From: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org,
martin.lau@kernel.org, davemarchevsky@meta.com, tj@kernel.org,
memxor@gmail.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org,
kernel-team@fb.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 bpf-next 6/6] bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier.
Date: Fri, 3 Mar 2023 08:22:52 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZAICvFGmh2ykz9Bi@maniforge> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230303041446.3630-7-alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>
On Thu, Mar 02, 2023 at 08:14:46PM -0800, Alexei Starovoitov wrote:
> From: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
>
> bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() are only available in clang compiled kernels. Lack
> of such key mechanism makes it impossible for sleepable bpf programs to use RCU
> pointers.
>
> Allow bpf_rcu_read_lock/unlock() in GCC compiled kernels (though GCC doesn't
> support btf_type_tag yet) and allowlist certain field dereferences in important
> data structures like tast_struct, cgroup, socket that are used by sleepable
> programs either as RCU pointer or full trusted pointer (which is valid outside
> of RCU CS). Use BTF_TYPE_SAFE_RCU and BTF_TYPE_SAFE_TRUSTED macros for such
> tagging. They will be removed once GCC supports btf_type_tag.
>
> With that refactor check_ptr_to_btf_access(). Make it strict in enforcing
> PTR_TRUSTED and PTR_UNTRUSTED while deprecating old PTR_TO_BTF_ID without
> modifier flags. There is a chance that this strict enforcement might break
> existing programs (especially on GCC compiled kernels), but this cleanup has to
> start sooner than later. Note PTR_TO_CTX access still yields old deprecated
> PTR_TO_BTF_ID. Once it's converted to strict PTR_TRUSTED or PTR_UNTRUSTED the
> kfuncs and helpers will be able to default to KF_TRUSTED_ARGS. KF_RCU will
> remain as a weaker version of KF_TRUSTED_ARGS where obj refcnt could be 0.
>
> Adjust rcu_read_lock selftest to run on gcc and clang compiled kernels.
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: David Vernet <void@manifault.com>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-03-03 14:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-03-03 4:14 [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/6] bpf: Introduce kptr RCU Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 1/6] bpf: Rename __kptr_ref -> __kptr and __kptr -> __kptr_untrusted Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 2/6] bpf: Mark cgroups and dfl_cgrp fields as trusted Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 3/6] bpf: Introduce kptr_rcu Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 4/6] selftests/bpf: Add a test case for kptr_rcu Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 5/6] selftests/bpf: Tweak cgroup kfunc test Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 4:14 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 6/6] bpf: Refactor RCU enforcement in the verifier Alexei Starovoitov
2023-03-03 14:22 ` David Vernet [this message]
2023-03-03 16:50 ` [PATCH v5 bpf-next 0/6] bpf: Introduce kptr RCU patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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