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From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: Rahul Rameshbabu <rrameshbabu@nvidia.com>
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>, Gal Pressman <gal@nvidia.com>,
	Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>,
	Yossi Kuperman <yossiku@nvidia.com>,
	Benjamin Poirier <bpoirier@nvidia.com>,
	Cosmin Ratiu <cratiu@nvidia.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next 2/3] macsec: Detect if Rx skb is macsec-related for offloading devices that update md_dst
Date: Wed, 24 Apr 2024 12:18:11 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <ZijcY_DHlmP84U4S@hog> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87plugpqrk.fsf@nvidia.com>

2024-04-22, 22:55:02 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> On Mon, 22 Apr, 2024 11:23:05 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> wrote:
> > 2024-04-19, 11:01:20 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> >> On Fri, 19 Apr, 2024 17:05:52 +0200 Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net> wrote:
> >> > 2024-04-18, 18:17:16 -0700, Rahul Rameshbabu wrote:
> >> <snip>
> >> >> +			/* This datapath is insecure because it is unable to
> >> >> +			 * enforce isolation of broadcast/multicast traffic and
> >> >> +			 * unicast traffic with promiscuous mode on the macsec
> >> >> +			 * netdev. Since the core stack has no mechanism to
> >> >> +			 * check that the hardware did indeed receive MACsec
> >> >> +			 * traffic, it is possible that the response handling
> >> >> +			 * done by the MACsec port was to a plaintext packet.
> >> >> +			 * This violates the MACsec protocol standard.
> >> >> +			 */
> >> >> +			DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
> >> >
> >> > If you insist on this warning (and I'm not convinced it's useful,
> >> > since if the HW is already built and cannot inform the driver, there's
> >> > nothing the driver implementer can do), I would move it somewhere into
> >> > the config path. macsec_update_offload would be a better location for
> >> > this kind of warning (maybe with a pr_warn (not limited to debug
> >> > configs) saying something like "MACsec offload on devices that don't
> >> > support md_dst are insecure: they do not provide proper isolation of
> >> > traffic"). The comment can stay here.
> >> >
> >> 
> >> I do not like the warning either. I left it mainly if it needed further
> >> discussion on the mailing list. Will remove it in my next revision. That
> >> said, it may make sense to advertise rx_uses_md_dst over netlink to
> >> annotate what macsec offload path a device uses? Just throwing out an
> >> idea here.
> >
> > Maybe. I was also thinking about adding a way to restrict offloading
> > only to devices with rx_uses_md_dst.
> 
> That's an option. Basically, devices that do not support rx_uses_md_dst
> really only just do SW MACsec but do not return an error if the offload
> parameter is passed over netlink so user scripts do not break?

Forcing a fallback to SW could be considered a breakage because of the
performance regression, so I don't think we can turn this on by
default. Then I would simply reject offload on those devices. We could
have a compat mode that does the SW fallback you suggest. I don't know
if it would be used.


> > (Slightly related) I also find it annoying that users have to tell the
> > kernel whether to use PHY or MAC offload, but have no way to know
> > which one their HW supports. That should probably have been an
> > implementation detail that didn't need to be part of uapi :/
> 
> We could leave the phy / mac netlink keywords and introduce an "on"
> option. We deduce whether the device is a phydev or not when on is
> passed and set the macsec->offload flag based on that. The phy and mac
> options for offload in ip-macsec can then be deprecated.

I thought about doing exactly that, and then dropped the idea because
it would only help with newer kernels.

-- 
Sabrina


  reply	other threads:[~2024-04-24 10:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-19  1:17 [PATCH net-next 0/3] Resolve security issue in MACsec offload Rx datapath Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-19  1:17 ` [PATCH net-next 1/3] macsec: Enable devices to advertise whether they update sk_buff md_dst during offloads Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-19  1:17 ` [PATCH net-next 2/3] macsec: Detect if Rx skb is macsec-related for offloading devices that update md_dst Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-19 15:05   ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-04-19 18:01     ` Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-22  9:23       ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-04-23  5:55         ` Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-24 10:18           ` Sabrina Dubroca [this message]
2024-04-19  1:17 ` [PATCH net-next 3/3] net/mlx5e: Advertise mlx5 ethernet driver updates sk_buff md_dst for MACsec Rahul Rameshbabu
2024-04-19 15:04 ` [PATCH net-next 0/3] Resolve security issue in MACsec offload Rx datapath Sabrina Dubroca
2024-04-19 17:56   ` Rahul Rameshbabu

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