* [PATCH net-next v5 2/6] tls: implement rekey for TLS1.3
2024-12-12 15:36 [PATCH net-next v5 0/6] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-12 15:36 ` [PATCH net-next v5 1/6] tls: block decryption when a rekey is pending Sabrina Dubroca
@ 2024-12-12 15:36 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-12 15:36 ` [PATCH net-next v5 3/6] tls: add counters for rekey Sabrina Dubroca
` (4 subsequent siblings)
6 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Sabrina Dubroca @ 2024-12-12 15:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, Vadim Fedorenko, Frantisek Krenzelok,
Jakub Kicinski, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Apoorv Kothari, Boris Pismenny,
John Fastabend, Shuah Khan, linux-kselftest, Gal Pressman,
Marcel Holtmann, Simon Horman, Parthiban.Veerasooran
This adds the possibility to change the key and IV when using
TLS1.3. Changing the cipher or TLS version is not supported.
Once we have updated the RX key, we can unblock the receive side. If
the rekey fails, the context is unmodified and userspace is free to
retry the update or close the socket.
This change only affects tls_sw, since 1.3 offload isn't supported.
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
Acked-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
---
v2:
- reverse xmas tree
- turn the alt_crypto_info into an else if
- don't modify the context when rekey fails
v3:
- only call tls_sw_strparser_arm when setting the initial RX key, not
on rekeys
- update tls_sk_poll to not say the socket is readable when we're
waiting for a rekey, and wake up poll() when the new key is installed
- use unsafe_memcpy to make FORTIFY_SOURCE happy
v4:
- rebase on top of current net-next
- no {} needed around single line (Simon)
v5: unchanged, keep Jakub's ack from v4
net/tls/tls.h | 3 +-
net/tls/tls_device.c | 2 +-
net/tls/tls_main.c | 46 ++++++++++++++-----
net/tls/tls_sw.c | 105 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
4 files changed, 108 insertions(+), 48 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls.h b/net/tls/tls.h
index e5e47452308a..774859b63f0d 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls.h
+++ b/net/tls/tls.h
@@ -145,7 +145,8 @@ void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err);
int init_prot_info(struct tls_prot_info *prot,
const struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info,
const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc);
-int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx);
+int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx,
+ struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info);
void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);
void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);
void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
index dc063c2c7950..e50b6e71df13 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -1227,7 +1227,7 @@ int tls_set_device_offload_rx(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx)
context->resync_nh_reset = 1;
ctx->priv_ctx_rx = context;
- rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0);
+ rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0, NULL);
if (rc)
goto release_ctx;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c
index 6b4b9f2749a6..68b5735dafc1 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_main.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c
@@ -423,9 +423,10 @@ static __poll_t tls_sk_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,
ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);
psock = sk_psock_get(sk);
- if (skb_queue_empty_lockless(&ctx->rx_list) &&
- !tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) &&
- sk_psock_queue_empty(psock))
+ if ((skb_queue_empty_lockless(&ctx->rx_list) &&
+ !tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx) &&
+ sk_psock_queue_empty(psock)) ||
+ READ_ONCE(ctx->key_update_pending))
mask &= ~(EPOLLIN | EPOLLRDNORM);
if (psock)
@@ -612,11 +613,13 @@ static int validate_crypto_info(const struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info,
static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
unsigned int optlen, int tx)
{
- struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
- struct tls_crypto_info *alt_crypto_info;
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, *alt_crypto_info;
+ struct tls_crypto_info *old_crypto_info = NULL;
struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc;
union tls_crypto_context *crypto_ctx;
+ union tls_crypto_context tmp = {};
+ bool update = false;
int rc = 0;
int conf;
@@ -633,9 +636,18 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
crypto_info = &crypto_ctx->info;
- /* Currently we don't support set crypto info more than one time */
- if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info))
- return -EBUSY;
+ if (TLS_CRYPTO_INFO_READY(crypto_info)) {
+ /* Currently we only support setting crypto info more
+ * than one time for TLS 1.3
+ */
+ if (crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return -EBUSY;
+
+ update = true;
