From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from abb.hmeau.com (abb.hmeau.com [180.181.231.80]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 86548322B8C; Tue, 5 May 2026 09:31:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777973502; cv=none; b=XAahC1F78Pu+jX5yg8piEuGdhzUb1NHDPllw4PAroaFnfzXB+SirsCXEjIMLJAt7n9cJtlNWEgmVv7c8DGcuGTNzI0nNgXKYMYqT2ss/GzyBfV+jbknuOq1JoTOaSh3GuD7iKHdDNA16pnF0GJ2+S0khX2TqcGJ5vMwWHJbEXX0= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1777973502; c=relaxed/simple; bh=cME2hSJQqjfurAz5kjr4W5BW8rqhIkE2CuEBZ53GFmQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=FuyZRL62NVKJL1BHjfdK8xj1q9aHdpQHqRG3GCXU5XxdU9iRiQS1a5pf9O7FDUrPzeQ3BZTeYdw1axw7EvcgGENoqwZ+yC0eN0YRnymdc3zxuwnrRfuSYVTIDyPfjL3tzdesDM+SrnpVpDs+lJyZQq/CiUSDJ75UpoRw7Twq1M4= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b=kML8cfP9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=180.181.231.80 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gondor.apana.org.au Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gondor.apana.org.au header.i=@gondor.apana.org.au header.b="kML8cfP9" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gondor.apana.org.au; s=h01; h=In-Reply-To:Content-Type:MIME-Version: References:Message-ID:Subject:Cc:To:From:Date:cc:to:subject:message-id:date: from:content-type:reply-to; bh=z1TRjgIEbNPZv6Gwi/aF2FIRkUXsdYr0MZ9HGwOOiCM=; b=kML8cfP9wYceaQS27Psot/ntjVnGxUK7ZASWegz+tma/X3sJNATlPDagPhyR1UsGI/zlTUUgQw5 faqK29K+4vEwizgmOOBjoeVcbG1ojT94rXPIHq90HUPm11gdLzph1cl/lupz/mYECY/7ulL6QixzY +dFVnD7Nra467US0BKQ4YwE33pFVzAmfKibbVEV9o5X0JhkpPb2VHqy32WkyrPqJIlRpLrZWlp8nA WBsj5LVkq5CEcrn6bEr31komfpfLPpuysaAVW9G+lX8IP+6psVf6l5QkPtLRi3PReP21Cis23mVL5 pZROiHY042Zs2iq14vcO6XwC+DeDD2eIpVig==; Received: from loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au ([192.168.167.2]) by formenos.hmeau.com with smtp (Exim 4.96 #2 (Debian)) id 1wKC7s-00BO46-0h; Tue, 05 May 2026 17:31:37 +0800 Received: by loth.rohan.me.apana.org.au (sSMTP sendmail emulation); Tue, 05 May 2026 17:31:36 +0800 Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 17:31:36 +0800 From: Herbert Xu To: Eric Biggers Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, Linus Torvalds Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Document the deprecation of AF_ALG Message-ID: References: <20260430011544.31823-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: <20260430011544.31823-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> On Wed, Apr 29, 2026 at 06:15:44PM -0700, Eric Biggers wrote: > AF_ALG is almost completely unnecessary, and it exposes a massive attack > surface that hasn't been standing up to modern vulnerability discovery > tools. The latest one even has its own website, providing a small > Python script that reliably roots most Linux distros: https://copy.fail/ > > This isn't sustainable, especially as LLMs have accelerated the rate the > vulnerabilities are coming in. The effort that is being put into this > thing is vastly disproportional to the few programs that actually use > it, and those programs would be better served by userspace code anyway. > > These issues have been noted in many mailing list discussions already. > But until now they haven't been reflected in the documentation or > kconfig menu itself, and the vulnerabilities are still coming in. > > Let's go ahead and document the deprecation. > > This isn't intended to change anything overnight. After all, most Linux > distros won't be able to disable the kconfig options quite yet, mainly > because of iwd. But this should create a bit more impetus for these > userspace programs to be fixed, and the documentation update should also > help prevent more users from appearing. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers > --- > > This patch is targeting crypto/master > > Documentation/crypto/userspace-if.rst | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++------- > crypto/Kconfig | 69 ++++++++++++++++------ > 2 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-) Patch applied. Thanks. -- Email: Herbert Xu Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/ PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt