From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>, willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com,
horms@kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org, kuni1840@gmail.com,
kuniyu@amazon.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
willemb@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 net-next 6/9] af_unix: Move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock.
Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 18:07:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <682665bf7cebc_26df0c294aa@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250515203540.85511-1-kuniyu@amazon.com>
Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> From: Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>
> Date: Thu, 15 May 2025 14:44:14 -0400
> > Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote:
> > > As explained in the next patch, SO_PASSRIGHTS would have a problem
> > > if we assigned a corresponding bit to socket->flags, so it must be
> > > managed in struct sock.
> > >
> > > Mixing socket->flags and sk->sk_flags for similar options will look
> > > confusing, and sk->sk_flags does not have enough space on 32bit system.
> > >
> > > Also, as mentioned in commit 16e572626961 ("af_unix: dont send
> > > SCM_CREDENTIALS by default"), SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSPID handling
> > > is known to be slow, and managing the flags in struct socket cannot
> > > avoid that for embryo sockets.
> > >
> > > Let's move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock.
> > >
> > > While at it, other SOCK_XXX flags in net.h are grouped as enum.
> > >
> > > Note that assign_bit() was atomic, so the writer side is moved down
> > > after lock_sock() in setsockopt(), but the bit is only read once
> > > in sendmsg() and recvmsg(), so lock_sock() is not needed there.
> >
> > Because the socket lock is already held there?
>
> No, for example, scm_recv_unix() is called without lock_sock(),
> but it's okay because reading a single bit is always a matter
> of timing, when to snapshot the flag, (unless there is another
> dependency or the bit is read more than once).
>
> With this, write happens before/after the if block:
>
> <-- write could happen here
> lock_sock()
> if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) {
> do something
> }
> lock_unlock()
> <-- or here (not related to logic)
>
> but this is same without lock_sock() if the bit is read only
> once:
>
> <-- write could happen here
> if (sk->sk_scm_credentials) {
> do something <-- or here (not related to logic)
> }
> <-- or here (not related to logic)
>
> So for SOCK_PASSXXX bits, lock_sock() prevents data-race
> between writers as you pointed out, but it does nothing
> for readers.
Essentially you're saying that a single bit read is a natural
word read, so atomic anyway? I.e., yes this is a data race, safe.
Will KCSAN report on the race regardless?
All other single bit cases in sk_getsockopt use sk_flags
and sock_flag, so are not a good existing example. But the single
bit reads in do_tcp_getsockopt do the same. So I guess it's fine.
Indeed constant_test_bit does nothing special either.
Sounds good, thanks.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-15 22:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-14 16:51 [PATCH v3 net-next 0/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 1/9] af_unix: Factorise test_bit() for SOCK_PASSCRED and SOCK_PASSPIDFD Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:07 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:23 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 21:48 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 2/9] af_unix: Don't pass struct socket to maybe_add_creds() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:07 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 3/9] scm: Move scm_recv() from scm.h to scm.c Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:08 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 4/9] tcp: Restrict SO_TXREHASH to TCP socket Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:36 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 5/9] net: Restrict SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to AF_{UNIX,NETLINK,BLUETOOTH} Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:36 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 6/9] af_unix: Move SOCK_PASS{CRED,PIDFD,SEC} to struct sock Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 3:18 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 18:44 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:35 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 22:07 ` Willem de Bruijn [this message]
2025-05-15 22:15 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 7/9] af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect() Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:06 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 8/9] af_unix: Introduce SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:25 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:38 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-14 16:51 ` [PATCH v3 net-next 9/9] selftest: af_unix: Test SO_PASSRIGHTS Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-15 19:27 ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-05-15 20:50 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=682665bf7cebc_26df0c294aa@willemb.c.googlers.com.notmuch \
--to=willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com \
--cc=brauner@kernel.org \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=edumazet@google.com \
--cc=horms@kernel.org \
--cc=kuba@kernel.org \
--cc=kuni1840@gmail.com \
--cc=kuniyu@amazon.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
--cc=willemb@google.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox