From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>
To: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
bpf <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
"open list:KERNEL SELFTEST FRAMEWORK"
<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/11] bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return value range
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 10:24:54 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <61e96101-caf7-456d-a125-13dfe33ca080@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHC9VhQ_sTmoXwQ_AVfjTYQe4KR-uTnksPVfsei5JZ+VDJBQkA@mail.gmail.com>
On 6/10/2024 2:17 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 9, 2024 at 1:39 PM Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
>> On 6/8/2024 6:54 AM, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
>>> On Sat, Jun 8, 2024 at 1:04 AM Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>>>> On 6/7/2024 5:53 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>>>>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2024 at 8:24 AM Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> wrote:
>>>>>> From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Add macro LSM_RET_INT to annotate lsm hook return integer type and the
>>>>>> default return value, and the expected return range.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The LSM_RET_INT is declared as:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> LSM_RET_INT(defval, min, max)
>>>>>>
>>>>>> where
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - defval is the default return value
>>>>>>
>>>>>> - min and max indicate the expected return range is [min, max]
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The return value range for each lsm hook is taken from the description
>>>>>> in security/security.c.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> The expanded result of LSM_RET_INT is not changed, and the compiled
>>>>>> product is not changed.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 591 +++++++++++++++++-----------------
>>>>>> include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 6 -
>>>>>> kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 10 +
>>>>>> security/security.c | 1 +
>>>>>> 4 files changed, 313 insertions(+), 295 deletions(-)
>>>>> ...
>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>>> index 334e00efbde4..708f515ffbf3 100644
>>>>>> --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>>> +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
>>>>>> @@ -18,435 +18,448 @@
>>>>>> * The macro LSM_HOOK is used to define the data structures required by
>>>>>> * the LSM framework using the pattern:
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> - * LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <default_value>, <hook_name>, args...)
>>>>>> + * LSM_HOOK(<return_type>, <return_description>, <hook_name>, args...)
>>>>>> *
>>>>>> * struct security_hook_heads {
>>>>>> - * #define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME;
>>>>>> + * #define LSM_HOOK(RET, RETVAL_DESC, NAME, ...) struct hlist_head NAME;
>>>>>> * #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
>>>>>> * #undef LSM_HOOK
>>>>>> * };
>>>>>> */
>>>>>> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_set_context_mgr, const struct cred *mgr)
>>>>>> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transaction, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> +LSM_HOOK(int, LSM_RET_INT(0, -MAX_ERRNO, 0), binder_set_context_mgr, const struct cred *mgr)
>>>>>> +LSM_HOOK(int, LSM_RET_INT(0, -MAX_ERRNO, 0), binder_transaction, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> const struct cred *to)
>>>>>> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_binder, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> +LSM_HOOK(int, LSM_RET_INT(0, -MAX_ERRNO, 0), binder_transfer_binder, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> const struct cred *to)
>>>>>> -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> +LSM_HOOK(int, LSM_RET_INT(0, -MAX_ERRNO, 0), binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from,
>>>>>> const struct cred *to, const struct file *file)
>>>>> I'm not overly excited about injecting these additional return value
>>>>> range annotations into the LSM hook definitions, especially since the
>>>>> vast majority of the hooks "returns 0 on success, negative values on
>>>>> error". I'd rather see some effort put into looking at the
>>>>> feasibility of converting some (all?) of the LSM hook return value
>>>>> exceptions into the more conventional 0/-ERRNO format. Unfortunately,
>>>>> I haven't had the time to look into that myself, but if you wanted to
>>>>> do that I think it would be a good thing.
>>>>>
>>>> I agree that keeping all hooks return a consistent range of 0/-ERRNO
>>>> is more elegant than adding return value range annotations. However, there
>>>> are two issues that might need to be addressed first:
>>>>
>>>> 1. Compatibility
>>>>
>>>> For instance, security_vm_enough_memory_mm() determines whether to
>>>> set cap_sys_admin by checking if the hook vm_enough_memory returns
>>>> a positive number. If we were to change the hook vm_enough_memory
>>>> to return 0 to indicate the need for cap_sys_admin, then for the
>>>> LSM BPF program currently returning 0, the interpretation of its
>>>> return value would be reversed after the modification.
>>>
>>> This is not an issue. bpf lsm progs are no different from other lsm-s.
>>> If the meaning of return value or arguments to lsm hook change
>>> all lsm-s need to adjust as well. Regardless of whether they are
>>> written as in-kernel lsm-s, bpf-lsm, or out-of-tree lsm-s.
>
> Yes, the are no guarantees around compatibility in kernel/LSM
> interface from one kernel release to the next. If we need to change a
> LSM hook, we can change a LSM hook; the important part is that when we
> change the LSM hook we must make sure to update all of the in-tree
> LSMs which make use of that hook.
