* [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length
@ 2024-04-04 12:20 Eric Dumazet
2024-04-04 14:11 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
2024-04-04 16:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
0 siblings, 2 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2024-04-04 12:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
Jozsef Kadlecsik
Cc: netdev, netfilter-devel, coreteam, eric.dumazet, Eric Dumazet,
syzbot
I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")
setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
before copying data.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238
CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
__asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9
RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8
</TASK>
Allocated by task 7238:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline]
__kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
__cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
__sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
__do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
__se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
__x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73
flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
page_owner tracks the page as allocated
page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828
set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490
prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline]
get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454
__alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712
__alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline]
alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline]
alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249
allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412
new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline]
___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615
__slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705
__slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089
kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62
device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558
dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232
do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864
__rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline]
rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727
rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594
netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace:
reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline]
free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617
discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline]
__put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980
put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055
__slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254
qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
__kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322
kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline]
slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline]
__do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
__kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076
kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634
bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline]
rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367
rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427
process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline]
process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299
worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380
kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
Memory state around the buggy address:
ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
>ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
^
ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
---
net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++++
net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++
net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
4 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
index 99d82676f780ac49d01151fa9c585f44f9ea8ccc..cbd0e3586c3f61904efb4db7d9101d7770c852e7 100644
--- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
+++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
@@ -1111,6 +1111,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
struct ebt_replace tmp;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1423,6 +1425,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
{
struct ebt_replace hlp;
+ if (len < sizeof(hlp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
return -EFAULT;
@@ -2352,6 +2356,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg,
{
struct compat_ebt_replace hlp;
+ if (len < sizeof(hlp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
index 2407066b0fec1121d71561ecbad6f4f87ecdebbc..b150c9929b12e86219a55c77da480e0c538b3449 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
@@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1254,6 +1256,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct arpt_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
index 7da1df4997d057a4292927c2041687c2b39d4a01..487670759578168c5ff53bce6642898fc41936b3 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
@@ -1108,6 +1108,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ipt_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1492,6 +1494,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ipt_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
index fd9f049d6d41e77eacc10ce074a8a0d96b0d2e11..636b360311c5365fba2330f6ca2f7f1b6dd1363e 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
@@ -1125,6 +1125,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
@@ -1501,6 +1503,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
void *loc_cpu_entry;
struct ip6t_entry *iter;
+ if (len < sizeof(tmp))
+ return -EINVAL;
if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
return -EFAULT;
--
2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length
2024-04-04 12:20 [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length Eric Dumazet
@ 2024-04-04 14:11 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
2024-04-04 16:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Pablo Neira Ayuso @ 2024-04-04 14:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: David S . Miller, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni, Jozsef Kadlecsik,
netdev, netfilter-devel, coreteam, eric.dumazet, syzbot
On Thu, Apr 04, 2024 at 12:20:51PM +0000, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
> by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
> in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")
>
> setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
> before copying data.
