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From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho.andersen@canonical.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org>, Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Pavel Emelyanov <xemul@parallels.com>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type
Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 18:07:57 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55F0595D.2080409@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150909155035.GA26679@smitten>

On 09/09/2015 05:50 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:08:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Tycho Andersen
[...]
>>>> I was expecting to see a validator, similar to the existing BPF
>>>> validator that is called when creating seccomp filters currently. Can
>>>> we add a similar validator for new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP?
>>>
>>> That's effectively what this patch does; when the eBPF is loaded via
>>> bpf(), you tell bpf() you want a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP, and it invokes
>>> this validation/translation code, i.e. it uses
>>> seccomp_is_valid_access() to check and make sure access are aligned
>>> and inside struct seccomp_data.
>>
>> What about limiting the possible instructions?
>
> I totally overlooked this. A quick glance through the eBPF verifier
> makes me think that we can just add another function to struct
> bpf_verifier_ops called valid_instruction, which shouldn't be too
> hard. Perhaps a more interesting question is what to allow:

It's possible, but keep in mind that when you disallow various
instructions from the base insns set, you won't be able to leverage
filter creation in the minimal C subset via clang/llvm anymore, so
usability would suffer from this side, even if you just use clang/llvm
to create the raw insns and later keep them in your application
directly.

And if you later on decide to allow maps, etc, hacking this together
by hand is a bit of a pain. ;)

[ Restricting helper functions and ctx access, etc via bpf_verifier_ops
   (as you can currently do) should not affect this. ]

> BPF_LD(X) and BPF_ST(X): it looks like all types of stores are
>    allowed, and only BPF_MEM and BPF_IMM loads are allowed; I think
>    these can stay the same. BPF_XADD is new in eBPF, and I don't think
>    we need it for seccomp (yet), since we don't have any shared memory
>    via maps.
>
> BPF_ALU: It looks like we're also not allowing regular BPF_ALU
>    instruction BPF_MOD; eBPF adds a few ones: BPF_MOV (register move),
>    BPF_ARSH (sign extended right shift), and BPF_END (endianness
>    conversion), wich I think should all be safe. In particular, we need
>    to allow BPF_MOV at least, since that's how the converter implements
>    BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX from classic.
>
> BPF_ALU64: I think we can safely allow all these as above, since
>    they're just the 64-bit versions.
>
> BPF_JMP: eBPF adds BPF_JNE, BPF_JSGT, BPF_JSGE, BPF_CALL, and
>    BPF_EXIT, which I think all should be safe (except maybe BPF_CALL
>    since we're not allowing functions really). Again we have to allow
>    one of the new eBPF codes, as the converter implements BPF_RET as
>    BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT.
>
> Thoughts?
>
> Tycho

  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-09-09 16:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 55+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-09-04 16:04 c/r of seccomp filters via underlying eBPF Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:09     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:34   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 21:06     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:08       ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 15:50         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 16:09             ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-09 16:37               ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 16:52                 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-09 17:27                   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-09 17:31                     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 16:07           ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2015-09-04 21:50   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-09 16:13     ` Daniel Borkmann
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 2/6] seccomp: make underlying bpf ref counted as well Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 3/6] ebpf: add a way to dump an eBPF program Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:17   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:45     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:50       ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:58         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 21:00           ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:48       ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 22:28         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:08           ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-05  0:27             ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 22:34               ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 23:44                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10  0:13                   ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-10  0:44                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-10  0:58                       ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 23:27           ` Kees Cook
2015-09-05  0:08             ` Andy Lutomirski
2015-09-04 20:27   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:42     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 4/6] seccomp: add a way to access filters via bpf fds Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:26   ` Kees Cook
2015-09-04 20:29     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 20:58       ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 5/6] seccomp: add a way to attach a filter via eBPF fd Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 20:40   ` Alexei Starovoitov
     [not found]   ` <1441382664-17437-6-git-send-email-tycho.andersen-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-04 20:41     ` Kees Cook
     [not found]       ` <CAGXu5jKke44txdYqEgPRrkn8SyWGjJuHxT2qMdq2ztp_16mQyw-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-05  7:13         ` Michael Kerrisk (man-pages)
     [not found]           ` <55EA95FE.7000006-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-08 13:40             ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09  0:07               ` Kees Cook
     [not found]                 ` <CAGXu5jKS0yX92XXhL6ZkqMrxkqFpPyyBd7wbsvEEx4rqZ0VG6g-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 14:47                   ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-09 15:14                     ` Alexei Starovoitov
     [not found]                       ` <20150909151402.GA3429-2RGepAHry04KGsCuBW9QBvb0xQGhdpdCAL8bYrjMMd8@public.gmane.org>
2015-09-09 15:55                         ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 16:04 ` [PATCH 6/6] ebpf: allow BPF_REG_X in src_reg conditional jumps Tycho Andersen
2015-09-04 21:06   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2015-09-04 22:43     ` Tycho Andersen
2015-09-05  4:12       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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