* RE: PATCH: Network Device Naming mechanism and policy
From: Narendra_K @ 2009-11-09 14:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: md, Matt_Domsch
Cc: bryan, dannf, bhutchings, netdev, linux-hotplug, Jordan_Hargrave,
Charles_Rose, Sandeep_K_Shandilya
In-Reply-To: <20091106223524.GA27121@bongo.bofh.it>
>> > As a distribution developer I highly value solutions like
>this which
>> > do not require patching every application which deals with
>interface
>> > names and then teaching users about aliases which only
>work in some
>> > places and are unknown to the kernel.
>> Fair enough - but would you object if we changed the naming scheme
>> from eth%d to something else?
>I suppose that this would depend on what else. :-) Since you
>want radical changes I recommend that you design the new
>persistent naming infrastructure in a way that will allow root
>to choose to use the classic naming scheme, or many users will
>scream a lot and at least some distributions will do it anyway.
>I also expect that providing choice at the beginning of
>development may lead to more acceptance later if and when the
>new scheme will have proved itself to be superior (at least in
>some situations).
>You have tought about this for a long time and if so far you
>have not found a solution which is widely considered superior
>then I doubt that one will appear soon. Providing your
>favourite naming scheme as an optional add on will immediately
>benefit those who like it and greatly reduce opposition from
>those who do not.
In that way, I suppose char device node solution fits the scheme
perfectly. It doesn't change or interfere with the kernel's default
naming scheme (ethN) in any way. Also, the applications continue to work
the way they did and in addition to supporting traditional names, they
would also support pathnames. Whether all the user space applications
need to be patched can be discussed and debated. But, we can patch
applications like, installers and firewall code, which when don't see
determinism ("eth0 mapping to integrated port 1"), fail and cause very
high impact could be patched. Since users are already familiar with
pathnames like /dev/disk/by-id{label, uuid}, I suppose it might not be
very difficult to get used to pathnames like
/dev/netdev/by-chassis-label/Embedded_NIC_1. Would that be acceptable ?
With regards,
Narendra K
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] net/compat_ioctl: support SIOCWANDEV
From: Krzysztof Halasa @ 2009-11-09 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann; +Cc: David Miller, Daniel Walker, linux-kernel, hch, netdev
In-Reply-To: <200911082239.24698.arnd@arndb.de>
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> writes:
> This adds compat_ioctl support for SIOCWANDEV, which has
> always been missing.
It looks good, can't test at the moment.
--
Krzysztof Halasa
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] net: TCP thin-stream detection
From: Andreas Petlund @ 2009-11-09 15:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ilpo Järvinen
Cc: Arnd Hannemann, William Allen Simpson, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, shemminger@vyatta.com,
davem@davemloft.net
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.00.0911051536200.7024@wel-95.cs.helsinki.fi>
Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> On Thu, 5 Nov 2009, Andreas Petlund wrote:
>
>> Arnd Hannemann wrote:
>>> One example: Consider standard NewReno non-SACK enabled flow:
>>> For some reasons two data packets get reordered.
>>> The TCP sender will produce a dupACK and an ACK.
>>> The dupACK will trigger (because of your logic) a spurious retransmit.
>>> The spurious retransmit will trigger a dupACK.
>>> This dupACK will again trigger a spurious retransmit.
>>> And this game will continue, unless a packet is dropped by coincidence.
>> Such an effect will be extremely rare. It will depend on the application
>> producing an extremely even flow of packets with just the right
>> interarrival time, and also on reordering of data (which also will
>> happen very seldom when the number of packets in flight are so low).
>> Even though it can happen, the data flow will progress (with spurious
>> retransmissions). The effect will stop as soon as the application sends
>> more than 4 segments in an RTT (which will disable the thin-stream
>> modifications) or less than 1 (which will cause all segments to be
>> successfully ACKed), or if, as you say, a packet is dropped.
>
> I'd simply workaround this problem by requiring SACK to be enabled for
> such a connection. This is reinforced by the fact that small windowed
> transfers want it certainly to be on anyway to get the best out of ACK
> flow even if there were some ACK losses.
>
Thanks. I will revise the patches based on all the feedback I have gotten
and get back to the list with a new version when I have done some more
testing.
Best regards,
Andreas
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next-2.6] udp: bind() optimisation
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2009-11-09 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S. Miller
Cc: Linux Netdev List, Lucian Adrian Grijincu, Octavian Purdila
UDP bind() can be O(N^2) in some pathological cases.
Thanks to secondary hash tables, we can make it O(N)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/udp.h | 6 +++
include/net/udp.h | 3 +
net/ipv4/udp.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
net/ipv6/udp.c | 14 ++++----
4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/udp.h b/include/linux/udp.h
index 59f0ddf..03f72a2 100644
--- a/include/linux/udp.h
+++ b/include/linux/udp.h
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ static inline struct udp_sock *udp_sk(const struct sock *sk)
return (struct udp_sock *)sk;
}
+#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry(__sk, node, list) \
+ hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
+
+#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
+ hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
+
#define IS_UDPLITE(__sk) (udp_sk(__sk)->pcflag)
#endif
diff --git a/include/net/udp.h b/include/net/udp.h
index af41850..5348d80 100644
--- a/include/net/udp.h
+++ b/include/net/udp.h
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ static inline void udp_lib_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
}
extern int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
- int (*)(const struct sock*,const struct sock*));
+ int (*)(const struct sock *,const struct sock *),
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr);
/* net/ipv4/udp.c */
extern int udp_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index d73e917..1eaf575 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -152,16 +152,49 @@ static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Note: we still hold spinlock of primary hash chain, so no other writer
+ * can insert/delete a socket with local_port == num
+ */
+static int udp_lib_lport_inuse2(struct net *net, __u16 num,
+ struct udp_hslot *hslot2,
+ struct sock *sk,
+ int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
+ const struct sock *sk2))
+{
+ struct sock *sk2;
+ struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
+ int res = 0;
+
+ spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
+ udp_portaddr_for_each_entry(sk2, node, &hslot2->head)
+ if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
+ sk2 != sk &&
+ (udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
+ (!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
+ (!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if
+ || sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
+ (*saddr_comp)(sk, sk2)) {
+ res = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
+ return res;
+}
+
/**
* udp_lib_get_port - UDP/-Lite port lookup for IPv4 and IPv6
*
* @sk: socket struct in question
* @snum: port number to look up
* @saddr_comp: AF-dependent comparison of bound local IP addresses
+ * @hash2_nulladdr: AF-dependant hash value in secondary hash chains,
+ * with NULL address
*/
int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
- const struct sock *sk2))
+ const struct sock *sk2),
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr)
{
struct udp_hslot *hslot, *hslot2;
struct udp_table *udptable = sk->sk_prot->h.udp_table;
@@ -210,6 +243,30 @@ int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
} else {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, snum);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
+ if (hslot->count > 10) {
+ int exist;
+ unsigned int slot2 = udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^ snum;
+
+ slot2 &= udptable->mask;
+ hash2_nulladdr &= udptable->mask;
+
+ hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, slot2);
+ if (hslot->count < hslot2->count)
+ goto scan_primary_hash;
+
+ exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
+ sk, saddr_comp);
+ if (!exist && (hash2_nulladdr != slot2)) {
+ hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, hash2_nulladdr);
+ exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
+ sk, saddr_comp);
+ }
+ if (exist)
+ goto fail_unlock;
+ else
+ goto found;
+ }
+scan_primary_hash:
if (udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, NULL, sk,
saddr_comp, 0))
goto fail_unlock;
@@ -255,12 +312,14 @@ static unsigned int udp4_portaddr_hash(struct net *net, __be32 saddr,
int udp_v4_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr =
+ udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), INADDR_ANY, snum);
+ unsigned int hash2_partial =
+ udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr, 0);
+
/* precompute partial secondary hash */
- udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash =
- udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk),
- inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr,
- 0);
- return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal);
+ udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash = hash2_partial;
+ return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal, hash2_nulladdr);
}
static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, __be32 saddr,
@@ -336,8 +395,6 @@ static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
return score;
}
-#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
- hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
/* called with read_rcu_lock() */
static struct sock *udp4_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index 2915e1d..f4c85b2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -100,12 +100,14 @@ static unsigned int udp6_portaddr_hash(struct net *net,
int udp_v6_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr =
+ udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), &in6addr_any, snum);
+ unsigned int hash2_partial =
+ udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), &inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr, 0);
+
/* precompute partial secondary hash */
- udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash =
- udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk),
- &inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr,
- 0);
- return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal);
+ udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash = hash2_partial;
+ return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal, hash2_nulladdr);
}
static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
@@ -181,8 +183,6 @@ static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
return score;
}
-#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
- hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
/* called with read_rcu_lock() */
static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH] xfrm: SAD entries do not expire correctly after suspend-resume
From: Herbert Xu @ 2009-11-09 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yury Polyanskiy; +Cc: netdev, davem, peterz, yoshfuji, tglx, mingo
In-Reply-To: <20091108211249.2ecdfd38@penta.localdomain>
Yury Polyanskiy <ypolyans@princeton.edu> wrote:
>
> This fixes the following bug in the current implementation of
> net/xfrm: SAD entries timeouts do not count the time spent by the machine
> in the suspended state. This leads to the connectivity problems because
> after resuming local machine thinks that the SAD entry is still valid, while
> it has already been expired on the remote server.
>
> The cause of this is very simple: the timeouts in the net/xfrm are bound to
> the old mod_timer() timers. This patch reassigns them to the
> CLOCK_REALTIME hrtimer.
>
> I have been using this version of the patch for a few months on my
> machines without any problems. Also run a few stress tests w/o any
> issues.
>
> This version of the patch uses tasklet_hrtimer by Peter Zijlstra
> (commit 9ba5f0).
>
> This patch is against 2.6.31.4. Please CC me.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yury Polyanskiy <polyanskiy@gmail.com>
Thanks for the patch.
However, I have some reservations as to whether this is the ideal
situation. Unless I'm mistaken, this patch may cause IPsec SAs
to expire if the system clock was out of sync prior to IPsec startup
and is subsequently resynced by ntpdate or similar.
For example, it's quite common for clocks to be out-of-sync by
10 hours in Australia due to time zone issues with BIOS clocks.
So potentially ntpdate could move the clock forward by 10 hours
or more on bootup thus causing IPsec SAs to expire prematurely
with this patch.
This shouldn't really be a problem in itself except that there
are some dodgy IPsec gateways out there that refuse to reestablish
IPsec SAs if the interval between two successive connections is
too small. This could render the SA inoperable for hours.
So the upshot of all this is that we definitely want the effect
of this patch for suspend/resume, but it would be great if we can
avoid it for settimeofday(2).
Cheers,
--
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/8 net-next-2.6] udp: optimisations
From: Octavian Purdila @ 2009-11-09 15:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet; +Cc: David Miller, netdev, lgrijincu
In-Reply-To: <4AF7AA94.6090909@gmail.com>
On Monday 09 November 2009 07:37:24 you wrote:
> David Miller a écrit :
> > Looks great, all applied, thanks Eric.
>
> Thanks David, I'll make the remaining patches too.
>
> > I would even go so far as to say that the cutoff to the second hash
> > table should be even lower than 10, like maybe 4 or 5.
>
> Probably, but we want to avoid the secondary way if possible,
> as this path might have to traverse two different chains.
>
> (total of three cache line accesses to only take a look at chains
> head/count)
>
> Maybe we can change the heuristic to take into account this like that :
>
> if (hslot->count > 4) {
> ...
> if (hslot->count < hslot2->count * 2)
> goto begin_primary_hash_lookup;
>
> This is tuning, and needs benchmarking.
>
Eric, thanks a lot !
Lucian is currently testing it on our setup and once we iron out some IPv6
issues we are seeing he will follow up with some numbers.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Libertas related kernel crash
From: Daniel Mack @ 2009-11-09 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, libertas-dev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Michael Hirsch
In-Reply-To: <20091105120549.GQ14091@buzzloop.caiaq.de>
On Thu, Nov 05, 2009 at 01:05:49PM +0100, Daniel Mack wrote:
> On an ARM (PXA300) embdedded platform with a libertas chip connected via
> SDIO, we happen to see the kernel Ooops below once in a while.
>
> Any pointer on where to dig?
Some more input on this. Oopses similar to the one below are likely
triggered when switching from Ad-hoc to managed mode multiple times in a
row, and something seems corrupt the memory badly. I've searched for the
obvious (double frees, out-of-bound writes etc), but I couldn't find
anything yet. It is, however, related to the wireless core and/or the
libertas driver.
Any ideas, anyone?
Daniel
> [ 2659.715112] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000001
> [ 2659.723164] pgd = c5ca8000
> [ 2659.725846] [00000001] *pgd=a5cbc031, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
> [ 2659.732062] Internal error: Oops: 13 [#4]
> [ 2659.736041] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/platform/pxa2xx-mci.0/mmc_host/mmc0/mmc0:0001/mmc0:0001:1/net/wlan0/address
> [ 2659.746573] Modules linked in: eeti_ts libertas_sdio pxamci ds2760_battery w1_ds2760 wire
> [ 2659.754698] CPU: 0 Tainted: G D (2.6.32-rc6 #1)
> [ 2659.760255] PC is at kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90
> [ 2659.764774] LR is at inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c
> [ 2659.769876] pc : [<c00a28d8>] lr : [<c02a4b24>] psr: 20000093
> [ 2659.769887] sp : c5c27d88 ip : c78ae4a0 fp : 00006e49
> [ 2659.781279] r10: 00008928 r9 : c04fcfac r8 : c0532148
> [ 2659.786466] r7 : 00000020 r6 : 00000020 r5 : 60000013 r4 : 00000001
> [ 2659.792945] r3 : 00000000 r2 : c78ae4a0 r1 : 00000020 r0 : c04d42e4
> [ 2659.799427] Flags: nzCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
> [ 2659.806602] Control: 0000397f Table: a5ca8018 DAC: 00000015
> [ 2659.812304] Process p0-renderer (pid: 1527, stack limit = 0xc5c26278)
> [ 2659.818697] Stack: (0xc5c27d88 to 0xc5c28000)
> [ 2659.823029] 7d80: c5cc5300 c5cb1000 c5c18800 c78ae4a0 00008928 00008928
> [ 2659.831155] 7da0: 00000001 c02a4b24 c2388c2e 00000000 c7eb6200 c02a4c8c c02a4200 c2388c2d
> [ 2659.839287] 7dc0: c04fcfac 00000000 0000ee48 00008000 fb0ca8c0 c7eb6200 c04fcfac 00000000
> [ 2659.847412] 7de0: 000038e5 fb0ca8c0 fb0ca8c0 c7eb6200 00000000 c02a4e28 c02a40e4 00000000
> [ 2659.855543] 7e00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c02b99d4 00000001 00000000 c5c27f08 00000000
> [ 2659.863669] 7e20: c5c7b500 000005a8 00000000 00000000 000200da c5c7b500 c0069a74 c5c27e3c
> [ 2659.871802] 7e40: c5c27e3c c0049fdc be96a8fc c0275d70 c5c27e88 00000006 00000005 00000001
> [ 2659.879933] 7e60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 fb0ca8c0 1d0ca8c0 00000000 00000000 00000000
> [ 2659.888057] 7e80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000006 38e50000 00000000 c7ff6e00
> [ 2659.896183] 7ea0: 000063f8 c5c27f08 00000010 c7eb6200 c5c27f08 c00440c4 c5c26000 c76cd2c0
> [ 2659.904314] 7ec0: 00000802 c02c4f70 0000c1ff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00045108
> [ 2659.912441] 7ee0: 00000010 c76cd2c0 00045108 00000010 c5c27f08 c00440c4 c5c26000 40343800
> [ 2659.920573] 7f00: 00044440 c0276888 38e50002 fb0ca8c0 00000000 00000000 000063f8 00000000
> [ 2659.928698] 7f20: 00000000 be96a858 c5c27f48 000450c0 000000c5 c00440c4 c5c26000 40343800
> [ 2659.936829] 7f40: 00044440 c00a9864 000063f8 00000000 00000005 c047c1ff 00000001 00000000
> [ 2659.944952] 7f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000003
> [ 2659.953078] 7f80: 00000000 c7b5aa00 00000000 00000000 00000000 00046cb8 00045108 40370ef8
> [ 2659.961203] 7fa0: 0000011b c0043f40 00046cb8 00045108 0000000a 00045108 00000010 0000001c
> [ 2659.969328] 7fc0: 00046cb8 00045108 40370ef8 0000011b 00000000 00043178 40343800 00044440
> [ 2659.977451] 7fe0: 40371050 be96a968 4035b3c8 40790638 60000010 0000000a 00000000 00000000
> [ 2659.985599] [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90) from [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c)
> [ 2659.995296] [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c) from [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280)
> [ 2660.005415] [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280) from [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50)
> [ 2660.015034] [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50) from [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420)
> [ 2660.024211] [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420) from [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c)
> [ 2660.033653] [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c) from [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90)
> [ 2660.042662] [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90) from [<c0043f40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
> [ 2660.051228] Code: e5904080 e5907090 e3540000 1590308c (17943103) [ 2660.057440] ---[ end trace 416b23b4578ffa42 ]---
> [ 2660.062021] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
> [ 2660.068400] [<c00486cc>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xdc) from [<c0351758>] (panic+0x34/0x120)
> [ 2660.076555] [<c0351758>] (panic+0x34/0x120) from [<c004758c>] (die+0x14c/0x178)
> [ 2660.083823] [<c004758c>] (die+0x14c/0x178) from [<c0049900>] (__do_kernel_fault+0x68/0x80)
> [ 2660.092060] [<c0049900>] (__do_kernel_fault+0x68/0x80) from [<c004b678>] (do_alignment+0x59c/0x700)
> [ 2660.101067] [<c004b678>] (do_alignment+0x59c/0x700) from [<c00432c8>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x94)
> [ 2660.109649] [<c00432c8>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x94) from [<c0043acc>] (__dabt_svc+0x4c/0x60)
> [ 2660.117874] Exception stack(0xc5c27d40 to 0xc5c27d88)
> [ 2660.122898] 7d40: c04d42e4 00000020 c78ae4a0 00000000 00000001 60000013 00000020 00000020
> [ 2660.131046] 7d60: c0532148 c04fcfac 00008928 00006e49 c78ae4a0 c5c27d88 c02a4b24 c00a28d8
> [ 2660.139189] 7d80: 20000093 ffffffff
> [ 2660.142673] [<c0043acc>] (__dabt_svc+0x4c/0x60) from [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90)
> [ 2660.151265] [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90) from [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c)
> [ 2660.160998] [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c) from [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280)
> [ 2660.171148] [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280) from [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50)
> [ 2660.180780] [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50) from [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420)
> [ 2660.189971] [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420) from [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c)
> [ 2660.199424] [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c) from [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90)
> [ 2660.208443] [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90) from [<c0043f40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 0/5 RFC] TCPCT part1: cookie option exchange
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
I'm torn at the moment, as the net-next tree modules don't compile today.