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
> Read of size 96 at addr ffff88802cd73da0 by task syz-executor.4/7238
>
> CPU: 1 PID: 7238 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc2-next-20240403-syzkaller #0
> Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
> Call Trace:
> <TASK>
> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
> dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:114
> print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline]
> print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488
> kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601
> kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189
> __asan_memcpy+0x29/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:105
> copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline]
> copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline]
> do_replace net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1111 [inline]
> do_ipt_set_ctl+0x902/0x3dd0 net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c:1627
> nf_setsockopt+0x295/0x2c0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101
> do_sock_setsockopt+0x3af/0x720 net/socket.c:2311
> __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
> __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
> __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
> __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
> do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
> RIP: 0033:0x7fd22067dde9
> Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 e1 20 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
> RSP: 002b:00007fd21f9ff0c8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036
> RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fd2207abf80 RCX: 00007fd22067dde9
> RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000003
> RBP: 00007fd2206ca47a R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
> R10: 0000000020000880 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
> R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007fd2207abf80 R15: 00007ffd2d0170d8
> </TASK>
>
> Allocated by task 7238:
> kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
> kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
> poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:370 [inline]
> __kasan_kmalloc+0x98/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:387
> kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:211 [inline]
> __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4069 [inline]
> __kmalloc_noprof+0x200/0x410 mm/slub.c:4082
> kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:664 [inline]
> __cgroup_bpf_run_filter_setsockopt+0xd47/0x1050 kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1869
> do_sock_setsockopt+0x6b4/0x720 net/socket.c:2293
> __sys_setsockopt+0x1ae/0x250 net/socket.c:2334
> __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline]
> __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline]
> __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340
> do_syscall_64+0xfb/0x240
> entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x72/0x7a
>
> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802cd73da0
> which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8 of size 8
> The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
> allocated 1-byte region [ffff88802cd73da0, ffff88802cd73da1)
>
> The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
> page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0xffff88802cd73020 pfn:0x2cd73
> flags: 0xfff80000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0xfff)
> page_type: 0xffffefff(slab)
> raw: 00fff80000000000 ffff888015041280 dead000000000100 dead000000000122
> raw: ffff88802cd73020 000000008080007f 00000001ffffefff 0000000000000000
> page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
> page_owner tracks the page as allocated
> page last allocated via order 0, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x12cc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY), pid 5103, tgid 2119833701 (syz-executor.4), ts 5103, free_ts 70804600828
> set_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:32 [inline]
> post_alloc_hook+0x1f3/0x230 mm/page_alloc.c:1490
> prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:1498 [inline]
> get_page_from_freelist+0x2e7e/0x2f40 mm/page_alloc.c:3454
> __alloc_pages_noprof+0x256/0x6c0 mm/page_alloc.c:4712
> __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:244 [inline]
> alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:271 [inline]
> alloc_slab_page+0x5f/0x120 mm/slub.c:2249
> allocate_slab+0x5a/0x2e0 mm/slub.c:2412
> new_slab mm/slub.c:2465 [inline]
> ___slab_alloc+0xcd1/0x14b0 mm/slub.c:3615
> __slab_alloc+0x58/0xa0 mm/slub.c:3705
> __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3758 [inline]
> slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3936 [inline]
> __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
> kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x286/0x450 mm/slub.c:4089
> kstrdup+0x3a/0x80 mm/util.c:62
> device_rename+0xb5/0x1b0 drivers/base/core.c:4558
> dev_change_name+0x275/0x860 net/core/dev.c:1232
> do_setlink+0xa4b/0x41f0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:2864
> __rtnl_newlink net/core/rtnetlink.c:3680 [inline]
> rtnl_newlink+0x180b/0x20a0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:3727
> rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x89b/0x10d0 net/core/rtnetlink.c:6594
> netlink_rcv_skb+0x1e3/0x430 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:2559
> netlink_unicast_kernel net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1335 [inline]
> netlink_unicast+0x7ea/0x980 net/netlink/af_netlink.c:1361
> page last free pid 5146 tgid 5146 stack trace:
> reset_page_owner include/linux/page_owner.h:25 [inline]
> free_pages_prepare mm/page_alloc.c:1110 [inline]
> free_unref_page+0xd3c/0xec0 mm/page_alloc.c:2617
> discard_slab mm/slub.c:2511 [inline]
> __put_partials+0xeb/0x130 mm/slub.c:2980
> put_cpu_partial+0x17c/0x250 mm/slub.c:3055
> __slab_free+0x2ea/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4254
