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From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>,  willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Cc: brauner@kernel.org,  davem@davemloft.net,  edumazet@google.com,
	 horms@kernel.org,  kuba@kernel.org,  kuni1840@gmail.com,
	 kuniyu@amazon.com,  netdev@vger.kernel.org,  pabeni@redhat.com,
	 willemb@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 6/9] af_unix: Move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock.
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 18:07:59 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <682665bf7cebc_26df0c294aa@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250515203540.85511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>

Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
> Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 14:44:14 -0400
> > Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> > > As explained in the next patch, SO_PASSRIGHTS would have a problem
> > > if we assigned a corresponding bit to socket->flags, so it must be
> > > managed in struct sock.
> > > 
> > > Mixing socket->flags and sk->sk_flags for similar options will look
> > > confusing, and sk->sk_flags does not have enough space on 32bit system.
> > > 
> > > Also, as mentioned in commit 16e572626961 ("af_unix: dont send
> > > SCM_CREDENTIALS by default"), SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSPID handling
> > > is known to be slow, and managing the flags in struct socket cannot
> > > avoid that for embryo sockets.
> > > 
> > > Let's move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock.
> > > 
> > > While at it, other SOCK_XXX flags in net.h are grouped as enum.
> > > 
> > > Note that assign_bit() was atomic, so the writer side is moved down
> > > after lock_sock() in setsockopt(), but the bit is only read once
> > > in sendmsg() and recvmsg(), so lock_sock() is not needed there.
> > 
> > Because the socket lock is already held there?
> 
> No, for example, scm_recv_unix() is called without lock_sock(),
> but it's okay because reading a single bit is always a matter
> of timing, when to snapshot the flag, (unless there is another
> dependency or the bit is read more than once).
> 
> With this, write happens before/after the if block:
> 
>                                <-- write could happen here
>   lock_sock()
>   if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) {
>     do something
>   }
>   lock_unlock()
>                                <-- or here (not related to logic)
> 
> but this is same without lock_sock() if the bit is read only
> once:
> 
>                                <-- write could happen here
>   if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) {
>     do something               <-- or here (not related to logic)
>   }
>                                <-- or here (not related to logic)
> 
> So for SOCK_PASSXXX bits, lock_sock() prevents data-race
> between writers as you pointed out, but it does nothing
> for readers.

Essentially you're saying that a single bit read is a natural
word read, so atomic anyway? I.e., yes this is a data race, safe.
Will KCSAN report on the race regardless?

All other single bit cases in sk_getsockopt use sk_flags
and sock_flag, so are not a good existing example. But the single
bit reads in do_tcp_getsockopt do the same. So I guess it's fine.
Indeed constant_test_bit does nothing special either.

Sounds good, thanks.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-05-15 22:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-05-14 16:51 [PATCH v3 net-next 0/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 1/9] af_unix: Factorise test_bit() for SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSPIDFD Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:07   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:23     ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 21:48       ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 2/9] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to maybe_add_creds() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:07   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 3/9] scm: Move scm_recv() from scm.h to scm.c Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:08   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 4/9] tcp: Restrict SO_TXREHASH to TCP socket Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:36   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 5/9] net: Restrict SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to AF_{UNIX,NETLINK,BLUETOOTH} Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:36   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 6/9] af_unix: Move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15  3:18   ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:44   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:35     ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:07       ` Willem de Bruijn [this message]
2025-05-15 22:15         ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 7/9] af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:06   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 8/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:25   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:38     ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 9/9] selftest: af_unix: Test SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:27   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:50     ` Kuniyuki Iwashima

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