Although 'make vmlinux' compiles this successfully, it is not tested.
Keep in mind that earlier variants were extensively tested. But at least
this helps move the review comment process along....
Updated to patch cleanly with recent commits.
Changes from previous version:
* swapped conditional tests, requested by Eric and Joe.
* separate patch for constant cleanup, requested by Ilpo.
* added hash generation of Responder Cookie with RCU locking.
* shuffled a few bits to save another byte of tcp socket space.
^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 1/5 RFC] TCPCT part 1a: add request_values parameter for sending SYNACK
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1000 bytes --]
Add optional function parameters associated with sending SYNACK.
These parameters are not needed after sending SYNACK, and are not
used for retransmission. Avoids extending struct tcp_request_sock,
and avoids allocating kernel memory.
Also affects DCCP as it uses common struct request_sock_ops,
but this parameter is currently reserved for future use.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
---
include/net/request_sock.h | 8 +++++++-
include/net/tcp.h | 1 +
net/dccp/ipv4.c | 5 +++--
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 5 +++--
net/dccp/minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
10 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1a5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 8638 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/net/request_sock.h b/include/net/request_sock.h
index c719084..c9b50eb 100644
--- a/include/net/request_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/request_sock.h
@@ -27,13 +27,19 @@ struct sk_buff;
struct dst_entry;
struct proto;
+/* empty to "strongly type" an otherwise void parameter.
+ */
+struct request_values {
+};
+
struct request_sock_ops {
int family;
int obj_size;
struct kmem_cache *slab;
char *slab_name;
int (*rtx_syn_ack)(struct sock *sk,
- struct request_sock *req);
+ struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp);
void (*send_ack)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req);
void (*send_reset)(struct sock *sk,
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index bf20f88..25bf3ba 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ extern int tcp_connect(struct sock *sk);
extern struct sk_buff * tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp,
struct request_sock *req);
extern int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags);
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
index 2423a08..efbcfdc 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -477,7 +477,8 @@ static struct dst_entry* dccp_v4_route_skb(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
return &rt->u.dst;
}
-static int dccp_v4_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int dccp_v4_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rv_unused)
{
int err = -1;
struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -626,7 +627,7 @@ int dccp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
dreq->dreq_iss = dccp_v4_init_sequence(skb);
dreq->dreq_service = service;
- if (dccp_v4_send_response(sk, req))
+ if (dccp_v4_send_response(sk, req, NULL))
goto drop_and_free;
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, DCCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 50ea91a..6574215 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ out:
}
-static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rv_unused)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *ireq6 = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
dreq->dreq_iss = dccp_v6_init_sequence(skb);
dreq->dreq_service = service;
- if (dccp_v6_send_response(sk, req))
+ if (dccp_v6_send_response(sk, req, NULL))
goto drop_and_free;
inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, DCCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/dccp/minisocks.c b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
index 5ca49ce..af226a0 100644
--- a/net/dccp/minisocks.c
+++ b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* counter (backoff, monitored by dccp_response_timer).
*/
req->retrans++;
- req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req);
+ req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req, NULL);
}
/* Network Duplicate, discard packet */
return NULL;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
index 26fb50e..ad098d6 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_prune(struct sock *parent,
&expire, &resend);
if (!expire &&
(!resend ||
- !req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req) ||
+ !req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req, NULL) ||
inet_rsk(req)->acked)) {
unsigned long timeo;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 657ae33..f83ac91 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -743,7 +743,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* socket.
*/
static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
- struct dst_entry *dst)
+ struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
int err = -1;
@@ -753,7 +754,7 @@ static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
return -1;
- skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req);
+ skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, rvp, req);
if (skb) {
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
@@ -774,9 +775,10 @@ static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
return err;
}
-static int tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
- return __tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, NULL);
+ return __tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, NULL, rvp);
}
/*
@@ -1211,13 +1213,13 @@ static struct timewait_sock_ops tcp_timewait_sock_ops = {
int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct request_sock *req;
+ struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
+ struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
__be32 saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
__be32 daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
- struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
@@ -1337,7 +1339,8 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
- if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst) || want_cookie)
+ if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst, NULL)
+ || want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index a9d34e2..fb68bab 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* Enforce "SYN-ACK" according to figure 8, figure 6
* of RFC793, fixed by RFC1122.
*/
- req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req);
+ req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req, NULL);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 616c686..784e6ee 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2224,6 +2224,7 @@ int tcp_send_synack(struct sock *sk)
/* Prepare a SYN-ACK. */
struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp,
struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 696a22f..6951827 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -461,7 +461,8 @@ out:
}
-static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
@@ -499,7 +500,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
if ((err = xfrm_lookup(sock_net(sk), &dst, &fl, sk, 0)) < 0)
goto done;
- skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req);
+ skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, rvp, req);
if (skb) {
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
@@ -1161,13 +1162,13 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_hnd_req(struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ struct request_sock *req;
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
- struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
- struct request_sock *req = NULL;
- __u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ __u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
@@ -1239,23 +1240,20 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
isn = tcp_v6_init_sequence(skb);
}
-
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
- if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req))
- goto drop;
+ if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req, NULL)
+ || want_cookie)
+ goto drop_and_free;
- if (!want_cookie) {
- inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
- return 0;
- }
+ inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
+ return 0;
+drop_and_free:
+ reqsk_free(req);
drop:
- if (req)
- reqsk_free(req);
-
return 0; /* don't send reset */
}
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 1/4] bnx2x: GSO implies CSUM offload
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Making sure that whenever the FW/HW is configured for GSO, it is also configured
to CSUM offload
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index 61974b7..856ca38 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -11121,10 +11121,10 @@ static inline u32 bnx2x_xmit_type(struct bnx2x *bp, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
- rc |= XMIT_GSO_V4;
+ rc |= (XMIT_GSO_V4 | XMIT_CSUM_V4 | XMIT_CSUM_TCP);
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
- rc |= XMIT_GSO_V6;
+ rc |= (XMIT_GSO_V6 | XMIT_CSUM_TCP | XMIT_CSUM_V6);
return rc;
}
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 2/4] bnx2x: Remove misleading error print
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Failing to allocate MSI-X vectors is not an error and should not be printed as
such
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 5 -----
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index 856ca38..a8ebd46 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -7478,11 +7478,6 @@ static int bnx2x_set_int_mode(struct bnx2x *bp)
rc = bnx2x_enable_msix(bp);
if (rc) {
/* failed to enable MSI-X */
- if (bp->multi_mode)
- BNX2X_ERR("Multi requested but failed to "
- "enable MSI-X (rx %d tx %d), "
- "set number of queues to 1\n",
- bp->num_rx_queues, bp->num_tx_queues);
bp->num_rx_queues = 1;
bp->num_tx_queues = 1;
}
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 3/4] bnx2x: Change coalescing granularity to 4us
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x.h | 2 +-
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 13 +++++++------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x.h b/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
index c3b32f7..928942b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static inline u32 reg_poll(struct bnx2x *bp, u32 reg, u32 expected, int ms,
#define MAX_SP_DESC_CNT (SP_DESC_CNT - 1)
-#define BNX2X_BTR 3
+#define BNX2X_BTR 1
#define MAX_SPQ_PENDING 8
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index a8ebd46..ab552d3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -4920,21 +4920,21 @@ static void bnx2x_update_coalesce(struct bnx2x *bp)
REG_WR8(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_TIMEOUT_U_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
U_SB_ETH_RX_CQ_INDEX),
- bp->rx_ticks/12);
+ bp->rx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR));
REG_WR16(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_DISABLE_U_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
U_SB_ETH_RX_CQ_INDEX),
- (bp->rx_ticks/12) ? 0 : 1);
+ (bp->rx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR)) ? 0 : 1);
/* HC_INDEX_C_ETH_TX_CQ_CONS */
REG_WR8(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_TIMEOUT_C_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
C_SB_ETH_TX_CQ_INDEX),
- bp->tx_ticks/12);
+ bp->tx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR));
REG_WR16(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_DISABLE_C_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
C_SB_ETH_TX_CQ_INDEX),
- (bp->tx_ticks/12) ? 0 : 1);
+ (bp->tx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR)) ? 0 : 1);
}
}
@@ -9008,8 +9008,9 @@ static int __devinit bnx2x_init_bp(struct bnx2x *bp)
bp->rx_csum = 1;
- bp->tx_ticks = 50;
- bp->rx_ticks = 25;
+ /* make sure that the numbers are in the right granularity */
+ bp->tx_ticks = (50 / (4 * BNX2X_BTR)) * (4 * BNX2X_BTR);
+ bp->rx_ticks = (25 / (4 * BNX2X_BTR)) * (4 * BNX2X_BTR);
timer_interval = (CHIP_REV_IS_SLOW(bp) ? 5*HZ : HZ);
bp->current_interval = (poll ? poll : timer_interval);
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 4/4] bnx2x: version 1.52.1-4
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index ab552d3..06ffa7d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@
#include "bnx2x_init_ops.h"
#include "bnx2x_dump.h"
-#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "1.52.1-3"
-#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "2009/11/05"
+#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "1.52.1-4"
+#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "2009/11/09"
#define BNX2X_BC_VER 0x040200
#include <linux/firmware.h>
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 2/5 RFC] TCPCT part1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 556 bytes --]
Define two symbols needed in both kernel and user space.
