From: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
To: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>
Cc: brauner@kernel.org, cyphar@cyphar.com, davem@davemloft.net,
edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
horms@kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v6 3/4] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 12:09:12 +0200 (CEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <728282285.265641.1785924552245@kpc.webmail.kpnmail.nl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAAVpQUCo0r+DDRJ9BT1_2JYmPcsUNnk6aS+oqPvOrO9ruCPUKw@mail.gmail.com>
> Op 04-08-2026 19:16 CEST schreef Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@google.com>:
>
>
> On Sun, Aug 2, 2026 at 8:11 AM Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl> wrote:
> >
> > Right now if some LSM such as Smack denies an AF_UNIX socket peer to
> > receive an SCM_RIGHTS fd, the SCM_RIGHTS fd array will be cut short at
> > that point, and MSG_CTRUNC is set on return of recvmsg(). This is
> > highly problematic behaviour, because it leaves the receiver
> > wondering what happened. As per man page MSG_CTRUNC is supposed to
> > indicate that the control buffer was sized too short, but suddenly
> > a permission error might result in the exact same flag being set.
> > Moreover, the receiver has no chance to determine how many fds got
> > originally sent and how many were suppressed.[1]
> >
> > Add a SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC option to UNIX sockets to enable more useful
> > handling of LSM denials when receiving SCM_RIGHTS messages: instead of
> > truncating the message at the first blocked fd, keep every fd slot
> > and store the LSM errno in the blocked slot. The socket option is
> > inherited by the child accept() socket if set on the listen() socket.
> >
> > [1]: https://github.com/uapi-group/kernel-features#useful-handling-of-lsm-denials-on-scm_rights
> >
> > Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
> > Signed-off-by: Jori Koolstra <jkoolstra@xs4all.nl>
> > ---
> > arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 2 ++
> > arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 2 ++
> > arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 2 ++
> > arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h | 2 ++
> > include/net/af_unix.h | 1 +
> > include/net/scm.h | 13 +++------
> > include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h | 2 ++
> > net/compat.c | 4 +--
> > net/core/scm.c | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
> > net/unix/af_unix.c | 12 ++++++++-
> > 10 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > index 5ef57f88df6b..946a5fad2691 100644
> > --- a/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > +++ b/arch/alpha/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > @@ -155,6 +155,8 @@
> > #define SO_INQ 84
> > #define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
> >
> > +#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 85
> > +
> > #if !defined(__KERNEL__)
> >
> > #if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
> > diff --git a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > index 72fb1b006da9..f1641dde135f 100644
> > --- a/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > +++ b/arch/mips/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > @@ -166,6 +166,8 @@
> > #define SO_INQ 84
> > #define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
> >
> > +#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 85
> > +
> > #if !defined(__KERNEL__)
> >
> > #if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
> > diff --git a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > index c16ec36dfee6..f3a3815c7dc2 100644
> > --- a/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > +++ b/arch/parisc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > @@ -147,6 +147,8 @@
> > #define SO_INQ 0x4052
> > #define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
> >
> > +#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 0x4053
> > +
> > #if !defined(__KERNEL__)
> >
> > #if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64
> > diff --git a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > index 71befa109e1c..7907f3b1f0ee 100644
> > --- a/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > +++ b/arch/sparc/include/uapi/asm/socket.h
> > @@ -148,6 +148,8 @@
> > #define SO_INQ 0x005d
> > #define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
> >
> > +#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 0x005e
> > +
> > #if !defined(__KERNEL__)
> >
> >
> > diff --git a/include/net/af_unix.h b/include/net/af_unix.h
> > index 34f53dde65ce..bb1b3dee02e8 100644
> > --- a/include/net/af_unix.h
> > +++ b/include/net/af_unix.h
> > @@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct unix_sock {
> > struct scm_stat scm_stat;
> > int inq_len;
> > bool recvmsg_inq;
> > + bool scm_rights_notrunc;
> > #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB)
> > struct sk_buff *oob_skb;
> > #endif
> > diff --git a/include/net/scm.h b/include/net/scm.h
> > index c52519669349..86ae6bc109ec 100644
> > --- a/include/net/scm.h
> > +++ b/include/net/scm.h
> > @@ -50,8 +50,8 @@ struct scm_cookie {
> > #endif
> > };
> >
> > -void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > -void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
> > +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc);
> > int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm);
> > struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl);
> > @@ -107,13 +107,8 @@ void scm_recv(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> > void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> > struct scm_cookie *scm, int flags);
> >
> > -static inline int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd,
> > - unsigned int flags)
> > -{
> > - if (!ufd)
> > - return -EFAULT;
> > - return receive_fd(f, ufd, flags);
> > -}
> > +int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd, unsigned int flags,
> > + bool notrunc);
> >
> > #endif /* __LINUX_NET_SCM_H */
> >
> > diff --git a/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h b/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
> > index 53b5a8c002b1..84ea7b92936e 100644
> > --- a/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
> > +++ b/include/uapi/asm-generic/socket.h
> > @@ -150,6 +150,8 @@
> > #define SO_INQ 84
> > #define SCM_INQ SO_INQ
> >
