From: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
To: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>
Cc: Nikolay Aleksandrov <nikolay@redhat.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>,
Fan Du <fan.du@windriver.com>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Possible fix
Date: Thu, 06 Mar 2014 22:04:54 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <7881571.eH1vgtYEXX@sifl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20140305122009.GR32371@secunet.com>
On Wednesday, March 05, 2014 01:20:09 PM Steffen Klassert wrote:
> On Fri, Feb 28, 2014 at 05:10:47PM -0500, Paul Moore wrote:
> > On Friday, February 28, 2014 11:10:07 AM Nikolay Aleksandrov wrote:
> > > On 02/28/2014 08:23 AM, Steffen Klassert wrote:
> > > > Looking at the git history, it seems that this bug is about nine
> > > > years old. I guess noone is actually using this.
> >
> > Most (all?) of the labeled IPsec users use the netlink interface and not
> > pfkey so it isn't surprising that this has gone unnoticed for some time.
>
> Right, that's not really surprising. But it is a bit surprising that
> we care for the security context only if we add a socket policy via
> the pfkey key manager. The security context is not handled if we do
> that with the netlink key manager, see xfrm_compile_policy().
>
> I'm not that familiar with selinux and labeled IPsec, but maybe this
> needs to be implemented in xfrm_compile_policy() too.
Okay, I see your point. We probably should add support for per-socket policy
labels just to keep parity with the pfkey code (and this is far removed from
any critical path), but to be honest it isn't something that I think would get
much use in practice. Labeled networking users tend to fall under the very
strict, one-system-wide-security-policy and per-socket policies tend to go
against that logic.
I'll have to think about it some more.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2014-03-07 3:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2014-02-27 15:19 kmalloc with locks held in xfrm Dave Jones
2014-02-27 16:17 ` Possible fix Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-02-27 16:24 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-02-27 17:05 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-02-28 7:23 ` Steffen Klassert
2014-02-28 10:10 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-02-28 22:10 ` Paul Moore
2014-03-02 16:26 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-05 12:20 ` Steffen Klassert
2014-03-07 3:04 ` Paul Moore [this message]
2014-03-07 11:23 ` Steffen Klassert
2014-03-07 15:50 ` Paul Moore
2014-03-04 12:26 ` [PATCH 0/2] af_key: fixes for sleeping while atomic Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-04 12:26 ` [PATCH 1/2] net: af_key: fix sleeping under rcu Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-04 12:46 ` David Laight
2014-03-04 21:40 ` David Miller
2014-03-04 12:26 ` [PATCH 2/2] selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-07 3:22 ` Paul Moore
2014-03-07 10:52 ` Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-05 12:07 ` [PATCH 0/2] af_key: fixes for sleeping while atomic Steffen Klassert
2014-03-05 22:21 ` Paul Moore
2014-03-07 11:44 ` [PATCHv2 " Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-07 11:44 ` [PATCHv2 1/2] net: af_key: fix sleeping under rcu Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-07 11:44 ` [PATCHv2 2/2] selinux: add gfp argument to security_xfrm_policy_alloc and fix callers Nikolay Aleksandrov
2014-03-07 22:27 ` Paul Moore
2014-03-10 12:52 ` Steffen Klassert
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