Remove old (somewhat incorrect) variant that wasn't used in many cases.
Default applies to both RMSS and SMSS.
Replace numeric constants with defined symbols.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++
include/net/tcp.h | 3 ---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 6 +++---
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1b5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 4017 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index eeecb85..32d7d77 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ enum {
TCP_DATA_OFFSET = __cpu_to_be32(0xF0000000)
};
+/*
+ * TCP general constants
+ */
+#define TCP_MSS_DEFAULT 536U /* IPv4 (RFC1122, RFC2581) */
+#define TCP_MSS_DESIRED 1220U /* IPv6 (tunneled), EDNS0 (RFC3226) */
+
/* TCP socket options */
#define TCP_NODELAY 1 /* Turn off Nagle's algorithm. */
#define TCP_MAXSEG 2 /* Limit MSS */
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 25bf3ba..a413e9f 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ extern void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
/* Minimal accepted MSS. It is (60+60+8) - (20+20). */
#define TCP_MIN_MSS 88U
-/* Minimal RCV_MSS. */
-#define TCP_MIN_RCVMSS 536U
-
/* The least MTU to use for probing */
#define TCP_BASE_MSS 512
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index be0c5bf..cc306ac 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void tcp_measure_rcv_mss(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
* "len" is invariant segment length, including TCP header.
*/
len += skb->data - skb_transport_header(skb);
- if (len >= TCP_MIN_RCVMSS + sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
+ if (len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
/* If PSH is not set, packet should be
* full sized, provided peer TCP is not badly broken.
* This observation (if it is correct 8)) allows
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ void tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(struct sock *sk)
unsigned int hint = min_t(unsigned int, tp->advmss, tp->mss_cache);
hint = min(hint, tp->rcv_wnd / 2);
- hint = min(hint, TCP_MIN_RCVMSS);
+ hint = min(hint, TCP_MSS_DEFAULT);
hint = max(hint, TCP_MIN_MSS);
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = hint;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index f83ac91..0718fde 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
if (inet->opt)
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet->opt->optlen;
- tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = 536;
+ tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
/* Socket identity is still unknown (sport may be zero).
* However we set state to SYN-SENT and not releasing socket
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto drop_and_free;
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
- tmp_opt.mss_clamp = 536;
+ tmp_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tmp_opt.user_mss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, dst);
@@ -1818,7 +1818,7 @@ static int tcp_v4_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
- tp->mss_cache = 536;
+ tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sysctl_tcp_reordering;
icsk->icsk_ca_ops = &tcp_init_congestion_ops;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index fb68bab..7a42990 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
if (newtp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, newsk))
newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
#endif
- if (skb->len >= TCP_MIN_RCVMSS+newtp->tcp_header_len)
+ if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len)
newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len;
newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss;
TCP_ECN_openreq_child(newtp, req);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 6951827..b528f75 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
- tp->mss_cache = 536;
+ tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sysctl_tcp_reordering;
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 3/5 RFC] TCPCT part1c: sysctl_tcp_cookie_size, socket option TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS, functions
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1358 bytes --]
Define sysctl (tcp_cookie_size) to turn on and off the cookie option
default globally, instead of a compiled configuration option.
Define per socket option (TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS) for setting constant
data values, retrieving variable cookie values, and other facilities.
Redefine two TCP header functions to accept TCP header pointer.
When subtracting, return signed int to allow error checking.
Move inline tcp_clear_options() unchanged from net/tcp.h to linux/tcp.h,
near its corresponding struct tcp_options_received (prior to changes).
This is a straightforward re-implementation of an earlier (year-old)
patch that no longer applies cleanly, with permission of the original
author (Adam Langley). The patch was previously reviewed:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/102586
These functions will also be used in subsequent patches that implement
additional features.
Requires:
TCPCT part 1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++
include/linux/tcp.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/net/tcp.h | 6 +---
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 8 ++++++
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 8 ++++++
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1c5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 5589 bytes --]
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index a0e134d..d47c000 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -164,6 +164,14 @@ tcp_congestion_control - STRING
additional choices may be available based on kernel configuration.
Default is set as part of kernel configuration.
+tcp_cookie_size - INTEGER
+ Default size of TCP Cookie Transactions (TCPCT) option, that may be
+ overridden on a per socket basis by the TCPCT socket option.
+ Values greater than the maximum (16) are interpreted as the maximum.
+ Values greater than zero and less than the minimum (8) are interpreted
+ as the minimum.
+ Default: 0 (off).
+
tcp_dsack - BOOLEAN
Allows TCP to send "duplicate" SACKs.
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index 32d7d77..57921c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ enum {
#define TCP_QUICKACK 12 /* Block/reenable quick acks */
#define TCP_CONGESTION 13 /* Congestion control algorithm */
#define TCP_MD5SIG 14 /* TCP MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS 15 /* TCP Cookie Transactions */
+/* for TCP_INFO socket option */
#define TCPI_OPT_TIMESTAMPS 1
#define TCPI_OPT_SACK 2
#define TCPI_OPT_WSCALE 4
@@ -174,6 +176,30 @@ struct tcp_md5sig {
__u8 tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN]; /* key (binary) */
};
+/* for TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS (TCPCT) socket option */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_MAX 16 /* 128-bits */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_MIN 8 /* 64-bits */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_PAIR_SIZE (2*TCP_COOKIE_MAX)
+
+/* Flags for both getsockopt and setsockopt */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS (1 << 0) /* Discard SYN without cookie */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER (1 << 1) /* Prohibit outgoing cookies,
+ * supercedes everything. */
+
+/* Flags for getsockopt */
+#define TCP_S_DATA_IN (1 << 2) /* Was data received? */
+#define TCP_S_DATA_OUT (1 << 3) /* Was data sent? */
+
+/* TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS data */
+struct tcp_cookie_transactions {
+ __u16 tcpct_flags; /* see above */
+ __u8 __tcpct_pad1; /* zero */
+ __u8 tcpct_cookie_desired; /* bytes */
+ __u16 tcpct_s_data_desired; /* bytes of variable data */
+ __u16 tcpct_used; /* bytes in value */
+ __u8 tcpct_value[TCP_MSS_DEFAULT];
+};
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -197,6 +223,17 @@ static inline unsigned int tcp_optlen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
return (tcp_hdr(skb)->doff - 5) * 4;
}
+static inline unsigned int tcp_header_len_th(const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ return th->doff * 4;
+}
+
+/* When doff is bad, this could be negative. */
+static inline int tcp_option_len_th(const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ return (int)(th->doff * 4) - sizeof(*th);
+}
+
/* This defines a selective acknowledgement block. */
struct tcp_sack_block_wire {
__be32 start_seq;
@@ -227,6 +264,11 @@ struct tcp_options_received {
u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */
};
+static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt)
+{
+ rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
+}
+
/* This is the max number of SACKS that we'll generate and process. It's safe
* to increse this, although since:
* size = TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE_ALIGNED (4) + n * TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK (8)
@@ -435,6 +477,6 @@ static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk)
return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_H */
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index a413e9f..f15924b 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ extern int sysctl_tcp_base_mss;
extern int sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows;
extern int sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle;
extern int sysctl_tcp_max_ssthresh;
+extern int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size;
extern atomic_t tcp_memory_allocated;
extern struct percpu_counter tcp_sockets_allocated;
@@ -340,11 +341,6 @@ static inline void tcp_dec_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk,
extern void tcp_enter_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk);
-static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt)
-{
- rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
-}
-
#define TCP_ECN_OK 1
#define TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR 2
#define TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR 4
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index 2dcf04d..3422c54 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -714,6 +714,14 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
},
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+ .procname = "tcp_cookie_size",
+ .data = &sysctl_tcp_cookie_size,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
+ },
+ {
+ .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
.procname = "udp_mem",
.data = &sysctl_udp_mem,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem),
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 784e6ee..492ccdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ int sysctl_tcp_base_mss __read_mostly = 512;
/* By default, RFC2861 behavior. */
int sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle __read_mostly = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+/* By default, let the user enable it. */
+int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size __read_mostly = 0;
+#else
+int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size __read_mostly = TCP_COOKIE_MAX;
+#endif
+
+
/* Account for new data that has been sent to the network. */
static void tcp_event_new_data_sent(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 42/75] myri10ge: declare MODULE_FIRMWARE
From: Andrew Gallatin @ 2009-11-09 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings; +Cc: David Miller, Brice Goglin, netdev
In-Reply-To: <1257630884.15927.442.camel@localhost>
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by Andrew Gallatin <gallatin@myri.com>
Thanks,
Drew
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 2/5 RFC] TCPCT part1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2009-11-09 16:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: William Allen Simpson; +Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF84248.1070103@gmail.com>
William Allen Simpson a écrit :
> Define two symbols needed in both kernel and user space.
