From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Daniel Borkmann Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] ebpf: add a seccomp program type Date: Wed, 09 Sep 2015 18:07:57 +0200 Message-ID: <55F0595D.2080409@iogearbox.net> References: <1441382664-17437-1-git-send-email-tycho.andersen@canonical.com> <1441382664-17437-2-git-send-email-tycho.andersen@canonical.com> <20150904210615.GR26679@smitten> <20150909155035.GA26679@smitten> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=windows-1252; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: Alexei Starovoitov , Will Drewry , Oleg Nesterov , Andy Lutomirski , Pavel Emelyanov , "Serge E. Hallyn" , LKML , Network Development To: Tycho Andersen , Kees Cook Return-path: Received: from www62.your-server.de ([213.133.104.62]:46020 "EHLO www62.your-server.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753709AbbIIQIH (ORCPT ); Wed, 9 Sep 2015 12:08:07 -0400 In-Reply-To: <20150909155035.GA26679@smitten> Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: On 09/09/2015 05:50 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote: > On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:08:37PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote: >> On Fri, Sep 4, 2015 at 2:06 PM, Tycho Andersen [...] >>>> I was expecting to see a validator, similar to the existing BPF >>>> validator that is called when creating seccomp filters currently. Can >>>> we add a similar validator for new BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP? >>> >>> That's effectively what this patch does; when the eBPF is loaded via >>> bpf(), you tell bpf() you want a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SECCOMP, and it invokes >>> this validation/translation code, i.e. it uses >>> seccomp_is_valid_access() to check and make sure access are aligned >>> and inside struct seccomp_data. >> >> What about limiting the possible instructions? > > I totally overlooked this. A quick glance through the eBPF verifier > makes me think that we can just add another function to struct > bpf_verifier_ops called valid_instruction, which shouldn't be too > hard. Perhaps a more interesting question is what to allow: It's possible, but keep in mind that when you disallow various instructions from the base insns set, you won't be able to leverage filter creation in the minimal C subset via clang/llvm anymore, so usability would suffer from this side, even if you just use clang/llvm to create the raw insns and later keep them in your application directly. And if you later on decide to allow maps, etc, hacking this together by hand is a bit of a pain. ;) [ Restricting helper functions and ctx access, etc via bpf_verifier_ops (as you can currently do) should not affect this. ] > BPF_LD(X) and BPF_ST(X): it looks like all types of stores are > allowed, and only BPF_MEM and BPF_IMM loads are allowed; I think > these can stay the same. BPF_XADD is new in eBPF, and I don't think > we need it for seccomp (yet), since we don't have any shared memory > via maps. > > BPF_ALU: It looks like we're also not allowing regular BPF_ALU > instruction BPF_MOD; eBPF adds a few ones: BPF_MOV (register move), > BPF_ARSH (sign extended right shift), and BPF_END (endianness > conversion), wich I think should all be safe. In particular, we need > to allow BPF_MOV at least, since that's how the converter implements > BPF_MISC | BPF_TAX from classic. > > BPF_ALU64: I think we can safely allow all these as above, since > they're just the 64-bit versions. > > BPF_JMP: eBPF adds BPF_JNE, BPF_JSGT, BPF_JSGE, BPF_CALL, and > BPF_EXIT, which I think all should be safe (except maybe BPF_CALL > since we're not allowing functions really). Again we have to allow > one of the new eBPF codes, as the converter implements BPF_RET as > BPF_JMP | BPF_EXIT. > > Thoughts? > > Tycho