From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from us-smtp-delivery-44.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-44.mimecast.com [207.211.30.44]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 53B6A13DB9B for ; Tue, 9 Jul 2024 08:53:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=207.211.30.44 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720515184; cv=none; b=aN9EakQ2Flh9foyVGQKtdwn5OS+QCN2Q5rzQ9Emn3wBfMPu8t6ZUFWth18ZcYUsj+etFOnffrYHwq7AYznv7lbXVD12/mgCJHayRUOb7jyKZP5OsBW7TLps0kEKSbMthNs/XenIowwQ6GQPL5dr8BgSOdGNdtvElKnybGbdy08g= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1720515184; c=relaxed/simple; bh=vOb7JPqhD/PWCmwpMbQyb5PNLGoibxnBBV7vMkT7wk4=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: In-Reply-To:Content-Type:Content-Disposition; b=aWVkL49avXPdF5m8AaYUQs6A+QUdPJ3CC4wzc7ElZuiO8cUZjlR0TvnfGBDYeWuksS5daSWxPcMKoVctUv97xDQikU8dkgxkmmWzeAfrvANzWPn7IpI5IdwtOSr/JZsHL8ApvZFrq77eywfS5gd7bCFaCPhUtXym2bfTFXcvphw= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=queasysnail.net; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=queasysnail.net; arc=none smtp.client-ip=207.211.30.44 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=queasysnail.net Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=queasysnail.net Received: from mx-prod-mc-02.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (ec2-54-186-198-63.us-west-2.compute.amazonaws.com [54.186.198.63]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP with STARTTLS (version=TLSv1.3, cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384) id us-mta-313-j2syhXpXNxS6De8SC9Vv0w-1; Tue, 09 Jul 2024 04:51:39 -0400 X-MC-Unique: j2syhXpXNxS6De8SC9Vv0w-1 Received: from mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com [10.30.177.4]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by mx-prod-mc-02.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4C1471955F45; Tue, 9 Jul 2024 08:51:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from hog (unknown [10.39.192.70]) by mx-prod-int-01.mail-002.prod.us-west-2.aws.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5DD7C3000185; Tue, 9 Jul 2024 08:51:34 +0000 (UTC) Date: Tue, 9 Jul 2024 10:51:33 +0200 From: Sabrina Dubroca To: Antonio Quartulli Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org, ryazanov.s.a@gmail.com, pabeni@redhat.com, edumazet@google.com, andrew@lunn.ch Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v5 12/25] ovpn: implement packet processing Message-ID: References: <20240627130843.21042-1-antonio@openvpn.net> <20240627130843.21042-13-antonio@openvpn.net> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20240627130843.21042-13-antonio@openvpn.net> X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 3.4.1 on 10.30.177.4 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: queasysnail.net Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Disposition: inline Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable 2024-06-27, 15:08:30 +0200, Antonio Quartulli wrote: > +/* removes the primary key from the crypto context */ > +void ovpn_crypto_kill_primary(struct ovpn_crypto_state *cs) > +{ > +=09struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks; > + > +=09mutex_lock(&cs->mutex); > +=09ks =3D rcu_replace_pointer(cs->primary, NULL, > +=09=09=09=09 lockdep_is_held(&cs->mutex)); Should there be a check that we're killing the key that has expired and not some other key? I'm wondering if this could happen: ovpn_encrypt_one ovpn_aead_encrypt ovpn_pktid_xmit_next seq_num reaches threshold returns -ERANGE returns -ERANGE ovpn_crypto_key_slots_swap replaces cs->primary with c= s->secondary ovpn_encrypt_post ret =3D -ERANGE ovpn_crypto_kill_primary kills the freshly installed primary key > +=09ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks); > +=09mutex_unlock(&cs->mutex); > +} > + [...] > +static void ovpn_aead_encrypt_done(void *data, int ret) > +{ > +=09struct sk_buff *skb =3D data; > + > +=09aead_request_free(ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req); > +=09ovpn_encrypt_post(skb, ret); > +} > + > +int ovpn_aead_encrypt(struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks, struct sk_buff *s= kb, > +=09=09 u32 peer_id) > +{ > +=09const unsigned int tag_size =3D crypto_aead_authsize(ks->encrypt); > +=09const unsigned int head_size =3D ovpn_aead_encap_overhead(ks); > +=09struct scatterlist sg[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2]; > +=09DECLARE_CRYPTO_WAIT(wait); unused? (also in _decrypt) [...] > + > +=09req =3D aead_request_alloc(ks->encrypt, GFP_ATOMIC); > +=09if (unlikely(!req)) > +=09=09return -ENOMEM; > + > +=09/* setup async crypto operation */ > +=09aead_request_set_tfm(req, ks->encrypt); > +=09aead_request_set_callback(req, 0, ovpn_aead_encrypt_done, NULL); NULL? That should be skb, ovpn_aead_encrypt_done needs it (same for decrypt). I suspect you haven't triggered the async path in testing. For that, you can use crconf: git clone https://git.code.sf.net/p/crconf/code cd code && make ./src/crconf add driver 'pcrypt(generic-gcm-aesni)' type 3 priority 10000 Then all packets encrypted with gcm(aes) should go through the async code. > +=09aead_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, skb->len - head_size, iv); > +=09aead_request_set_ad(req, OVPN_OP_SIZE_V2 + NONCE_WIRE_SIZE); > + > +=09ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->req =3D req; > +=09ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->ks =3D ks; > + > +=09/* encrypt it */ > +=09return crypto_aead_encrypt(req); > +} [...] > @@ -77,14 +133,45 @@ static void ovpn_decrypt_post(struct sk_buff *skb, i= nt ret) > /* pick next packet from RX queue, decrypt and forward it to the device = */ > void ovpn_recv(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb) > { > +=09struct ovpn_crypto_key_slot *ks; > +=09u8 key_id; > + > +=09/* get the key slot matching the key ID in the received packet */ > +=09key_id =3D ovpn_key_id_from_skb(skb); > +=09ks =3D ovpn_crypto_key_id_to_slot(&peer->crypto, key_id); This takes a reference on the keyslot (ovpn_crypto_key_slot_hold), but I don't see it getting released in ovpn_decrypt_post. In ovpn_encrypt_post you're adding a ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put (to match ovpn_crypto_key_slot_primary), but nothing equivalent in ovpn_decrypt_post? > +=09if (unlikely(!ks)) { > +=09=09net_info_ratelimited("%s: no available key for peer %u, key-id: %u= \n", > +=09=09=09=09 peer->ovpn->dev->name, peer->id, key_id); > +=09=09dev_core_stats_rx_dropped_inc(peer->ovpn->dev); > +=09=09kfree_skb(skb); > +=09=09return; > +=09} > + > =09ovpn_skb_cb(skb)->peer =3D peer; > -=09ovpn_decrypt_post(skb, 0); > +=09ovpn_decrypt_post(skb, ovpn_aead_decrypt(ks, skb)); > } --=20 Sabrina