>
> Remove old (somewhat incorrect) variant that wasn't used in many cases.
> Default applies to both RMSS and SMSS.
>
> Replace numeric constants with defined symbols.
>
> Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
> ---
> include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++
> include/net/tcp.h | 3 ---
> net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++--
> net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 6 +++---
> net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
> net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +-
> 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 4/5 RFC] TCPCT part1d: generate Responder Cookie
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers; +Cc: Eric Dumazet, Paul E. McKenney
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 807 bytes --]
Define (missing) hash message size for SHA1.
Define hashing size constants specific to TCP cookies, and add new function.
Maintain global secret values for tcp_cookie_generator().
This is a significantly revised implementation of earlier (15-year-old)
Photuris [RFC-2522] code for the KA9Q cooperative multitasking platform.
Linux RCU technique appears to be well-suited to this application, though
neither of the circular queue items are freed.
These functions will also be used in subsequent patches that implement
additional features.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
include/linux/cryptohash.h | 1 +
include/net/tcp.h | 8 +++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1d5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 6995 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
index c118b2a..ec78a4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#define __CRYPTOHASH_H
#define SHA_DIGEST_WORDS 5
+#define SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES (512 /*bits*/ / 8)
#define SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS 80
void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index f15924b..702fd0a 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1474,6 +1474,14 @@ struct tcp_request_sock_ops {
#endif
};
+/* Using SHA1 for now, define some constants.
+ */
+#define COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS (SHA_DIGEST_WORDS)
+#define COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS (SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4)
+#define COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS (COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS)
+
+extern int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery);
+
extern void tcp_v4_init(void);
extern void tcp_init(void);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index e0cfa63..3ae01bf 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
@@ -2842,6 +2843,141 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key);
#endif
+/**
+ * Each Responder maintains up to two secret values concurrently for
+ * efficient secret rollover. Each secret value has 4 states:
+ *
+ * Generating. (tcp_secret_generating != tcp_secret_primary)
+ * Generates new Responder-Cookies, but not yet used for primary
+ * verification. This is a short-term state, typically lasting only
+ * one round trip time (RTT).
+ *
+ * Primary. (tcp_secret_generating == tcp_secret_primary)
+ * Used both for generation and primary verification.
+ *
+ * Retiring. (tcp_secret_retiring != tcp_secret_secondary)
+ * Used for verification, until the first failure that can be
+ * verified by the newer Generating secret. At that time, this
+ * cookie's state is changed to Secondary, and the Generating
+ * cookie's state is changed to Primary. This is a short-term state,
+ * typically lasting only one round trip time (RTT).
+ *
+ * Secondary. (tcp_secret_retiring == tcp_secret_secondary)
+ * Used for secondary verification, after primary verification
+ * failures. This state lasts no more than twice the Maximum Segment
+ * Lifetime (2MSL). Then, the secret is discarded.
+ */
+struct tcp_cookie_secret {
+ /* The secret is divided into two parts. The digest part is the
+ * equivalent of previously hashing a secret and saving the state,
+ * and serves as an initialization vector (IV). The message part
+ * serves as the trailing secret.
+ */
+ u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+ unsigned long expires;
+};
+
+#define TCP_SECRET_1MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL)
+#define TCP_SECRET_2MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL * 2)
+#define TCP_SECRET_LIFE (HZ * 600)
+
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_one;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_two;
+
+/* Essentially a circular list, without dynamic allocation. */
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_generating;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_primary;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_retiring;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_secondary;
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_secret_locker);
+
+/* Select a random word in the cookie workspace.
+ */
+static inline u32 tcp_cookie_work(const u32 *ws, const int n)
+{
+ return ws[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + ((COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS-1) & ws[n])];
+}
+
+/* Fill bakery[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS] with generator, updating as needed.
+ * Called in softirq context.
+ * Returns: 0 for success.
+ */
+int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery)
+{
+ unsigned long jiffy = jiffies;
+
+ if (unlikely(time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires))) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ if (!time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires)) {
+ /* refreshed by another */
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &tcp_secret_generating->secrets[0],
+ sizeof(tcp_secret_generating->secrets));
+ } else {
+ u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+
+ /* still needs refreshing */
+ get_random_bytes(secrets, sizeof(secrets));
+
+ /* The first time, paranoia assumes that the
+ * randomization function isn't as strong. But,
+ * this secret initialization is delayed until
+ * the last possible moment (packet arrival).
+ * Although that time is observable, it is
+ * unpredictably variable. Mash in the most
+ * volatile clock bits available, and expire the
+ * secret extra quickly.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(tcp_secret_primary->expires ==
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires)) {
+ struct timespec tv;
+
+ getnstimeofday(&tv);
+ secrets[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS+0] ^=
+ (u32)tv.tv_nsec;
+
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_1MSL
+ + (0x0f & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 0));
+ } else {
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_LIFE
+ + (0xff & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 1));
+ tcp_secret_primary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_2MSL
+ + (0x1f & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 2));
+ }
+ memcpy(&tcp_secret_secondary->secrets[0],
+ &secrets[0],
+ sizeof(secrets));
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_generating,
+ tcp_secret_secondary);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_retiring,
+ tcp_secret_primary);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ /* Neither call_rcu() or synchronize_rcu() are needed.
+ * Retiring data is not freed. It is replaced after
+ * further (locked) pointer updates, and a quiet time
+ * (minimum 1MSL, maximum LIFE - 2MSL).
+ */
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &secrets[0],
+ sizeof(secrets));
+ }
+ } else {
+ rcu_read_lock_bh();
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &rcu_dereference(tcp_secret_generating)->secrets[0],
+ sizeof(tcp_secret_generating->secrets));
+ rcu_read_unlock_bh();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_cookie_generator);
+
void tcp_done(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT || sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV)
@@ -2876,6 +3012,7 @@ void __init tcp_init(void)
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
unsigned long nr_pages, limit;
int order, i, max_share;
+ unsigned long jiffy = jiffies;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
@@ -2969,6 +3106,15 @@ void __init tcp_init(void)
tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1, tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size);
tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_reno);
+
+ memset(&tcp_secret_one.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_one.secrets));
+ memset(&tcp_secret_two.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_two.secrets));
+ tcp_secret_one.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
+ tcp_secret_two.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
+ tcp_secret_generating = &tcp_secret_one;
+ tcp_secret_primary = &tcp_secret_one;
+ tcp_secret_retiring = &tcp_secret_two;
+ tcp_secret_secondary = &tcp_secret_two;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_close);
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Johannes Berg @ 2009-11-09 16:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Patrick McHardy; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <4AF816D3.7000304@trash.net>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 722 bytes --]
On Mon, 2009-11-09 at 14:19 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
> > Ok, cool, thanks. Do you want me to send the change removing the
> > multicast check, or would you want to do that since you audited all the
> > netlink callers?
>
> Please go ahead.
Will do.
> > Also, it's called URELEASE for unicast -- should we rename it to just
> > RELEASE?
>
> I think URELEASE is still fine since won't necessarily get called
> for sockets that are used for pure multicast reception when using
> setsockopt to bind to groups.
