Re: [PATCH bpf-next v5 5/8] bpf: Fix context type resolving for extension programs

["Toke Høiland-Jørgensen" <toke@redhat.com>]

Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> writes:

> On Thu, Sep 17, 2020 at 10:10 AM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> wrote:
>>
>> Andrii Nakryiko <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> writes:
>>
>> > On Wed, Sep 16, 2020 at 12:59 PM Andrii Nakryiko
>> > <andrii.nakryiko@gmail.com> wrote:
>> >>
>> >> On Tue, Sep 15, 2020 at 5:50 PM Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com> wrote:
>> >> >
>> >> > From: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
>> >> >
>> >> > Eelco reported we can't properly access arguments if the tracing
>> >> > program is attached to extension program.
>> >> >
>> >> > Having following program:
>> >> >
>> >> >   SEC("classifier/test_pkt_md_access")
>> >> >   int test_pkt_md_access(struct __sk_buff *skb)
>> >> >
>> >> > with its extension:
>> >> >
>> >> >   SEC("freplace/test_pkt_md_access")
>> >> >   int test_pkt_md_access_new(struct __sk_buff *skb)
>> >> >
>> >> > and tracing that extension with:
>> >> >
>> >> >   SEC("fentry/test_pkt_md_access_new")
>> >> >   int BPF_PROG(fentry, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> >> >
>> >> > It's not possible to access skb argument in the fentry program,
>> >> > with following error from verifier:
>> >> >
>> >> >   ; int BPF_PROG(fentry, struct sk_buff *skb)
>> >> >   0: (79) r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
>> >> >   invalid bpf_context access off=0 size=8
>> >> >
>> >> > The problem is that btf_ctx_access gets the context type for the
>> >> > traced program, which is in this case the extension.
>> >> >
>> >> > But when we trace extension program, we want to get the context
>> >> > type of the program that the extension is attached to, so we can
>> >> > access the argument properly in the trace program.
>> >> >
>> >> > This version of the patch is tweaked slightly from Jiri's original one,
>> >> > since the refactoring in the previous patches means we have to get the
>> >> > target prog type from the new variable in prog->aux instead of directly
>> >> > from the target prog.
>> >> >
>> >> > Reported-by: Eelco Chaudron <echaudro@redhat.com>
>> >> > Suggested-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
>> >> > Signed-off-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
>> >> > ---
>> >> >  kernel/bpf/btf.c |    9 ++++++++-
>> >> >  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>> >> >
>> >> > diff --git a/kernel/bpf/btf.c b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> >> > index 9228af9917a8..55f7b2ba1cbd 100644
>> >> > --- a/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> >> > +++ b/kernel/bpf/btf.c
>> >> > @@ -3860,7 +3860,14 @@ bool btf_ctx_access(int off, int size, enum bpf_access_type type,
>> >> >
>> >> >         info->reg_type = PTR_TO_BTF_ID;
>> >> >         if (tgt_prog) {
>> >> > -               ret = btf_translate_to_vmlinux(log, btf, t, tgt_prog->type, arg);
>> >> > +               enum bpf_prog_type tgt_type;
>> >> > +
>> >> > +               if (tgt_prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
>> >> > +                       tgt_type = tgt_prog->aux->tgt_prog_type;
>> >>
>> >> what if tgt_prog->aux->tgt_prog_type is also BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT? Should
>> >> this be a loop?
>> >
>> > ok, never mind this specifically. there is an explicit check
>> >
>> > if (tgt_prog->type == prog->type) {
>> >     verbose(env, "Cannot recursively attach\n");
>> >     return -EINVAL;
>> > }
>> >
>> > that will prevent this.
>> >
>> > But, I think we still will be able to construct a long chain of
>> > fmod_ret -> freplace -> fmod_ret -> freplace -> and so on ad
>> > infinitum. Can you please construct such a selftest? And then we
>> > should probably fix those checks to also disallow FMOD_RET, in
>> > addition to BPF_TRACE_FENTRY/FEXIT (and someone more familiar with LSM
>> > prog type should check if that can cause any problems).
>>
>> Huh, I thought fmod_ret was supposed to be for kernel functions only?
>
> Yeah, I realized that afterwards, but didn't want to ramble on forever :)
>
>> However, I can't really point to anywhere in the code that ensures this,
>> other than check_attach_modify_return(), but I think that will allow a
>> bpf function as long as its name starts with "security_" ?
>
> I think error_injection_list check will disallow anything that's not a
> specially marked kernel function. So we are probably safe as is, even
> though a bit implicitly.

Got a selftest working now, and no, it seems not. At least attachment
will succeed if the freplace program has a security_ prefix in its
function name. So will add a new patch to fix that, and the selftest :)

-Toke