From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH v3] Unprivileged: Disable raising of privileges
Date: Thu, 31 Dec 2009 10:41:08 -0800
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Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serue@us.ibm.com>,
	Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	Bryan Donlan <bdonlan@gmail.com>,
	Benny Amorsen <benny+usenet@amorsen.dk>,
	Michael Stone <michael@laptop.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	Andi Kleen <andi@firstfloor.org>, David Lang <david@lang.hm>,
	Oliver Hartkopp <socketcan@hartkopp.net>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Valdis Kletnieks <Valdis.Kletnieks@vt.edu>,
	Evgeniy Polyakov <zbr@ioremap.net>,
	"C. Scott Ananian" <cscott@cscott.net>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Bernie Innocenti <bernie@codewiz.org>,
	Mark Seaborn <mrs@mythic-beasts.com>,
	Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap@oracle.com>,
	=?utf-8?Q?Am=C3=A9rico?= Wang <xiyou.wangcong@gmail.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Samir Bellabes <sam@synack.fr>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com
To: "Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org>
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In-Reply-To: <551280e50912311020x2bdc5b1o699a601f67b91662@mail.gmail.com> (Andrew G. Morgan's message of "Thu\, 31 Dec 2009 10\:20\:18 -0800")
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"Andrew G. Morgan" <morgan@kernel.org> writes:

> Since there is already independent support for disabling file
> capabilities (the privilege escalation part), I see these two
> mechanisms as separable.

I guess there is something that resembles support for disabling
privilege escalation.  The problem is that it requires privilege to
use it.

I have no problem with expressing this in a fine grained manner internally
to the kernel but the user space interface needs to be atomic so that
we can enable this all without privilege.

Further I may be off but I think the implementation would be more
challenging than what I have already posted.  That doesn't mean it
won't be more useful long term.

Eric