From: Pavel Begunkov <asml.silence@gmail.com>
To: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
Willem de Bruijn <willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com>,
Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>,
davem@davemloft.net, edumazet@google.com, kuba@kernel.org,
netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: dborkman@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Subject: Re: [PATCH net v4 2/3] net: prevent rewrite of msg_name in sock_sendmsg()
Date: Thu, 21 Sep 2023 13:30:25 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0f4a2ab-7010-5b09-f47e-21dc54a759c2@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <139933c6013e444047dc685ade53fa3dc1ad68d3.camel@redhat.com>
On 9/21/23 09:32, Paolo Abeni wrote:
> On Wed, 2023-09-20 at 09:28 -0400, Willem de Bruijn wrote:
>> Jordan Rife wrote:
>>> Callers of sock_sendmsg(), and similarly kernel_sendmsg(), in kernel
>>> space may observe their value of msg_name change in cases where BPF
>>> sendmsg hooks rewrite the send address. This has been confirmed to break
>>> NFS mounts running in UDP mode and has the potential to break other
>>> systems.
>>>
>>> This patch:
>>>
>>> 1) Creates a new function called __sock_sendmsg() with same logic as the
>>> old sock_sendmsg() function.
>>> 2) Replaces calls to sock_sendmsg() made by __sys_sendto() and
>>> __sys_sendmsg() with __sock_sendmsg() to avoid an unnecessary copy,
>>> as these system calls are already protected.
>>> 3) Modifies sock_sendmsg() so that it makes a copy of msg_name if
>>> present before passing it down the stack to insulate callers from
>>> changes to the send address.
>>>
>>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20230912013332.2048422-1-jrife@google.com/
>>> Fixes: 1cedee13d25a ("bpf: Hooks for sys_sendmsg")
>>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>> Signed-off-by: Jordan Rife <jrife@google.com>
>>
>> Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
>
> CC Jens and Pavel, as I guess io_uring likely want to use
> __sock_sendmsg(), in a follow-up patch.
Yeah, likely so. Thanks Paolo, we'll take a look
--
Pavel Begunkov
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-09-21 17:49 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-09-19 17:52 [PATCH net v4 2/3] net: prevent rewrite of msg_name in sock_sendmsg() Jordan Rife
2023-09-20 13:28 ` Willem de Bruijn
2023-09-21 8:32 ` Paolo Abeni
2023-09-21 12:30 ` Pavel Begunkov [this message]
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