+ old_crypto_info = crypto_info;
+ crypto_info = &tmp.info;
+ crypto_ctx = &tmp;
+ }
rc = copy_from_sockptr(crypto_info, optval, sizeof(*crypto_info));
if (rc) {
@@ -643,7 +655,14 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
goto err_crypto_info;
}
- rc = validate_crypto_info(crypto_info, alt_crypto_info);
+ if (update) {
+ /* Ensure that TLS version and ciphers are not modified */
+ if (crypto_info->version != old_crypto_info->version ||
+ crypto_info->cipher_type != old_crypto_info->cipher_type)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ rc = validate_crypto_info(crypto_info, alt_crypto_info);
+ }
if (rc)
goto err_crypto_info;
@@ -673,7 +692,8 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXDEVICE);
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRTXDEVICE);
} else {
- rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1);
+ rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 1,
+ update ? crypto_info : NULL);
if (rc)
goto err_crypto_info;
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSTXSW);
@@ -687,14 +707,16 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXDEVICE);
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXDEVICE);
} else {
- rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0);
+ rc = tls_set_sw_offload(sk, 0,
+ update ? crypto_info : NULL);
if (rc)
goto err_crypto_info;
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSRXSW);
TLS_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_TLSCURRRXSW);
conf = TLS_SW;
}
- tls_sw_strparser_arm(sk, ctx);
+ if (!update)
+ tls_sw_strparser_arm(sk, ctx);
}
if (tx)
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 3dcf8ee60fea..9e5aff5bab98 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -2716,12 +2716,22 @@ int init_prot_info(struct tls_prot_info *prot,
return 0;
}
-int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
+static void tls_finish_key_update(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)
{
+ struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
+
+ WRITE_ONCE(ctx->key_update_pending, false);
+ /* wake-up pre-existing poll() */
+ ctx->saved_data_ready(sk);
+}
+
+int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx,
+ struct tls_crypto_info *new_crypto_info)
+{
+ struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info, *src_crypto_info;
struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx_tx = NULL;
struct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx_rx = NULL;
const struct tls_cipher_desc *cipher_desc;
- struct tls_crypto_info *crypto_info;
char *iv, *rec_seq, *key, *salt;
struct cipher_context *cctx;
struct tls_prot_info *prot;
@@ -2733,45 +2743,47 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);
prot = &ctx->prot_info;
- if (tx) {
- ctx->priv_ctx_tx = init_ctx_tx(ctx, sk);
- if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ /* new_crypto_info != NULL means rekey */
+ if (!new_crypto_info) {
+ if (tx) {
+ ctx->priv_ctx_tx = init_ctx_tx(ctx, sk);
+ if (!ctx->priv_ctx_tx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ } else {
+ ctx->priv_ctx_rx = init_ctx_rx(ctx);
+ if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tx) {
sw_ctx_tx = ctx->priv_ctx_tx;
crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_send.info;
cctx = &ctx->tx;
aead = &sw_ctx_tx->aead_send;
} else {
- ctx->priv_ctx_rx = init_ctx_rx(ctx);
- if (!ctx->priv_ctx_rx)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
sw_ctx_rx = ctx->priv_ctx_rx;
crypto_info = &ctx->crypto_recv.info;
cctx = &ctx->rx;
aead = &sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv;
- sw_ctx_rx->key_update_pending = false;
}
- cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(crypto_info->cipher_type);
+ src_crypto_info = new_crypto_info ?: crypto_info;
+
+ cipher_desc = get_cipher_desc(src_crypto_info->cipher_type);
if (!cipher_desc) {
rc = -EINVAL;
goto free_priv;
}
- rc = init_prot_info(prot, crypto_info, cipher_desc);
+ rc = init_prot_info(prot, src_crypto_info, cipher_desc);
if (rc)
goto free_priv;
- iv = crypto_info_iv(crypto_info, cipher_desc);
- key = crypto_info_key(crypto_info, cipher_desc);
- salt = crypto_info_salt(crypto_info, cipher_desc);
- rec_seq = crypto_info_rec_seq(crypto_info, cipher_desc);
-
- memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, cipher_desc->salt);
- memcpy(cctx->iv + cipher_desc->salt, iv, cipher_desc->iv);
- memcpy(cctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, cipher_desc->rec_seq);
+ iv = crypto_info_iv(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc);
+ key = crypto_info_key(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc);
+ salt = crypto_info_salt(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc);
+ rec_seq = crypto_info_rec_seq(src_crypto_info, cipher_desc);
if (!*aead) {
*aead = crypto_alloc_aead(cipher_desc->cipher_name, 0, 0);
@@ -2784,20 +2796,30 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
ctx->push_pending_record = tls_sw_push_pending_record;
+ /* setkey is the last operation that could fail during a
+ * rekey. if it succeeds, we can start modifying the
+ * context.
+ */
rc = crypto_aead_setkey(*aead, key, cipher_desc->key);
- if (rc)
- goto free_aead;
+ if (rc) {
+ if (new_crypto_info)
+ goto out;
+ else
+ goto free_aead;
+ }
- rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
- if (rc)
- goto free_aead;
+ if (!new_crypto_info) {
+ rc = crypto_aead_setauthsize(*aead, prot->tag_size);
+ if (rc)
+ goto free_aead;
+ }
- if (sw_ctx_rx) {
+ if (!tx && !new_crypto_info) {
tfm = crypto_aead_tfm(sw_ctx_rx->aead_recv);
tls_update_rx_zc_capable(ctx);
sw_ctx_rx->async_capable =
- crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
+ src_crypto_info->version != TLS_1_3_VERSION &&
!!(tfm->__crt_alg->cra_flags & CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
rc = tls_strp_init(&sw_ctx_rx->strp, sk);
@@ -2805,18 +2827,33 @@ int tls_set_sw_offload(struct sock *sk, int tx)
goto free_aead;
}
+ memcpy(cctx->iv, salt, cipher_desc->salt);
+ memcpy(cctx->iv + cipher_desc->salt, iv, cipher_desc->iv);
+ memcpy(cctx->rec_seq, rec_seq, cipher_desc->rec_seq);
+
+ if (new_crypto_info) {
+ unsafe_memcpy(crypto_info, new_crypto_info,
+ cipher_desc->crypto_info,
+ /* size was checked in do_tls_setsockopt_conf */);
+ memzero_explicit(new_crypto_info, cipher_desc->crypto_info);
+ if (!tx)
+ tls_finish_key_update(sk, ctx);
+ }
+
goto out;
free_aead:
crypto_free_aead(*aead);
*aead = NULL;
free_priv:
- if (tx) {
- kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
- ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
- } else {
- kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
- ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;
+ if (!new_crypto_info) {
+ if (tx) {
+ kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_tx);
+ ctx->priv_ctx_tx = NULL;
+ } else {
+ kfree(ctx->priv_ctx_rx);
+ ctx->priv_ctx_rx = NULL;
+ }
}
out:
return rc;
--
2.47.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 8+ messages in thread* [PATCH net-next v5 6/6] selftests: tls: add rekey tests
2024-12-12 15:36 [PATCH net-next v5 0/6] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 Sabrina Dubroca
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2024-12-12 15:36 ` [PATCH net-next v5 5/6] selftests: tls: add key_generation argument to tls_crypto_info_init Sabrina Dubroca
@ 2024-12-12 15:36 ` Sabrina Dubroca
2024-12-16 12:50 ` [PATCH net-next v5 0/6] tls: implement key updates for TLS1.3 patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
6 siblings, 0 replies; 8+ messages in thread
From: Sabrina Dubroca @ 2024-12-12 15:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev
Cc: Sabrina Dubroca, Vadim Fedorenko, Frantisek Krenzelok,
Jakub Kicinski, Kuniyuki Iwashima, Apoorv Kothari, Boris Pismenny,
John Fastabend, Shuah Khan, linux-kselftest, Gal Pressman,
Marcel Holtmann, Simon Horman, Parthiban.Veerasooran
Test the kernel's ability to:
- update the key (but not the version or cipher), only for TLS1.3
- pause decryption after receiving a KeyUpdate message, until a new
RX key has been provided
- reflect the pause/non-readable socket in poll()
Signed-off-by: Sabrina Dubroca <sd@queasysnail.net>
---
v2: add rekey_fail test (reject changing the version/cipher)
v3: add rekey_peek_splice following Jakub's comment
add rekey+poll tests
v4: rebase, new selftests were added
check that rekey isn't supported on TLS1.2
tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c | 458 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 458 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index b1f52d2bb096..9a85f93c33d8 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -1670,6 +1670,464 @@ TEST_F(tls, recv_efault)
EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(rec2, recv_mem + 9, ret - 9), 0);
}
+#define TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE 0x16
+/* key_update, length 1, update_not_requested */
+static const char key_update_msg[] = "\x18\x00\x00\x01\x00";
+static void tls_send_keyupdate(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd)
+{
+ size_t len = sizeof(key_update_msg);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(tls_send_cmsg(fd, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE,
+ (char *)key_update_msg, len, 0),
+ len);
+}
+
+static void tls_recv_keyupdate(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd, int flags)
+{
+ char buf[100];
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(tls_recv_cmsg(_metadata, fd, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_HANDSHAKE, buf, sizeof(buf), flags),
+ sizeof(key_update_msg));
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, key_update_msg, sizeof(key_update_msg)), 0);
+}
+
+/* set the key to 0 then 1 for RX, immediately to 1 for TX */
+TEST_F(tls_basic, rekey_rx)
+{
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_0, tls12_1;
+ char const *test_str = "test_message";
+ int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+ char buf[20];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (self->notls)
+ return;
+
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ &tls12_0, 0);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ &tls12_1, 1);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_0, tls12_0.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+/* set the key to 0 then 1 for TX, immediately to 1 for RX */
+TEST_F(tls_basic, rekey_tx)
+{
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_0, tls12_1;
+ char const *test_str = "test_message";
+ int send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+ char buf[20];
+ int ret;
+
+ if (self->notls)
+ return;
+
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ &tls12_0, 0);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_3_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128,
+ &tls12_1, 1);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_0, tls12_0.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ ret = setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_1, tls12_1.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ret, 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey)
+{
+ char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+ char const *test_str_2 = "test_message_after_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ int send_len;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ /* initial send/recv */
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* send after rekey */
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_2) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_2, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ /* recv blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+ /* recv non-blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+ /* update RX key */
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* recv after rekey */
+ EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_2, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_fail)
+{
+ char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+ char const *test_str_2 = "test_message_after_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ int send_len;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ /* initial send/recv */
