netdev.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: kuba@kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, aelior@marvell.com, davem@davemloft.net,
	manishc@marvell.com, pabeni@redhat.com, skalluru@marvell.com,
	simon.horman@corigine.com, edumazet@google.com,
	VENKATA.SAI.DUGGI@ibm.com, drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	abdhalee@in.ibm.com, Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH v8 1/2] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool
Date: Thu,  8 Feb 2024 12:55:15 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <90238577e00a7a996767b84769b5e03ef840b13a.1707414045.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1707414045.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling

During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using 
bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also frees SGEs. This race condition can
result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations.

[  793.003930] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[  793.003937] PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
[  793.003939] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
[  793.004037] bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
[  793.008839] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
[  793.122134] Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[  793.122143] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
[  793.122147] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
[  793.122152] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
.....
[  793.122315] Call Trace:
[  793.122318] [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
[  793.122331] [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
[  793.122338] [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
[  793.122342] [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
[  793.122347] [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
[  793.122352] [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
[  793.122356] [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64

To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
freeing.


Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
index d8b1824c334d..0bc1367fd649 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
@@ -1002,9 +1002,6 @@ static inline void bnx2x_set_fw_mac_addr(__le16 *fw_hi, __le16 *fw_mid,
 static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_mem_pool(struct bnx2x *bp,
 					  struct bnx2x_alloc_pool *pool)
 {
-	if (!pool->page)
-		return;
-
 	put_page(pool->page);
 
 	pool->page = NULL;
@@ -1015,6 +1012,9 @@ static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(struct bnx2x *bp,
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (!fp->page_pool.page)
+		return;
+
 	if (fp->mode == TPA_MODE_DISABLED)
 		return;
 
-- 
2.25.1


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
To: kuba@kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, davem@davemloft.net, manishc@marvell.com,
	pabeni@redhat.com, skalluru@marvell.com,
	simon.horman@corigine.com, edumazet@google.com,
	VENKATA.SAI.DUGGI@ibm.com, drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	abdhalee@in.ibm.com, thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com
Subject: [PATCH v9 1/2] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool
Date: Mon, 12 Feb 2024 14:47:44 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <90238577e00a7a996767b84769b5e03ef840b13a.1707414045.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com> (raw)
Message-ID: <20240212204744.P36UU1tc5POebd3Y5LC225dTxXW0Hmrdb4M_F3cTbVI@z> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1707414045.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

Fix race condition leading to system crash during EEH error handling

During EEH error recovery, the bnx2x driver's transmit timeout logic
could cause a race condition when handling reset tasks. The
bnx2x_tx_timeout() schedules reset tasks via bnx2x_sp_rtnl_task(),
which ultimately leads to bnx2x_nic_unload(). In bnx2x_nic_unload()
SGEs are freed using bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(). However, this could
overlap with the EEH driver's attempt to reset the device using 
bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), which also frees SGEs. This race condition can
result in system crashes due to accessing freed memory locations.

[  793.003930] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[  793.003937] PCI 0011:01:00.0#10000: EEH: Invoking bnx2x->slot_reset()
[  793.003939] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14228(eth1)]IO slot reset initializing...
[  793.004037] bnx2x 0011:01:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142)
[  793.008839] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14244(eth1)]IO slot reset --> driver unload
[  793.122134] Kernel attempted to read user page (0) - exploit attempt? (uid: 0)
[  793.122143] BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference on read at 0x00000000
[  793.122147] Faulting instruction address: 0xc0080000025065fc
[  793.122152] Oops: Kernel access of bad area, sig: 11 [#1]
.....
[  793.122315] Call Trace:
[  793.122318] [c000000003c67a20] [c00800000250658c] bnx2x_io_slot_reset+0x204/0x610 [bnx2x] (unreliable)
[  793.122331] [c000000003c67af0] [c0000000000518a8] eeh_report_reset+0xb8/0xf0
[  793.122338] [c000000003c67b60] [c000000000052130] eeh_pe_report+0x180/0x550
[  793.122342] [c000000003c67c70] [c00000000005318c] eeh_handle_normal_event+0x84c/0xa60
[  793.122347] [c000000003c67d50] [c000000000053a84] eeh_event_handler+0xf4/0x170
[  793.122352] [c000000003c67da0] [c000000000194c58] kthread+0x1c8/0x1d0
[  793.122356] [c000000003c67e10] [c00000000000cf64] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x5c/0x64

To solve this issue, we need to verify page pool allocations before
freeing.

Fixes: 4cace675d687 ("bnx2x: Alloc 4k fragment for each rx ring buffer element")

Signed-off-by: Thinh Tran <thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com>

---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h | 6 +++---
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
index d8b1824c334d..0bc1367fd649 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnx2x/bnx2x_cmn.h
@@ -1002,9 +1002,6 @@ static inline void bnx2x_set_fw_mac_addr(__le16 *fw_hi, __le16 *fw_mid,
 static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_mem_pool(struct bnx2x *bp,
 					  struct bnx2x_alloc_pool *pool)
 {
-	if (!pool->page)
-		return;
-
 	put_page(pool->page);
 
 	pool->page = NULL;
@@ -1015,6 +1012,9 @@ static inline void bnx2x_free_rx_sge_range(struct bnx2x *bp,
 {
 	int i;
 
+	if (!fp->page_pool.page)
+		return;
+
 	if (fp->mode == TPA_MODE_DISABLED)
 		return;
 
-- 
2.25.1


  reply	other threads:[~2024-02-08 18:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 14+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-02-01 17:48 [PATCH v7 0/2] bnx2x: Fix error recovering in switch configuration Thinh Tran
2024-02-01 17:48 ` [PATCH v7 1/2] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool Thinh Tran
2024-02-08  2:37   ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-02-01 17:48 ` [PATCH v7 2/2] net/bnx2x: refactor common code to bnx2x_stop_nic() Thinh Tran
2024-02-08 18:55 ` [PATCH v8 0/2] bnx2x: Fix error recovering in switch configuration Thinh Tran
2024-02-08 18:55   ` Thinh Tran [this message]
2024-02-08 19:14     ` [PATCH v8 1/2] net/bnx2x: Prevent access to a freed page in page_pool Thinh Tran
2024-02-08 19:18     ` Thinh Tran
2024-02-09  1:29       ` Jakub Kicinski
2024-02-12 20:47         ` Thinh Tran
2024-02-12 20:47     ` [PATCH v9 " Thinh Tran
2024-02-08 18:55   ` [PATCH v8 2/2] net/bnx2x: refactor common code to bnx2x_stop_nic() Thinh Tran
2024-02-12 20:47     ` [PATCH v9 " Thinh Tran
2024-02-12 20:47   ` [PATCH v9 0/2] bnx2x: Fix error recovering in switch configuration Thinh Tran

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=90238577e00a7a996767b84769b5e03ef840b13a.1707414045.git.thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --to=thinhtr@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=VENKATA.SAI.DUGGI@ibm.com \
    --cc=abdhalee@in.ibm.com \
    --cc=aelior@marvell.com \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=manishc@marvell.com \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=simon.horman@corigine.com \
    --cc=skalluru@marvell.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).