that we threw away after a reply.
Thanks for the analysis. The collisions in COOKIE_WAIT state is definitely
a hole and it looks like all capabilities need to be updated and we should
probably do an audit to make sure we don't miss anything else.
-vlad
>
>>>>> If not, then something else if wrong and my guess is that all
>>>>> other capabilities would be wrong too.
>>>>
>>>> I agree that they might likely also be flawed.
>>>>
>>>> Ok, let me dig further.
>>>
>>> So I think I know why case D ends up not authenticating the COOKIE-ACK.
>>> Most likely the reason is the following statement:
>>> repl = sctp_make_cookie_ack(new_asoc, chunk);
>>>
>>> Note that we use new_asoc, instead of current asoc.
>>
>> Thanks, I will give it a try.
>>
>> Btw, noticed also that when we have AUTH + COOKIE_ECHO collisions,
>> we don't seem to handle them properly either. The normal case works
>> fine, but in case of a collision both sides seem to use wrong RANDOM
>> etc params, and thus discard the handshake due to bad signature.
>>
>>> Not sure why case B is dumping core yet.
>> --
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-07-19 2:23 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-07-17 18:05 [PATCH net] net: sctp: inherit auth_capable on INIT collisions Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-18 12:35 ` Neil Horman
2014-07-18 14:38 ` Vlad Yasevich
2014-07-18 19:17 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-18 21:59 ` Vlad Yasevich
2014-07-18 22:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-18 23:03 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-19 2:23 ` Vlad Yasevich [this message]
2014-07-20 9:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-18 23:23 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-22 13:25 ` Daniel Borkmann
2014-07-22 16:41 ` Vlad Yasevich
2014-07-22 16:43 ` Daniel Borkmann
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