Netdev List
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson" <halg@google.com>
To: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
Cc: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
	"Alexander Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	"Serge Hallyn" <sergeh@kernel.org>, "Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
	"David S . Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	"Eric Dumazet" <edumazet@google.com>,
	"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
	"Paolo Abeni" <pabeni@redhat.com>, "Jan Kara" <jack@suse.cz>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Simon Horman" <horms@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Shuah Khan" <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>,
	"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
	"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
	"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	"Jonathan Calmels" <jcalmels@3xx0.net>,
	"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org,
	containers@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/8] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set and opt-in netns loopback
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2026 10:47:13 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <av7TsXKUE69lyiWl@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261118.faiBee9Taigh@digikod.net>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 03:43:03PM +0100, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> Hallgrimur, could you please explain why your use case would not work
> with Landlock?  The capability split or new clone flags would be
> complementary of course.

Apologies for the late reply.

Landlock's capability restrictions work well for self-sandboxing
applications and launchers. The main gap for our use case is setting a
host-wide default for unprivileged user namespaces while still permitting
exceptions. Because Landlock restricts all capability use (not just
capabilities acquired via user namespaces) and its domains are strictly
irrevocable, PID 1 cannot apply a default policy at boot without
locking out privileged services, file-capability helpers, and authorized
workloads. Using Landlock here would require explicit opt-in enforcement
at every unprivileged transition boundary (SSH, container/job launchers,
etc.), where missing any entrypoint leaves unprivileged user namespaces
unrestricted.

In v1 we had the global sysctl to tackle this. In v2 (based on Christian
and Andy's feedback), we combine per-cred cap_userns with per-userns
cap_bset), and PID 1 or a service manager can lower the default userns
ceiling once at the root of the process tree, while privileged tasks
automatically retain capabilities held in cap_permitted and can
explicitly raise cap_userns for authorized workloads unless locked.

Another minor difference is visibility. Clamping the task's capability
sets on userns entry (and exposing CapUns in /proc/<pid>/status in v2)
makes it easy for userspace to inspect what is actually restricted.


      reply	other threads:[~2026-11-19 10:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-28 22:16 [PATCH 0/8] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set and opt-in netns loopback Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:16 ` [PATCH 1/8] net: introduce CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK to auto-enable loopback Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:16 ` [PATCH 2/8] userns: introduce capability bounding set for user namespaces Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 3/8] userns: allow restricting capability bounding set via clone3() Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 4/8] nsfs: add NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl to inspect user namespace capabilities Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 5/8] selftests/net: add test suite for CLONE_NEWNET_LOOPBACK Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 6/8] selftests/capabilities: tests for user namespace capability bounding set Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 7/8] selftests/capabilities: add clone3() tests for CLONE_NEWUSER_BSET Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:17 ` [PATCH 8/8] selftests/nsfs: add tests for NS_USER_GET_INFO ioctl Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-10-28 22:56 ` [PATCH 0/8] userns: per-namespace capability bounding set and opt-in netns loopback Andy Lutomirski
2026-10-29 10:44   ` Alexey Gladkov
2026-10-29 12:11   ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-03 18:37     ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-04 11:30       ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-05 16:48         ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-06 13:13   ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-07 18:47     ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-10 15:31       ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-11 15:20         ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 16:43           ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-17 16:49             ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-16 17:15           ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-17 17:10             ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-17 17:37               ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 10:21                 ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-18 21:06                   ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-18 21:12                     ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-18 21:37                       ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-18 21:49                         ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-03 12:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2026-11-05 15:37   ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson
2026-11-05 16:59     ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-11-06 10:12   ` Christian Brauner
2026-11-04 14:09 ` Josef Bacik
2026-11-07 12:43 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-18 14:43   ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-11-19 10:47     ` Hallgrimur H. Gunnarsson [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=av7TsXKUE69lyiWl@google.com \
    --to=halg@google.com \
    --cc=brauner@kernel.org \
    --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=containers@lists.linux.dev \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=davem@davemloft.net \
    --cc=edumazet@google.com \
    --cc=gnoack@google.com \
    --cc=horms@kernel.org \
    --cc=jack@suse.cz \
    --cc=jannh@google.com \
    --cc=jcalmels@3xx0.net \
    --cc=jmorris@namei.org \
    --cc=kees@kernel.org \
    --cc=kpsingh@kernel.org \
    --cc=kuba@kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-api@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mic@digikod.net \
    --cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=pabeni@redhat.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=rdunlap@infradead.org \
    --cc=sergeh@kernel.org \
    --cc=skhan@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox