From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Oliver Hartkopp Subject: Re: [PATCH] can: af_can: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2018 20:02:18 +0100 Message-ID: References: <20181221212229.GA32635@embeddedor> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Cc: linux-can@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org To: "Gustavo A. R. Silva" , Marc Kleine-Budde , "David S. Miller" Return-path: Received: from mo4-p00-ob.smtp.rzone.de ([85.215.255.25]:18928 "EHLO mo4-p00-ob.smtp.rzone.de" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725308AbeLWTOc (ORCPT ); Sun, 23 Dec 2018 14:14:32 -0500 In-Reply-To: <20181221212229.GA32635@embeddedor> Content-Language: en-US Sender: netdev-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: After *trying* to follow the discussion on ... https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=154554485324143&w=2 [PATCH] net: core: Fix Spectre v1 vulnerability ... I'm still not sure whether af_can.c needs this enhancement or not. Just waiting for the end of the discussion :-) Thanks to the experts! Oliver On 12/21/18 10:22 PM, Gustavo A. R. Silva wrote: > protocol is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to > a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability. > > This issue was detected with the help of Smatch: > > net/can/af_can.c:115 can_get_proto() warn: potential spectre issue 'proto_tab' [w] > > Fix this by sanitizing protocol before using it to index proto_tab. > > Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is > to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be > completed with a dependent load/store [1]. > > [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=152449131114778&w=2 > > Signed-off-by: Gustavo A. R. Silva > --- > net/can/af_can.c | 2 ++ > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/net/can/af_can.c b/net/can/af_can.c > index 1684ba5b51eb..cade7250c6d4 100644 > --- a/net/can/af_can.c > +++ b/net/can/af_can.c > @@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > #include > #include > > @@ -136,6 +137,7 @@ static int can_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol, > > if (protocol < 0 || protocol >= CAN_NPROTO) > return -EINVAL; > + protocol = array_index_nospec(protocol, CAN_NPROTO); > > cp = can_get_proto(protocol); > >