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From: stsp <stsp2@yandex.ru>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>,
	Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	network dev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Security Module list
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	SElinux list <selinux@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: Possible mistake in commit 3ca459eaba1b ("tun: fix group permission check")
Date: Mon, 27 Jan 2025 13:00:03 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <e8b6c6f9-9647-4ab6-8bbb-ccc94b04ade4@yandex.ru> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFqZXNtkCBT4f+PwyVRmQGoT3p1eVa01fCG_aNtpt6dakXncUg@mail.gmail.com>

27.01.2025 12:10, Ondrej Mosnacek пишет:
> Hello,
>
> It looks like the commit in $SUBJ may have introduced an unintended
> change in behavior. According to the commit message, the intent was to
> require just one of {user, group} to match instead of both, which
> sounds reasonable, but the commit also changes the behavior for when
> neither of tun->owner and tun->group is set. Before the commit the
> access was always allowed, while after the commit CAP_NET_ADMIN is
> required in this case.
>
> I'm asking because the tun_tap subtest of selinux-testuite [1] started
> to fail after this commit (it assumed CAP_NET_ADMIN was not needed),
> so I'm trying to figure out if we need to change the test or if it
> needs to be fixed in the kernel.
>
> Thanks,
>
> [1] https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-testsuite/
>
Hi, IMHO having the persistent
TAP device inaccessible by anyone
but the CAP_NET_ADMIN is rather
useless, so the compatibility should
be restored on the kernel side.
I'd raise the questions about adding
the CAP_NET_ADMIN checks into
TUNSETOWNER and/or TUNSETPERSIST,
but this particular change to TUNSETIFF,
at least on my side, was unintentional.

Sorry about that. :(


  reply	other threads:[~2025-01-27 10:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-01-27  9:10 Possible mistake in commit 3ca459eaba1b ("tun: fix group permission check") Ondrej Mosnacek
2025-01-27 10:00 ` stsp [this message]
2025-01-27 14:50   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-01-27 14:58     ` stsp
2025-01-28 14:20     ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2025-01-28 14:45       ` stsp
2025-01-28 14:58         ` stsp
2025-01-28 15:04       ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-01-28 17:49         ` stsp
2025-01-28 22:59           ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-01-29  6:59             ` stsp
2025-01-29 14:12               ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-01-29 14:27                 ` stsp
2025-01-30 16:46                   ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-02-04  0:29                     ` Paul Moore
2025-02-04 16:18                       ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2025-02-04 19:40                         ` Paul Moore
2025-02-06  3:04                           ` Willem de Bruijn
2025-01-29 14:19       ` Willem de Bruijn

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