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From: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
To: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Cc: Wilfred Mallawa <wilfred.mallawa@wdc.com>,
	"corbet@lwn.net" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"dlemoal@kernel.org" <dlemoal@kernel.org>,
	"davem@davemloft.net" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org>,
	"john.fastabend@gmail.com" <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Alistair Francis <Alistair.Francis@wdc.com>,
	"pabeni@redhat.com" <pabeni@redhat.com>,
	"skhan@linuxfoundation.org" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"horms@kernel.org" <horms@kernel.org>,
	"edumazet@google.com" <edumazet@google.com>,
	Daiki Ueno <dueno@redhat.com>, Simo Sorce <ssorce@redhat.com>,
	"netdev@vger.kernel.org" <netdev@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC net-next 1/3] net/tls_sw: support randomized zero padding
Date: Tue, 17 Mar 2026 10:19:27 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <abkcnzIJ5q0XCVJ7@krikkit> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260316180355.37d45785@kernel.org>

2026-03-16, 18:03:55 -0700, Jakub Kicinski wrote:
> On Tue, 17 Mar 2026 00:53:07 +0000 Wilfred Mallawa wrote:
> > > Or maybe you could refer to existing implementations of this feature
> > > in user space libs? The padding feature seems slightly nebulous, 
> > > I wasn't aware of anyone actually using it. Maybe I should ask...
> > > are you actually planning to use it, or are you checking a box?  
> > 
> > For upcoming WD hardware, we were planning on informing users to use
> > this feature if an extra layer of security can benefit their particular
> > configuration. But to answer your question, I think this falls more
> > into the "checking a box"...
> > 
> > I'm happy to drop this series if there's not much added value from
> > having this as an available option for users.
> 
> I'm not much of a security person, and maybe Sabrina will disagree
> but I feel like it's going to be hard for us to design this feature
> in a sensible way if we don't know at least one potential attack :S

No, same here, that's why I tried to CC some userspace developers on
the cover (as well as for awareness of what's going on in the kernel
and the API being discussed -- adding them here again).

My understanding is that attacks of this type are mainly "observers
will figure out what type of traffic I'm doing based on message
length", and I feel all those "traffic pattern masking" features are
only interesting for very paranoid users. The RFC links to some
research, and maybe the kind of statistics/machine learning that those
attacks require has improved since, which could make such attacks more
realistic? No idea.

-- 
Sabrina

  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-03-17  9:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-09  5:48 [RFC net-next 0/3] tls_sw: add tx record zero padding Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-09  5:48 ` [RFC net-next 1/3] net/tls_sw: support randomized " Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-13 13:16   ` Sabrina Dubroca
2026-03-14 14:39     ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-17  0:53       ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-17  1:03         ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-17  1:21           ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-17  1:30             ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-03-17  1:53               ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-19  1:35                 ` Alistair Francis
2026-03-17  9:19           ` Sabrina Dubroca [this message]
2026-03-17  0:20     ` Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-09  5:48 ` [RFC net-next 2/3] net/tls: add randomized zero padding socket option Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-09  5:48 ` [RFC net-next 3/3] selftest: tls: add tls record zero pad test Wilfred Mallawa
2026-03-13 12:13 ` [RFC net-next 0/3] tls_sw: add tx record zero padding Sabrina Dubroca
2026-03-17  0:59   ` Wilfred Mallawa

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