> > +#define SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC 85
> > +
> > #if !defined(__KERNEL__)
> >
> > #if __BITS_PER_LONG == 64 || (defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__))
> > diff --git a/net/compat.c b/net/compat.c
> > index d68cf9c3aad5..6bdf4a2c9077 100644
> > --- a/net/compat.c
> > +++ b/net/compat.c
> > @@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static int scm_max_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg)
> > return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct compat_cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
> > }
> >
> > -void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> > +void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc)
> > {
> > struct compat_cmsghdr __user *cm =
> > (struct compat_cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
> > @@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ void scm_detach_fds_compat(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> > int err = 0, i;
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
> > - err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
> > + err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, notrunc);
> > if (err < 0)
> > break;
> > }
> > diff --git a/net/core/scm.c b/net/core/scm.c
> > index a73b1eb30fd2..f0d44ecdb11f 100644
> > --- a/net/core/scm.c
> > +++ b/net/core/scm.c
> > @@ -351,7 +351,31 @@ static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg)
> > return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int);
> > }
> >
> > -void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> > +int scm_recv_one_fd(struct file *f, int __user *ufd, unsigned int flags,
> > + bool notrunc)
> > +{
> > + int error;
> > +
> > + if (!ufd)
> > + return -EFAULT;
> > +
> > + error = security_file_receive(f);
> > + if (error)
> > + return notrunc ? put_user(error, ufd) : error;
> > +
> > + FD_PREPARE(fdf, flags, get_file(f));
> > + if (fdf.err)
> > + return fdf.err;
> > +
> > + error = put_user(fd_prepare_fd(fdf), ufd);
> > + if (error)
> > + return error;
> > +
> > + __receive_sock(fd_prepare_file(fdf));
> > + return fd_publish(fdf);
> > +}
> > +
> > +void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm, bool notrunc)
> > {
> > struct cmsghdr __user *cm =
> > (__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user;
> > @@ -365,12 +389,12 @@ void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
> > return;
> >
> > if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) {
> > - scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
> > + scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm, notrunc);
> > return;
> > }
> >
> > for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) {
> > - err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags);
> > + err = scm_recv_one_fd(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags, notrunc);
> > if (err < 0)
> > break;
> > }
> > @@ -542,8 +566,12 @@ void scm_recv_unix(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
> > if (!__scm_recv_common(sock->sk, msg, scm, flags))
> > return;
> >
> > - if (scm->fp)
> > - scm_detach_fds(msg, scm);
> > + if (scm->fp) {
> > + struct unix_sock *u;
> > +
> > + u = unix_sk(sock->sk);
> > + scm_detach_fds(msg, scm, READ_ONCE(u->scm_rights_notrunc));
> > + }
> >
> > if (sock->sk->sk_scm_pidfd)
> > scm_pidfd_recv(msg, scm);
> > diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> > index 51cbf920130d..03ce23a4ebee 100644
> > --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c
> > +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c
> > @@ -922,6 +922,7 @@ static bool unix_custom_sockopt(int optname)
> > {
> > switch (optname) {
> > case SO_INQ:
> > + case SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC:
> > return true;
> > default:
> > return false;
> > @@ -957,6 +958,14 @@ static int unix_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
> >
> > WRITE_ONCE(u->recvmsg_inq, val);
> > break;
> > +
> > + case SO_RIGHTS_NOTRUNC:
> > + if (val > 1 || val < 0)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + WRITE_ONCE(u->scm_rights_notrunc, val);
> > + break;
> > +
> > default:
> > return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> > }
> > @@ -1746,9 +1755,10 @@ static int unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr_unsized *uad
> > init_peercred(newsk, &peercred);
> >
> > newu = unix_sk(newsk);
> > + otheru = unix_sk(other);
> > newu->listener = other;
> > + newu->scm_rights_notrunc = otheru->scm_rights_notrunc;
>
> nit: READ_ONCE() is needed here.
>
Yeah, I was thinking whether to add that or not. We have
newsk->sk_scm_recv_flags = other->sk_scm_recv_flags;
earlier, so without READ_ONCE(), and earlier there is
unix_state_lock(other);
which should make this assignment safe. However, that does not protect necessarily
against compiler mangling. Then again, we are reading a bool here, so isn't this
a theoretical concern mostly?
I am happy to change it though (if only to signal intent), but then the access to
sk_scm_recv_flags should also be READ_ONCE(), I believe, or it will be needlessly
confusing why it is there for one access but not the other.
Thanks,
Jori.
>
>
> > RCU_INIT_POINTER(newsk->sk_wq, &newu->peer_wq);
> > - otheru = unix_sk(other);
> >
> > /* copy address information from listening to new sock
> > *
> > --
> > 2.55.0
> >
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 10:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-02 15:12 [PATCH net-next v6 0/4] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS Jori Koolstra
2026-08-02 15:12 ` [PATCH net-next v6 1/4] net: af_unix: enable custom setsockopt for all socket types Jori Koolstra
2026-08-04 16:49 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-08-02 15:12 ` [PATCH net-next v6 2/4] net: scm: move scm_detach_fds() from common path to scm_recv_unix() Jori Koolstra
2026-08-02 15:12 ` [PATCH net-next v6 3/4] net: af_unix: useful handling of LSM denials on SCM_RIGHTS Jori Koolstra
2026-08-04 17:16 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-08-05 10:09 ` Jori Koolstra [this message]
2026-08-05 16:27 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-08-02 15:12 ` [PATCH net-next v6 4/4] selftest: Add tests for " Jori Koolstra
2026-08-04 17:26 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2026-08-05 10:18 ` Jori Koolstra
2026-08-05 16:30 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
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