From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from abb.hmeau.com (abb.hmeau.com [180.181.231.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1F38B40DFDE; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 02:37:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777516657; cv=none; b=PIMzHvAcROUaGwzJkQZUHxi5dHHCPqp7KW5AXEO86P14wOnM9z3gp7/G6GF5VLpstXSYkSx+5/dDhAcxCjOPlIuwwqk0cOj+lbh+kVJ1LUIoC4DHUh4g2Xbi11oupnU0YU+PeWKqvNNO81oSq720pcopQcziZhjnaWdPfhZf+Gk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777516657; c=relaxed/simple; bh=cmojHuLP3jnNZWqmo/6rv3gqgflgbv0J4HVHA1I/ffo=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=c7JLaLgNQVQG7aGssXup/HQdpoD3E6CAPNGn5t3PFpNJz4ezoYmAq7DkNCY14t+Rq7JaVSxed9xMObrtWJwW/jpXr4vjK801Edb65e9LEd4ip0gnfkSgqix0BVzYPJUTADZ3zJQChsbwUWZktAQCRKY19ci8wxgaTxctt+iJ4Ag= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b=B41INN4W; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b="B41INN4W" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gondor.apana.org.au; s=h01; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:cc:to:subject:message-id:date: from:content-type:reply-to; bh=dVtNlQBpH51UytQpIb8A6JMmXFC/Chl+lh2xCMpAn80=; b=B41INN4Wgi9RyGKTQmptdjwvbjK5VHc2WwpnIVc1s9k5mK+s0F24dIeS5bFODOqXTdKseb00Naf TCQQOL/t0N3IPq5mCY4NYzk28P7BufssSYEYtiUPX+kFz1zdTlrVU/GJgb8ILVPXaosRMqn+Lw0HN tl6lpUCGLY43BU5x1271pyOkBc9cYBvIigphUr21YA5mFnYFQoY5OuxwnzK4FOL31O3A3yb4DXtaM I2dVeBnvZxrfi8msBorNmpmjRd7LT4oY1Lk87KFqaBega+CUX2NSGg0BdQ1XDWUr8kVUZFu5u1c40 13CcP1vx4MIeBY8yqOsVN8u0u26NtvrI5siQ==; Received: from loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.167.2]) by formenos.hmeau.com with smtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Debian)) id 1wIGlw-00A1Fb-2O; Thu, 30 Apr 2026 10:05:01 +0800 Received: by loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Thu, 30 Apr 2026 10:05:00 +0800 Date: Thu, 30 Apr 2026 10:05:00 +0800 From: Herbert Xu To: Eric Biggers Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds , David Howells Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Document the deprecation of AF_ALG Message-ID: References: <20260430011544.31823-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260430011544.31823-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 06:15:44PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > AF_ALG is almost completely unnecessary, and it exposes a massive attack > surface that hasn't been standing up to modern vulnerability discovery > tools. The latest one even has its own website, providing a small > Python script that reliably roots most Linux distros: https://copy.fail/ > > This isn't sustainable, especially as LLMs have accelerated the rate the > vulnerabilities are coming in. The effort that is being put into this > thing is vastly disproportional to the few programs that actually use > it, and those programs would be better served by userspace code anyway. > > These issues have been noted in many mailing list discussions already. > But until now they haven't been reflected in the documentation or > kconfig menu itself, and the vulnerabilities are still coming in. > > Let's go ahead and document the deprecation. > > This isn't intended to change anything overnight. After all, most Linux > distros won't be able to disable the kconfig options quite yet, mainly > because of iwd. But this should create a bit more impetus for these > userspace programs to be fixed, and the documentation update should also > help prevent more users from appearing. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers What about the exposure of akcipher through security/keys/keyctl_pkey.c? There isn't even a Kconfig option to disable that user-space API. If module signatures are enabled then this automatically gets added to the kernel: MODULE_SIG -> MODULE_SIG_FORMAT -> SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION -> KEYS + ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE Cheers, -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt