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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Steffen Klassert <steffen.klassert@secunet.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-janitors@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net] xfrm: prevent some integer overflows in verify_ functions
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 11:42:31 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <92dc4619-7598-439e-8544-4b3b2cf5e597@stanley.mountain> (raw)

The xfrm_alg_len() type functions take the alg->alg_key_len which
is the length in bits and converts it to bytes and add it to
sizeof(*alg).

	return sizeof(*alg) + ((alg->alg_key_len + 7) / 8);

The alg->alg_key_len is type unsigned int.  That means that if we pick
an ->alg_key_len which is greater than "UINT_MAX - 7" it leads to an
integer overflow and the key length is treated as zero.  The result
is that xfrm_alg_len() function will return "sizeof(*alg) + 0".

However, so far as I can see this does not cause a problem.  All the
places which use this length consistently do the same conversion.  The
type of thing I was looking for would be code which uses partial keys
or code which uses a different type instead of u32 for ->alg_key_len.
I didn't find anything like that so I can't see a negative impact from
this bug.  Still fixing it is the right thing to do.

Fixes: 31c26852cb2a ("[IPSEC]: Verify key payload in verify_one_algo")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@linaro.org>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
index 08c6d6f0179f..686c6a24d92b 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ static int verify_one_alg(struct nlattr **attrs, enum xfrm_attr_type_t type,
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH/CRYPT/COMP key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH/CRYPT/COMP attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -75,6 +79,10 @@ static int verify_auth_trunc(struct nlattr **attrs,
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH_TRUNC key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)xfrm_alg_auth_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AUTH_TRUNC attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -93,6 +101,10 @@ static int verify_aead(struct nlattr **attrs, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 		return 0;
 
 	algp = nla_data(rt);
+	if (algp->alg_key_len > INT_MAX) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AEAD key length");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	if (nla_len(rt) < (int)aead_len(algp)) {
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid AEAD attribute length");
 		return -EINVAL;
-- 
2.45.2


             reply	other threads:[~2024-12-17  8:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-17  8:42 Dan Carpenter [this message]
2024-12-17 12:03 ` [PATCH net] xfrm: prevent some integer overflows in verify_ functions Herbert Xu
2024-12-17 12:32   ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-18  9:42     ` [PATCH net] xfrm: Rewrite key length conversion to avoid overflows Herbert Xu
2024-12-18 10:54       ` Dan Carpenter
2024-12-18 11:58         ` Herbert Xu

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