Oh? So on which sockets can I rely on it being used? After sending at
least one unicast message into the kernel? This seems to depend on pid
being assigned -- when is that?
johannes
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 801 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Patrick McHardy @ 2009-11-09 16:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <1257785502.29454.178.camel@johannes.local>
Johannes Berg wrote:
> On Mon, 2009-11-09 at 14:19 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
>
>>> Ok, cool, thanks. Do you want me to send the change removing the
>>> multicast check, or would you want to do that since you audited all the
>>> netlink callers?
>> Please go ahead.
>
> Will do.
>
>>> Also, it's called URELEASE for unicast -- should we rename it to just
>>> RELEASE?
>> I think URELEASE is still fine since won't necessarily get called
>> for sockets that are used for pure multicast reception when using
>> setsockopt to bind to groups.
>
> Oh? So on which sockets can I rely on it being used? After sending at
> least one unicast message into the kernel? This seems to depend on pid
> being assigned -- when is that?
All unicast sockets that have either manually or automatically
bound. Automatic binding happens when sending the first message
or when calling connect().
Before that, your code can't know of the sockets existance, so
I guess this should be fine.
^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 5/5 RFC] TCPCT part1e: initial SYN exchange with SYNACK data
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 17:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
Cc: Eric Dumazet, Ilpo Järvinen, Joe Perches
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 2346 bytes --]
This is a significantly revised implementation of an earlier (year-old)
patch that no longer applies cleanly, with permission of the original
author (Adam Langley). That patch was previously reviewed:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/102586
The principle difference is using a TCP option to carry the cookie nonce,
instead of a user configured offset in the data. This is more flexible and
less subject to user configuration error. Such a cookie option has been
suggested for many years, and is also useful without SYN data, allowing
several related concepts to use the same extension option.
"Re: SYN floods (was: does history repeat itself?)", September 9, 1996.
http://www.merit.net/mail.archives/nanog/1996-09/msg00235.html
"Re: what a new TCP header might look like", May 12, 1998.
ftp://ftp.isi.edu/end2end/end2end-interest-1998.mail
Data structures are carefully composed to require minimal additions.
For example, the struct tcp_options_received cookie_plus variable fits
between existing 16-bit and 8-bit variables, requiring no additional
space (taking alignment into consideration). There are no additions to
tcp_request_sock, and only 1 pointer in tcp_sock.
Allocations have been rearranged to avoid requiring GFP_ATOMIC, with
only one unavoidable exception in tcp_create_openreq_child(), where the
tcp_sock itself is created GFP_ATOMIC.
These functions will also be used in subsequent patches that implement
additional features.
Requires:
TCPCT part 1a: add request_values parameter for sending SYNACK
TCPCT part 1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
TCPCT part 1c: sysctl_tcp_cookie_size, socket option TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS, functions
TCPCT part 1d: generate Responder Cookie
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
include/linux/tcp.h | 29 ++++-
include/net/tcp.h | 72 +++++++++++++
net/ipv4/syncookies.c | 5 +-
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 127 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 86 +++++++++++++--
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 69 ++++++++++++-
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 59 ++++++++---
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 255 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
net/ipv6/syncookies.c | 5 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 65 +++++++++++-
10 files changed, 701 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1e5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 41725 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index 57921c1..80ebb52 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -258,31 +258,38 @@ struct tcp_options_received {
sack_ok : 4, /* SACK seen on SYN packet */
snd_wscale : 4, /* Window scaling received from sender */
rcv_wscale : 4; /* Window scaling to send to receiver */
-/* SACKs data */
+ u8 cookie_plus:6, /* bytes in authenticator/cookie option */
+ cookie_out_never:1,
+ cookie_in_always:1;
u8 num_sacks; /* Number of SACK blocks */
- u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */
+ u16 user_mss; /* mss requested by user in ioctl */
u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */
};
static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt)
{
- rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
+ rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = 0;
+ rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
+ rx_opt->cookie_plus = 0;
}
/* This is the max number of SACKS that we'll generate and process. It's safe
- * to increse this, although since:
+ * to increase this, although since:
* size = TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE_ALIGNED (4) + n * TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK (8)
* only four options will fit in a standard TCP header */
#define TCP_NUM_SACKS 4
+struct tcp_cookie_values;
+struct tcp_request_sock_ops;
+
struct tcp_request_sock {
struct inet_request_sock req;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Only used by TCP MD5 Signature so far. */
const struct tcp_request_sock_ops *af_specific;
#endif
- u32 rcv_isn;
- u32 snt_isn;
+ u32 rcv_isn;
+ u32 snt_isn;
};
static inline struct tcp_request_sock *tcp_rsk(const struct request_sock *req)
@@ -452,6 +459,12 @@ struct tcp_sock {
/* TCP MD5 Signature Option information */
struct tcp_md5sig_info *md5sig_info;
#endif
+
+ /* When the cookie options are generated and exchanged, then this
+ * object holds a reference to them (cookie_values->kref). Also
+ * contains related tcp_cookie_transactions fields.
+ */
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *cookie_values;
};
static inline struct tcp_sock *tcp_sk(const struct sock *sk)
@@ -470,6 +483,10 @@ struct tcp_timewait_sock {
u16 tw_md5_keylen;
u8 tw_md5_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN];
#endif
+ /* Few sockets in timewait have cookies; in that case, then this
+ * object holds a reference to it (tw_cookie_values->kref)
+ */
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *tw_cookie_values;
};
static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk)
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 702fd0a..d992c35 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <linux/dmaengine.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
#include <linux/cryptohash.h>
+#include <linux/kref.h>
#include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
#include <net/inet_timewait_sock.h>
@@ -164,6 +165,7 @@ extern void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
#define TCPOPT_SACK 5 /* SACK Block */
#define TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP 8 /* Better RTT estimations/PAWS */
#define TCPOPT_MD5SIG 19 /* MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */
+#define TCPOPT_COOKIE 253 /* Cookie extension (experimental) */
/*
* TCP option lengths
@@ -174,6 +176,10 @@ extern void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
#define TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM 2
#define TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP 10
#define TCPOLEN_MD5SIG 18
+#define TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE 2 /* Cookie-less header extension */
+#define TCPOLEN_COOKIE_PAIR 3 /* Cookie pair header extension */
+#define TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MAX (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE+TCP_COOKIE_MAX)
+#define TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE+TCP_COOKIE_MIN)
/* But this is what stacks really send out. */
#define TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED 12
@@ -401,6 +407,7 @@ extern int tcp_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
extern void tcp_parse_options(struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx,
+ u8 **cryptic,
int estab,
struct dst_entry *dst);
@@ -1482,6 +1489,71 @@ struct tcp_request_sock_ops {
extern int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery);
+/**
+ * A tcp_sock contains a pointer to the current value, and this is cloned to
+ * the tcp_timewait_sock.
+ *
+ * @cookie_pair: variable data from the option exchange.
+ *
+ * @cookie_desired: user specified tcpct_cookie_desired. Zero
+ * indicates default (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size).
+ * After cookie sent, remembers size of cookie.
+ * Range 0, TCP_COOKIE_MIN to TCP_COOKIE_MAX.
+ *
+ * @s_data_desired: user specified tcpct_s_data_desired. When the
+ * constant payload is specified (@s_data_constant),
+ * holds its length instead.
+ * Range 0 to TCP_MSS_DESIRED.
+ *
+ * @s_data_payload: constant data that is to be included in the
+ * payload of SYN or SYNACK segments when the
+ * cookie option is present.
+ */
+struct tcp_cookie_values {
+ struct kref kref;
+ u8 cookie_pair[TCP_COOKIE_PAIR_SIZE];
+ u8 cookie_pair_size;
+ u8 cookie_desired;
+ u16 s_data_desired:11,
+ s_data_constant:1,
+ s_data_in:1,
+ s_data_out:1;
+ u8 s_data_payload[0];
+};
+
+static inline void tcp_cookie_values_release(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ kfree(container_of(kref, struct tcp_cookie_values, kref));
+}
+
+/* The length of constant payload data. Note that s_data_desired is
+ * overloaded, depending on s_data_constant: either the length of constant
+ * data (returned here) or the limit on variable data.
+ */
+static inline int tcp_s_data_size(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
+{
+ return (tp->cookie_values != NULL && tp->cookie_values->s_data_constant)
+ ? tp->cookie_values->s_data_desired
+ : 0;
+}
+
+/* As tcp_request_sock has already been extended in other places, the
+ * only remaining method is to pass stack values along as function
+ * parameters. These parameters are not needed after sending SYNACK.