>
Great, so there are no compatibility restrictions on both LSM and BPF
sides.
>>>> 2. Expressing multiple non-error states using 0/-ERRNO
>>>>
>>>> IIUC, although 0/-ERRNO can be used to express different errors,
>>>> only 0 can be used for non-error state. If there are multiple
>>>> non-error states, they cannot be distinguished. For example,
>>>> security_inode_need_killpriv() returns < 0 on error, 0 if
>>>> security_inode_killpriv() doesn't need to be called, and > 0
>>>> if security_inode_killpriv() does need to be called.
>>> This looks like a problem indeed.
>>
>> Hang on. There aren't really three states here. security_inode_killpriv()
>> is called only on the security_inode_need_killpriv() > 0 case. I'm not
>> looking at the code this instant, but adjusting the return to something
>> like -ENOSYS (OK, maybe not a great choice, but you get the idea) instead
>> of 0 in the don't call case and switching the positive value to 0 should
>> work just fine.
>>
>> We're working on getting the LSM interfaces to be more consistent. This
>> particular pair of hooks is an example of why we need to do that.
>
> Yes, exactly. Aside from the issues with BPF verification, we've seen
> problems in the past with LSM hooks that differ from the usual "0 on
> success, negative values on failure" pattern. I'm not saying it is
> possible to convert all of the hooks to fit this model, but even if we
> can only adjust one or two I think that is still a win.
>
> As far as security_inode_need_killpriv()/security_inode_killpriv() is
> concerned, one possibility would be to shift the ATTR_KILL_PRIV
> set/mask operation into the LSM hook, something like this:
>
> [WARNING: completely untested, likely broken, yadda yadda]
>
> /**
> * ...
> * Returns: Return 0 on success, negative values on failure. @attrs
> may be updated
> * on success.
> */
> int security_inode_need_killpriv(*dentry, attrs)
> {
> int rc;
> rc = call_int_hook(inode_killpriv, dentry);
> if (rc < 0)
> return rc;
> if (rc > 0)
> attrs |= ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> else if (rc == 0)
> attrs &= ~ATTR_KILL_PRIV;
> return 0;
> }
>
> Yes, that doesn't fix the problem for the individual LSMs, but it does
> make the hook a bit more consistent from the rest of the kernel.
>
Alright, I'll give it a try. Perhaps in the end, there will be a few
hooks that cannot be converted. If that's the case, it seems we can
just provide exceptions for the return value explanations for these
not unconverted hooks, maybe on the BPF side only, thus avoiding the
need to annotate return values for all LSM hooks.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2024-06-11 2:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2024-04-11 12:27 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] Add check for bpf lsm return value Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/11] bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return value range Xu Kuohai
2024-06-06 21:53 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-08 8:04 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-06-08 13:54 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2024-06-09 17:39 ` Casey Schaufler
2024-06-09 18:17 ` Paul Moore
2024-06-11 2:24 ` Xu Kuohai [this message]
2024-06-11 20:06 ` Paul Moore
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/11] bpf, lsm: Add helper to read " Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/11] bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier Xu Kuohai
2024-04-13 11:44 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/11] bpf, lsm: Add bpf lsm disabled hook list Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/11] bpf: Avoid progs for different hooks calling each other with tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/11] bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within Xu Kuohai
2024-04-12 8:53 ` Shung-Hsi Yu
2024-04-25 23:41 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-26 8:08 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/11] bpf: Fix a false rejection caused by AND operation Xu Kuohai
2024-04-19 23:00 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-20 8:33 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-23 21:55 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-24 2:25 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-24 22:06 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-25 2:42 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-25 16:28 ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-26 7:43 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-26 20:36 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-28 15:15 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 20:58 ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-29 22:18 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-30 3:56 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-30 3:54 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 21:56 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/11] selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/11] selftests/bpf: Add return value checks for failed tests Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/11] selftests/bpf: Add test for lsm tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/11] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf lsm Xu Kuohai
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=61e96101-caf7-456d-a125-13dfe33ca080@huaweicloud.com \
--to=xukuohai@huaweicloud.com \
--cc=alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com \
--cc=andrii@kernel.org \
--cc=ast@kernel.org \
--cc=bpf@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=daniel@iogearbox.net \
--cc=eddyz87@gmail.com \
--cc=haoluo@google.com \
--cc=jackmanb@chromium.org \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.fastabend@gmail.com \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=jolsa@kernel.org \
--cc=kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com \
--cc=martin.lau@linux.dev \
--cc=mattbobrowski@google.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=omosnace@redhat.com \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=roberto.sassu@huawei.com \
--cc=sdf@google.com \
--cc=serge@hallyn.com \
--cc=shung-hsi.yu@suse.com \
--cc=song@kernel.org \
--cc=yonghong.song@linux.dev \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).