From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: James Morris Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] Security: Implement disablenetwork semantics. (v4) Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2010 09:58:52 +1100 (EST) Message-ID: References: <20100110215409.GA3705@heat> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: TEXT/PLAIN; charset=US-ASCII Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, Andi Kleen , David Lang , Oliver Hartkopp , Alan Cox , Herbert Xu , Valdis Kletnieks , Bryan Donlan , Evgeniy Polyakov , "C. Scott Ananian" , "Eric W. Biederman" , Bernie Innocenti , Mark Seaborn , Randy Dunlap , =?ISO-8859-15?Q?Am=E9rico_Wang?= , Tetsuo Handa , Samir Bellabes , Casey Schaufler , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Pavel Machek , Al Viro Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20100110215409.GA3705@heat> Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: netdev.vger.kernel.org On Sun, 10 Jan 2010, Michael Stone wrote: > > Pavel's position is that disablenetwork is likely to permit some attacker > somewhere to deny network access to some setuid app some day in a way that > violates some security policy. > > He has mentioned specific concern over scenarios like: > > Alice configures PAM auth to 'fail open' by checking login credentials > against a restrictive LDAP server and, if the server is unavailable, against > a very permissive files database. > > Alice updates her kernel to a version with disablenetwork. > > Mallory calls disablenetwork, calls su -, and vanquishes all. > > My position is that better isolation facilities like disablenetwork will > prevent far more grievous security faults than they (theoretically) cause. > > What is your perspective on the matter? Unexpected failure modes for privileged apps using security interfaces has already proven to be a problem (e.g. the sendmail capabilities bug), so it seems prudent to try and mitigate that as well. I don't think we need to look at this as an either-or situation -- it seems we can do both, and get something useful in its own right from the mitigation. -- James Morris