+ */
+struct tcp_extend_values {
+ struct request_values rv;
+ u32 cookie_bakery[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+ u8 cookie_plus:6,
+ cookie_out_never:1,
+ cookie_in_always:1;
+};
+
+static inline struct tcp_extend_values *tcp_xv(struct request_values *rvp)
+{
+ return (struct tcp_extend_values *)rvp;
+}
+
extern void tcp_v4_init(void);
extern void tcp_init(void);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
index 3146cc4..3503762 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/syncookies.c
@@ -253,6 +253,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cookie_check_timestamp);
struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct ip_options *opt)
{
+ struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
@@ -263,7 +265,6 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
int mss;
struct rtable *rt;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
- struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack)
goto out;
@@ -341,7 +342,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v4_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, &rt->u.dst);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &cryptic_value, 0, &rt->u.dst);
if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp)
cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index 3ae01bf..b650e67 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -2079,8 +2079,8 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
int val;
int err = 0;
- /* This is a string value all the others are int's */
- if (optname == TCP_CONGESTION) {
+ /* These are data/string values, all the others are ints */
+ if (TCP_CONGESTION == optname) {
char name[TCP_CA_NAME_MAX];
if (optlen < 1)
@@ -2096,6 +2096,88 @@ static int do_tcp_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
err = tcp_set_congestion_control(sk, name);
release_sock(sk);
return err;
+ } else if (TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS == optname) {
+ struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd;
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = NULL;
+
+ if (sizeof(ctd) > optlen)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (copy_from_user(&ctd, optval, sizeof(ctd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (sizeof(ctd.tcpct_value) < ctd.tcpct_used
+ || TCP_MSS_DESIRED < ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired == 0) {
+ /* default to global value */
+ } else if ((0x1 & ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired)
+ || TCP_COOKIE_MAX < ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired
+ || TCP_COOKIE_MIN > ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired) {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER & ctd.tcpct_flags) {
+ /* Supercedes all other values */
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) {
+ kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref,
+ tcp_cookie_values_release);
+ tp->cookie_values = NULL;
+ }
+ tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always = 0; /* false */
+ tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
+ release_sock(sk);
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ /* Allocate ancillary memory before locking.
+ */
+ if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0
+ || (tp->cookie_values == NULL
+ && (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0
+ || ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired > 0
+ || ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired > 0))) {
+ cvp = kzalloc(sizeof(*cvp) + ctd.tcpct_used,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (cvp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ lock_sock(sk);
+ tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always =
+ (TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS & ctd.tcpct_flags);
+ tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */
+
+ if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) {
+ if (cvp != NULL) {
+ /* Changed values are recorded by a changed
+ * pointer, ensuring the cookie will differ,
+ * without separately hashing each value later.
+ */
+ kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref,
+ tcp_cookie_values_release);
+ kref_init(&cvp->kref);
+ tp->cookie_values = cvp;
+ } else {
+ cvp = tp->cookie_values;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cvp != NULL) {
+ cvp->cookie_desired = ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired;
+
+ if (ctd.tcpct_used > 0) {
+ memcpy(cvp->s_data_payload, ctd.tcpct_value,
+ ctd.tcpct_used);
+ cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_used;
+ cvp->s_data_constant = 1; /* true */
+ } else {
+ /* No constant payload data. */
+ cvp->s_data_desired = ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired;
+ cvp->s_data_constant = 0; /* false */
+ }
+ }
+ release_sock(sk);
+ return err;
}
if (optlen < sizeof(int))
@@ -2421,6 +2503,47 @@ static int do_tcp_getsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level,
if (copy_to_user(optval, icsk->icsk_ca_ops->name, len))
return -EFAULT;
return 0;
+
+ case TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS: {
+ struct tcp_cookie_transactions ctd;
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values;
+
+ if (get_user(len, optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (len < sizeof(ctd))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ memset(&ctd, 0, sizeof(ctd));
+ ctd.tcpct_flags = (tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always
+ ? TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS : 0)
+ + (tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never
+ ? TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER : 0);
+
+ if (cvp != NULL) {
+ ctd.tcpct_flags += (cvp->s_data_in
+ ? TCP_S_DATA_IN : 0)
+ + (cvp->s_data_out
+ ? TCP_S_DATA_OUT : 0);
+
+ ctd.tcpct_cookie_desired = cvp->cookie_desired;
+ ctd.tcpct_s_data_desired = cvp->s_data_desired;
+
+ /* Cookie(s) saved, return as nonce */
+ if (sizeof(ctd.tcpct_value) < cvp->cookie_pair_size) {
+ /* impossible? */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ memcpy(&ctd.tcpct_value[0], &cvp->cookie_pair[0],
+ cvp->cookie_pair_size);
+ ctd.tcpct_used = cvp->cookie_pair_size;
+ }
+
+ if (put_user(sizeof(ctd), optlen))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ if (copy_to_user(optval, &ctd, sizeof(ctd)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return 0;
+ }
default:
return -ENOPROTOOPT;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index cc306ac..8fb50f0 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -3698,11 +3698,11 @@ old_ack:
* the fast version below fails.
*/
void tcp_parse_options(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx,
- int estab, struct dst_entry *dst)
+ u8 **cryptic, int estab, struct dst_entry *dst)
{
unsigned char *ptr;
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
- int length = (th->doff * 4) - sizeof(struct tcphdr);
+ int length = tcp_option_len_th(th);
ptr = (unsigned char *)(th + 1);
opt_rx->saw_tstamp = 0;
@@ -3785,6 +3785,19 @@ void tcp_parse_options(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcp_options_received *opt_rx,
*/
break;
#endif
+ case TCPOPT_COOKIE:
+ /* This option carries 3 different lengths.
+ */
+ if (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MAX >= opsize
+ && TCPOLEN_COOKIE_MIN <= opsize) {
+ opt_rx->cookie_plus = opsize;
+ *cryptic = ptr;
+ } else if (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_PAIR == opsize) {
+ /* not yet implemented */
+ } else if (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE == opsize) {
+ /* not yet implemented */
+ }
+ break;
}
ptr += opsize-2;
@@ -3813,17 +3826,21 @@ static int tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(struct tcp_sock *tp, struct tcphdr *th)
* If it is wrong it falls back on tcp_parse_options().
*/
static int tcp_fast_parse_options(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcphdr *th,
- struct tcp_sock *tp)
+ struct tcp_sock *tp, u8 **cryptic)
{
- if (th->doff == sizeof(struct tcphdr) >> 2) {
+ /* In the spirit of fast parsing, compare doff directly to shifted
+ * constant values. Because equality is used, short doff can be
+ * ignored here, and checked later.
+ */
+ if (th->doff == (sizeof(*th) >> 2)) {
tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
return 0;
} else if (tp->rx_opt.tstamp_ok &&
- th->doff == (sizeof(struct tcphdr)>>2)+(TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED>>2)) {
+ th->doff == ((sizeof(*th)+TCPOLEN_TSTAMP_ALIGNED)>>2)) {
if (tcp_parse_aligned_timestamp(tp, th))
return 1;
}
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, 1, NULL);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, cryptic, 1, NULL);
return 1;
}
@@ -3833,7 +3850,7 @@ static int tcp_fast_parse_options(struct sk_buff *skb, struct tcphdr *th,
*/
u8 *tcp_parse_md5sig_option(struct tcphdr *th)
{
- int length = (th->doff << 2) - sizeof (*th);
+ int length = tcp_option_len_th(th);
u8 *ptr = (u8*)(th + 1);
/* If the TCP option is too short, we can short cut */
@@ -5077,10 +5094,11 @@ out:
static int tcp_validate_incoming(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcphdr *th, int syn_inerr)
{
+ u8 *cv;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
/* RFC1323: H1. Apply PAWS check first. */
- if (tcp_fast_parse_options(skb, th, tp) && tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp &&
+ if (tcp_fast_parse_options(skb, th, tp, &cv) && tp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp &&
tcp_paws_discard(sk, skb)) {
if (!th->rst) {
NET_INC_STATS_BH(sock_net(sk), LINUX_MIB_PAWSESTABREJECTED);
@@ -5368,12 +5386,15 @@ discard:
static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcphdr *th, unsigned len)
{
- struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
struct inet_connection_sock *icsk = inet_csk(sk);
- int saved_clamp = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp;
+ struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values;
+ int saved_clamp = tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp;
+ int queued = 0;
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, 0, dst);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tp->rx_opt, &cryptic_value, 0, dst);
if (th->ack) {
/* rfc793:
@@ -5470,6 +5491,44 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* Change state from SYN-SENT only after copied_seq
* is initialized. */
tp->copied_seq = tp->rcv_nxt;
+
+ if (cvp != NULL
+ && cvp->cookie_pair_size > 0
+ && tp->rx_opt.cookie_plus > 0) {
+ int cookie_size = tp->rx_opt.cookie_plus
+ - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
+ int cookie_pair_size = cookie_size
+ + cvp->cookie_desired;
+
+ /* A cookie extension option was sent and returned.
+ * Note that each incoming SYNACK replaces the
+ * Responder cookie. The initial exchange is most
+ * fragile, as protection against spoofing relies
+ * entirely upon the sequence and timestamp (above).
+ * This replacement strategy allows the correct pair to
+ * pass through, while any others will be filtered via
+ * Responder verification later.