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION) {
+ /* just check that rekey is not supported and return */
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EBUSY);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* successful update */
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* invalid update: change of version */
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ /* invalid update (RX socket): change of version */
+ tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ /* invalid update: change of cipher */
+ if (variant->cipher_type == TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256)
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305, &tls12, 1);
+ else
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ /* send after rekey, the invalid updates shouldn't have an effect */
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_2) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_2, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ /* recv blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+ /* recv non-blocking -> -EKEYEXPIRED */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+ /* update RX key */
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* recv after rekey */
+ EXPECT_NE(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_2, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_peek)
+{
+ char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ int send_len;
+ char buf[100];
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+ /* can't receive the KeyUpdate without a control message */
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, send_len, MSG_PEEK), -1);
+
+ /* peek KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, MSG_PEEK);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ /* update RX key */
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, splice_rekey)
+{
+ int send_len = TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN / 2;
+ char mem_send[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN];
+ char mem_recv[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN];
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ int p[2];
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ memrnd(mem_send, sizeof(mem_send));
+
+ ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, mem_send, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, mem_send, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(read(p[0], mem_recv, send_len), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(mem_send, mem_recv, send_len), 0);
+
+ /* can't splice the KeyUpdate */
+ EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EINVAL);
+
+ /* peek KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, MSG_PEEK);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ /* can't splice before updating the key */
+ EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(errno, EKEYEXPIRED);
+
+ /* update RX key */
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(read(p[0], mem_recv, send_len), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(mem_send, mem_recv, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_peek_splice)
+{
+ char const *test_str_1 = "test_message_before_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ int send_len;
+ char buf[100];
+ char mem_recv[TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN];
+ int p[2];
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);
+
+ send_len = strlen(test_str_1) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str_1, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_PEEK), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, TLS_PAYLOAD_MAX_LEN, 0), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(read(p[0], mem_recv, send_len), send_len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(mem_recv, test_str_1, send_len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_getsockopt)
+{
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12_get;
+ socklen_t len;
+
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 0);
+
+ len = tls12.len;
+ EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ len = tls12.len;
+ EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ len = tls12.len;
+ EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ len = tls12.len;
+ EXPECT_EQ(getsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12_get, &len), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(len, tls12.len);
+ EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(&tls12_get, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_poll_pending)
+{
+ char const *test_str = "test_message_after_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ struct pollfd pfd = { };
+ int send_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ /* send immediately after rekey */
+ send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ /* key hasn't been updated, expect cfd to be non-readable */
+ pfd.fd = self->cfd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ EXPECT_EQ(poll(&pfd, 1, 0), 0);
+
+ ret = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(ret, 0);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ int pid2, status;
+
+ /* wait before installing the new key */
+ sleep(1);
+
+ /* update RX key while poll() is sleeping */
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ pid2 = wait(&status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pid2, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(status, 0);
+ } else {
+ pfd.fd = self->cfd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ EXPECT_EQ(poll(&pfd, 1, 5000), 1);
+
+ exit(!__test_passed(_metadata));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F(tls, rekey_poll_delay)
+{
+ char const *test_str = "test_message_after_rekey";
+ struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+ struct pollfd pfd = { };
+ int send_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (variant->tls_version != TLS_1_3_VERSION)
+ return;
+
+ /* update TX key */
+ tls_send_keyupdate(_metadata, self->fd);
+ tls_crypto_info_init(variant->tls_version, variant->cipher_type, &tls12, 1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->fd, SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ /* get KeyUpdate */
+ tls_recv_keyupdate(_metadata, self->cfd, 0);
+
+ ret = fork();
+ ASSERT_GE(ret, 0);
+
+ if (ret) {
+ int pid2, status;
+
+ /* wait before installing the new key */
+ sleep(1);
+
+ /* update RX key while poll() is sleeping */
+ EXPECT_EQ(setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len), 0);
+
+ sleep(1);
+ send_len = strlen(test_str) + 1;
+ EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, test_str, send_len, 0), send_len);
+
+ pid2 = wait(&status);
+ EXPECT_EQ(pid2, ret);
+ EXPECT_EQ(status, 0);
+ } else {
+ pfd.fd = self->cfd;
+ pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ EXPECT_EQ(poll(&pfd, 1, 5000), 1);
+ exit(!__test_passed(_metadata));
+ }
+}
+
FIXTURE(tls_err)
{
int fd, cfd;
--
2.47.1
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