From: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
kafai@fb.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net] bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged
Date: Mon, 08 May 2017 00:51:02 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <590FA4D6.4060206@iogearbox.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAG48ez0S92fLmX5fEa1=HNC3wF+SYizske5MjiJDpW4=tLg6Uw@mail.gmail.com>
On 05/08/2017 12:26 AM, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 12:04 AM, Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net> wrote:
>> The patch fixes two things at once:
>>
>> 1) It checks the env->allow_ptr_leaks and only prints the map address to
>> the log if we have the privileges to do so, otherwise it just dumps 0
>> as we would when kptr_restrict is enabled on %pK. Given the latter is
>> off by default and not every distro sets it, I don't want to rely on
>> this, hence the 0 by default for unprivileged.
>>
>> 2) Printing of ldimm64 in the verifier log is currently broken in that
>> we don't print the full immediate, but only the 32 bit part of the
>> first insn part for ldimm64. Thus, fix this up as well; it's okay to
>> access, since we verified all ldimm64 earlier already (including just
>> constants) through replace_map_fd_with_map_ptr().
>>
>> Fixes: cbd357008604 ("bpf: verifier (add ability to receive verification log)")
>> Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
> [...]
>> @@ -362,9 +363,19 @@ static void print_bpf_insn(struct bpf_insn *insn)
>> insn->code,
>> bpf_ldst_string[BPF_SIZE(insn->code) >> 3],
>> insn->src_reg, insn->imm);
>> - } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM) {
>> - verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%x\n",
>> - insn->code, insn->dst_reg, insn->imm);
>> + } else if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM &&
>> + BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW) {
>> + /* At this point, we already made sure that the second
>> + * part of the ldimm64 insn is accessible.
>> + */
>> + u64 imm = ((u64)(insn + 1)->imm << 32) | (u32)insn->imm;
>> + bool map_ptr = insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_MAP_FD;
>> +
>> + if (map_ptr && !env->allow_ptr_leaks)
>> + imm = 0;
>> +
>> + verbose("(%02x) r%d = 0x%llx\n", insn->code,
>> + insn->dst_reg, (unsigned long long)imm);
>> } else {
>> verbose("BUG_ld_%02x\n", insn->code);
>> return;
>
> You replaced the `BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM` branch with a
> `BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_IMM && BPF_SIZE(insn->code) == BPF_DW`
> branch. Doesn't that break printing normal immediates?
What do you mean by 'normal' immediates? You mean loads of imm into
register, right? The ldimm64 is kind of special treated; for imms
fitting into 32 bit, there is BPF_MOV64_IMM() and BPF_MOV32_IMM()
otherwise.
F.e. see the jumptable in __bpf_prog_run(), which is the interpreter.
All BPF_LD instructions that we have are:
static const void *jumptable[256] = {
[...]
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_W] = &&LD_ABS_W,
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_H] = &&LD_ABS_H,
[BPF_LD | BPF_ABS | BPF_B] = &&LD_ABS_B,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_W] = &&LD_IND_W,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_H] = &&LD_IND_H,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IND | BPF_B] = &&LD_IND_B,
[BPF_LD | BPF_IMM | BPF_DW] = &&LD_IMM_DW,
};
In the print_bpf_insn() under class == BPF_LD, the BPF_ABS and BPF_IND
are separately handled (load of packet data from skb), and the BPF_IMM
is the one we're fixing, which only has BPF_DW as an option. I added it
there since we really only want to see BPF_DW in this branch due to the
double imm access.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-05-07 22:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-05-07 22:04 [PATCH net] bpf: don't let ldimm64 leak map addresses on unprivileged Daniel Borkmann
2017-05-07 22:26 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-07 22:51 ` Daniel Borkmann [this message]
2017-05-07 22:54 ` Jann Horn
2017-05-08 8:44 ` Daniel Borkmann
2017-05-08 17:18 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-05-08 19:08 ` David Miller
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=590FA4D6.4060206@iogearbox.net \
--to=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=kafai@fb.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).