> qlink_free mm/kasan/quarantine.c:163 [inline]
> qlist_free_all+0x9e/0x140 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:179
> kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x14f/0x170 mm/kasan/quarantine.c:286
> __kasan_slab_alloc+0x23/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:322
> kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline]
> slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3888 [inline]
> slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3948 [inline]
> __do_kmalloc_node mm/slub.c:4068 [inline]
> __kmalloc_node_noprof+0x1d7/0x450 mm/slub.c:4076
> kmalloc_node_noprof include/linux/slab.h:681 [inline]
> kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x72/0x190 mm/util.c:634
> bucket_table_alloc lib/rhashtable.c:186 [inline]
> rhashtable_rehash_alloc+0x9e/0x290 lib/rhashtable.c:367
> rht_deferred_worker+0x4e1/0x2440 lib/rhashtable.c:427
> process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3218 [inline]
> process_scheduled_works+0xa2c/0x1830 kernel/workqueue.c:3299
> worker_thread+0x86d/0xd70 kernel/workqueue.c:3380
> kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:388
> ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
> ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:243
>
> Memory state around the buggy address:
> ffff88802cd73c80: 07 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
> ffff88802cd73d00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
> >ffff88802cd73d80: fa fc fc fc 01 fc fc fc fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc
> ^
> ffff88802cd73e00: fa fc fc fc fa fc fc fc 05 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
> ffff88802cd73e80: 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc 07 fc fc fc
>
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Reviewed-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> ---
> net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c | 6 ++++++
> net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c | 4 ++++
> net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c | 4 ++++
> net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c | 4 ++++
> 4 files changed, 18 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> index 99d82676f780ac49d01151fa9c585f44f9ea8ccc..cbd0e3586c3f61904efb4db7d9101d7770c852e7 100644
> --- a/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> +++ b/net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c
> @@ -1111,6 +1111,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> struct ebt_table_info *newinfo;
> struct ebt_replace tmp;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -1423,6 +1425,8 @@ static int update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> {
> struct ebt_replace hlp;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(hlp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -2352,6 +2356,8 @@ static int compat_update_counters(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg,
> {
> struct compat_ebt_replace hlp;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(hlp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&hlp, arg, sizeof(hlp)))
> return -EFAULT;
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
> index 2407066b0fec1121d71561ecbad6f4f87ecdebbc..b150c9929b12e86219a55c77da480e0c538b3449 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/arp_tables.c
> @@ -956,6 +956,8 @@ static int do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct arpt_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -1254,6 +1256,8 @@ static int compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct arpt_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
> index 7da1df4997d057a4292927c2041687c2b39d4a01..487670759578168c5ff53bce6642898fc41936b3 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/netfilter/ip_tables.c
> @@ -1108,6 +1108,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct ipt_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -1492,6 +1494,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct ipt_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> index fd9f049d6d41e77eacc10ce074a8a0d96b0d2e11..636b360311c5365fba2330f6ca2f7f1b6dd1363e 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c
> @@ -1125,6 +1125,8 @@ do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct ip6t_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> @@ -1501,6 +1503,8 @@ compat_do_replace(struct net *net, sockptr_t arg, unsigned int len)
> void *loc_cpu_entry;
> struct ip6t_entry *iter;
>
> + if (len < sizeof(tmp))
> + return -EINVAL;
> if (copy_from_sockptr(&tmp, arg, sizeof(tmp)) != 0)
> return -EFAULT;
>
> --
> 2.44.0.478.gd926399ef9-goog
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length
2024-04-04 12:20 [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length Eric Dumazet
2024-04-04 14:11 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
@ 2024-04-04 16:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
1 sibling, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: patchwork-bot+netdevbpf @ 2024-04-04 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet
Cc: davem, kuba, pabeni, pablo, kadlec, netdev, netfilter-devel,
coreteam, eric.dumazet, syzkaller
Hello:
This patch was applied to netdev/net.git (main)
by Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>:
On Thu, 4 Apr 2024 12:20:51 +0000 you wrote:
> I got multiple syzbot reports showing old bugs exposed
> by BPF after commit 20f2505fb436 ("bpf: Try to avoid kzalloc
> in cgroup/{s,g}etsockopt")
>
> setsockopt() @optlen argument should be taken into account
> before copying data.
>
> [...]
Here is the summary with links:
- [net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length
https://git.kernel.org/netdev/net/c/0c83842df40f
You are awesome, thank you!
--
Deet-doot-dot, I am a bot.
https://korg.docs.kernel.org/patchwork/pwbot.html
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2024-04-04 12:20 [PATCH net] netfilter: validate user input for expected length Eric Dumazet
2024-04-04 14:11 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso
2024-04-04 16:50 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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