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From: John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>
To: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
	kpsingh@kernel.org, john.fastabend@gmail.com,
	songliubraving@fb.com, kafai@fb.com, yhs@fb.com
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Subject: RE: [PATCH v5 3/5] bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper
Date: Tue, 21 Jun 2022 15:27:46 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <62b245e22effa_1627420871@john.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220621163757.760304-4-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Add the bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper, to give eBPF security modules
> the ability to check the validity of a signature against supplied data, by
> using user-provided or system-provided keys as trust anchor.
> 
> The new helper makes it possible to enforce mandatory policies, as eBPF
> programs might be allowed to make security decisions only based on data
> sources the system administrator approves.
> 
> The caller should provide both the data to be verified and the signature as
> eBPF dynamic pointers (to minimize the number of parameters).
> 
> The caller should also provide a keyring pointer obtained with
> bpf_lookup_user_key() or, alternatively, a keyring ID with values defined
> in verification.h. While the first choice gives users more flexibility, the
> second offers better security guarantees, as the keyring selection will not
> depend on possibly untrusted user space but on the kernel itself.
> 
> Defined keyring IDs are: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of
> system keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring (where keys can
> be added only if they are vouched for by existing keys in those keyrings);
> 2 for the platform keyring (primarily used by the integrity subsystem to
> verify a kexec'ed kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature).
> 
> Note: since the keyring ID assignment is understood only by
> verify_pkcs7_signature(), it must be passed directly to the corresponding
> helper, rather than to a separate new helper returning a struct key pointer
> with the keyring ID as a pointer value. If such pointer is passed to any
> other helper which does not check its validity, an illegal memory access
> could occur.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
> Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com> (cast warning)
> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/bpf.h       | 17 +++++++++++++++
>  kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c           | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>  tools/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h | 17 +++++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> index 7bbcf2cd105d..524bed4d7170 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/bpf.h
> @@ -5339,6 +5339,22 @@ union bpf_attr {
>   *		bpf_lookup_user_key() helper.
>   *	Return
>   *		0
> + *
> + * long bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature(struct bpf_dynptr *data_ptr, struct bpf_dynptr *sig_ptr, struct key *trusted_keys, unsigned long keyring_id)
> + *	Description
> + *		Verify the PKCS#7 signature *sig* against the supplied *data*
> + *		with keys in *trusted_keys* or in a keyring with ID
> + *		*keyring_id*.

Would be nice to give precedence here so that its obvious order between
trusted_keys and keyring_id. 

> + *
> + *		*keyring_id* can have the following values defined in
> + *		verification.h: 0 for the primary keyring (immutable keyring of
> + *		system keys); 1 for both the primary and secondary keyring
> + *		(where keys can be added only if they are vouched for by
> + *		existing keys in those keyrings); 2 for the platform keyring
> + *		(primarily used by the integrity subsystem to verify a kexec'ed
> + *		kerned image and, possibly, the initramfs signature).
> + *	Return
> + *		0 on success, a negative value on error.
>   */

  reply	other threads:[~2022-06-21 22:28 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-06-21 16:37 [PATCH v5 0/5] bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 16:37 ` [PATCH v5 1/5] bpf: Export bpf_dynptr_get_size() Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 16:37 ` [PATCH v5 2/5] bpf: Add bpf_lookup_user_key() and bpf_key_put() helpers Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 22:32   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-06-22  7:12     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-23 12:36       ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-23 20:54         ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-06-24 15:32           ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-24 16:50             ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-06-24 17:38               ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-24 15:59           ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 16:37 ` [PATCH v5 3/5] bpf: Add bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 22:27   ` John Fastabend [this message]
2022-06-22  9:54     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-23  1:27       ` John Fastabend
2022-06-21 16:37 ` [PATCH v5 4/5] selftests/bpf: Add test for unreleased key references Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 22:35   ` John Fastabend
2022-06-22  7:14     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 16:37 ` [PATCH v5 5/5] selftests/bpf: Add test for bpf_verify_pkcs7_signature() helper Roberto Sassu
2022-06-21 22:31   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2022-06-22  7:06     ` Roberto Sassu
2022-06-22 18:16       ` Alexei Starovoitov

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