From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 18:07:57 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <55F0595D.2080409@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150909155035.GA26679@smitten>
On 09/09/2015 05:50 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:08:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Tycho Andersen
[...]
>>>> I was expecting to see a validator, similar to the existing BPF
>>>> validator that is called when creating seccomp filters currently. Can
>>>> we add a similar validator for new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP?
>>>
>>> That's effectively what this patch does; when the eBPF is loaded via
>>> bpf(), you tell bpf() you want a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP, and it invokes
>>> this validation/translation code, i.e. it uses
>>> seccomp_is_valid_access() to check and make sure access are aligned
>>> and inside struct seccomp_data.
>>
>> What about limiting the possible instructions?
>
> I totally overlooked this. A quick glance through the eBPF verifier
> makes me think that we can just add another function to struct
> bpf_verifier_ops called valid_instruction, which shouldn't be too
> hard. Perhaps a more interesting question is what to allow:
It's possible, but keep in mind that when you disallow various
instructions from the base insns set, you won't be able to leverage
filter creation in the minimal C subset via clang/llvm anymore, so
usability would suffer from this side, even if you just use clang/llvm
to create the raw insns and later keep them in your application
directly.
And if you later on decide to allow maps, etc, hacking this together
by hand is a bit of a pain. ;)
[ Restricting helper functions and ctx access, etc via bpf_verifier_ops
(as you can currently do) should not affect this. ]
> BPF_LD(X) and BPF_ST(X): it looks like all types of stores are
> allowed, and only BPF_MEM and BPF_IMM loads are allowed; I think
> these can stay the same. BPF_XADD is new in eBPF, and I don't think
> we need it for seccomp (yet), since we don't have any shared memory
> via maps.
>
> BPF_ALU: It looks like we're also not allowing regular BPF_ALU
> instruction BPF_MOD; eBPF adds a few ones: BPF_MOV (register move),
> BPF_ARSH (sign extended right shift), and BPF_END (endianness
> conversion), wich I think should all be safe. In particular, we need
> to allow BPF_MOV at least, since that's how the converter implements
> BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX from classic.
>
> BPF_ALU64: I think we can safely allow all these as above, since
> they're just the 64-bit versions.
>
> BPF_JMP: eBPF adds BPF_JNE, BPF_JSGT, BPF_JSGE, BPF_CALL, and
> BPF_EXIT, which I think all should be safe (except maybe BPF_CALL
> since we're not allowing functions really). Again we have to allow
> one of the new eBPF codes, as the converter implements BPF_RET as
> BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Tycho
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-09-09 16:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-09-04 16:04 c/r of seccomp filters via underlying eBPF Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:34 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:08 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 15:50 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 16:09 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-09 16:37 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 16:52 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 17:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 17:31 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2015-09-04 21:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-09 16:13 ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] seccomp: make underlying bpf ref counted as well Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:53 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:45 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:50 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:00 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:48 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 22:28 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-05 0:27 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 22:34 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 23:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:13 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-10 0:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10 0:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:27 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-05 0:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 20:27 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:42 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:26 ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:58 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:40 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <1441382664-17437-6-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-04 20:41 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKke44txdYqEgPRrkn8SyWGjJuHxT2qMdq2ztp_16mQyw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-05 7:13 ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
[not found] ` <55EA95FE.7000006-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-08 13:40 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 0:07 ` Kees Cook
[not found] ` <CAGXu5jKS0yX92XXhL6ZkqMrxkqFpPyyBd7wbsvEEx4rqZ0VG6g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 14:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 15:14 ` Alexei Starovoitov
[not found] ` <20150909151402.GA3429-2RGepAHry04KGsCuBW9QBvb0xQGhdpdCAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 15:55 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] ebpf: allow BPF_REG_X in src_reg conditional jumps Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:06 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 22:43 ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-05 4:12 ` Alexei Starovoitov
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