+ */
+ if (sizeof(cvp->cookie_pair) >= cookie_pair_size) {
+ memcpy(&cvp->cookie_pair[cvp->cookie_desired],
+ cryptic_value, cookie_size);
+ cvp->cookie_pair_size = cookie_pair_size;
+ }
+
+ if (tcp_header_len_th(th) < skb->len) {
+ /* Queue incoming transaction data. */
+ __skb_pull(skb, tcp_header_len_th(th));
+ __skb_queue_tail(&sk->sk_receive_queue, skb);
+ skb_set_owner_r(skb, sk);
+ sk->sk_data_ready(sk, 0);
+ cvp->s_data_in = 1; /* true */
+ queued = 1; /* should be amount? */
+ tp->rcv_nxt = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
+ tp->rcv_wup = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq;
+ tp->copied_seq = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+ }
+ }
+
smp_mb();
tcp_set_state(sk, TCP_ESTABLISHED);
@@ -5521,11 +5580,14 @@ static int tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
TCP_DELACK_MAX, TCP_RTO_MAX);
discard:
- __kfree_skb(skb);
+ if (queued == 0)
+ __kfree_skb(skb);
return 0;
} else {
tcp_send_ack(sk);
}
+ if (queued > 0)
+ return 0; /* amount queued? */
return -1;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 0718fde..5992d0b 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -1213,9 +1213,12 @@ static struct timewait_sock_ops tcp_timewait_sock_ops = {
int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct tcp_extend_values tmp_ext;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
struct request_sock *req;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
+ struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
__be32 saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
__be32 daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
@@ -1271,15 +1274,50 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
- tmp_opt.user_mss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
+ tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &cryptic_value, 0, dst);
+
+ if (tmp_opt.cookie_plus > 0
+ && tmp_opt.saw_tstamp
+ && !tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never
+ && (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0
+ || (tp->cookie_values != NULL
+ && tp->cookie_values->cookie_desired > 0))) {
+ u8 *c;
+ u32 *mess = &tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ int l = tmp_opt.cookie_plus - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
+
+ if (tcp_cookie_generator(&tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[0]) != 0)
+ goto drop_and_release;
+
+ /* Secret recipe starts with IP addresses */
+ *mess++ ^= daddr;
+ *mess++ ^= saddr;
+
+ /* plus variable length Initiator Cookie */
+ c = (u8 *)mess;
+ while (l-- > 0) {
+ *c++ ^= *cryptic_value++;
+ }
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, dst);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
+ want_cookie = 0; /* not our kind of cookie */
+#endif
+ tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_plus = tmp_opt.cookie_plus;
+ } else if (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always) {
+ /* redundant indications, but ensure initialization. */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_plus = 0;
+ } else {
+ goto drop_and_release;
+ }
+ tmp_ext.cookie_in_always = tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always;
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = tmp_opt.saw_tstamp;
-
tcp_openreq_init(req, &tmp_opt, skb);
if (security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req))
@@ -1339,7 +1377,8 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
- if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst, NULL)
+ if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst,
+ (struct request_values *)&tmp_ext)
|| want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
@@ -1834,6 +1873,19 @@ static int tcp_v4_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv4_specific;
#endif
+ /* TCP Cookie Transactions */
+ if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0) {
+ /* Default, cookies without s_data. */
+ tp->cookie_values =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->cookie_values),
+ sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (tp->cookie_values != NULL)
+ kref_init(&tp->cookie_values->kref);
+ }
+ /* Presumed zeroed, in order of appearance:
+ * cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never, extend_timestamp,
+ * s_data_constant, s_data_in, s_data_out
+ */
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[1];
sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tcp_rmem[1];
@@ -1887,6 +1939,15 @@ void tcp_v4_destroy_sock(struct sock *sk)
sk->sk_sndmsg_page = NULL;
}
+ /*
+ * If cookie or s_data exists, remove it.
+ */
+ if (tp->cookie_values != NULL) {
+ kref_put(&tp->cookie_values->kref,
+ tcp_cookie_values_release);
+ tp->cookie_values = NULL;
+ }
+
percpu_counter_dec(&tcp_sockets_allocated);
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index 7a42990..db46797 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -96,13 +96,14 @@ enum tcp_tw_status
tcp_timewait_state_process(struct inet_timewait_sock *tw, struct sk_buff *skb,
const struct tcphdr *th)
{
- struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
+ struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcptw = tcp_twsk((struct sock *)tw);
int paws_reject = 0;
if (th->doff > (sizeof(*th) >> 2) && tcptw->tw_ts_recent_stamp) {
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = 1;
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 1, NULL);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &cryptic_value, 1, NULL);
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
tmp_opt.ts_recent = tcptw->tw_ts_recent;
@@ -389,14 +390,42 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct tcp_request_sock *treq = tcp_rsk(req);
struct inet_connection_sock *newicsk = inet_csk(newsk);
- struct tcp_sock *newtp;
+ struct tcp_sock *newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
+ struct tcp_sock *oldtp = tcp_sk(sk);
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *oldcvp = oldtp->cookie_values;
+
+ /* TCP Cookie Transactions require space for the cookie pair,
+ * as it differs for each connection. There is no need to
+ * copy any s_data stored at the original socket. Failure
+ * will prevent resuming the connection.
+ *
+ * Presumed copied, in order of appearance:
+ * cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never
+ */
+ if (oldcvp != NULL) {
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *newcvp =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(*newtp->cookie_values),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+
+ if (newcvp != NULL) {
+ kref_init(&newcvp->kref);
+ newcvp->cookie_desired =
+ oldcvp->cookie_desired;
+ newtp->cookie_values = newcvp;
+ } else {
+ /* Not Yet Implemented */
+ newtp->cookie_values = NULL;
+ }
+ }
/* Now setup tcp_sock */
- newtp = tcp_sk(newsk);
newtp->pred_flags = 0;
- newtp->rcv_wup = newtp->copied_seq = newtp->rcv_nxt = treq->rcv_isn + 1;
- newtp->snd_sml = newtp->snd_una = newtp->snd_nxt = treq->snt_isn + 1;
- newtp->snd_up = treq->snt_isn + 1;
+
+ newtp->rcv_wup = newtp->copied_seq =
+ newtp->rcv_nxt = treq->rcv_isn + 1;
+
+ newtp->snd_sml = newtp->snd_una = newtp->snd_nxt =
+ newtp->snd_up = treq->snt_isn + 1 + tcp_s_data_size(oldtp);
tcp_prequeue_init(newtp);
@@ -429,8 +458,8 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
tcp_set_ca_state(newsk, TCP_CA_Open);
tcp_init_xmit_timers(newsk);
skb_queue_head_init(&newtp->out_of_order_queue);
- newtp->write_seq = treq->snt_isn + 1;
- newtp->pushed_seq = newtp->write_seq;
+ newtp->write_seq = newtp->pushed_seq =
+ treq->snt_isn + 1 + tcp_s_data_size(oldtp);
newtp->rx_opt.saw_tstamp = 0;
@@ -495,15 +524,16 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req,
struct request_sock **prev)
{
+ struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
+ struct sock *child;
const struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
__be32 flg = tcp_flag_word(th) & (TCP_FLAG_RST|TCP_FLAG_SYN|TCP_FLAG_ACK);
int paws_reject = 0;
- struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
- struct sock *child;
- if ((th->doff > (sizeof(struct tcphdr)>>2)) && (req->ts_recent)) {
+ if ((th->doff > (sizeof(*th) >> 2)) && (req->ts_recent)) {
tmp_opt.tstamp_ok = 1;
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 1, NULL);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &cryptic_value, 1, NULL);
if (tmp_opt.saw_tstamp) {
tmp_opt.ts_recent = req->ts_recent;
@@ -596,7 +626,8 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* Invalid ACK: reset will be sent by listening socket
*/
if ((flg & TCP_FLAG_ACK) &&
- (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq != tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1))
+ (TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->ack_seq != tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn + 1 +
+ tcp_s_data_size(tcp_sk(sk))))
return sk;
/* Also, it would be not so bad idea to check rcv_tsecr, which
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 492ccdd..08dc649 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -370,15 +370,45 @@ static inline int tcp_urg_mode(const struct tcp_sock *tp)
#define OPTION_TS (1 << 1)
#define OPTION_MD5 (1 << 2)
#define OPTION_WSCALE (1 << 3)
+#define OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION (1 << 4)
struct tcp_out_options {
u8 options; /* bit field of OPTION_* */
u8 ws; /* window scale, 0 to disable */
+ u8 hash_size; /* bytes in hash */
u8 num_sack_blocks; /* number of SACK blocks to include */
u16 mss; /* 0 to disable */
__u32 tsval, tsecr; /* need to include OPTION_TS */
+ __u8 *hash_location; /* temporary pointer, overloaded */
};
+/* The sysctl int routines are generic, so check consistency here.
+ */
+static u8 tcp_cookie_size_check(u8 desired)
+{
+ if (desired > 0) {
+ /* previously specified */
+ return desired;
+ }
+ if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size <= 0) {
+ /* no default specified */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size < TCP_COOKIE_MIN) {
+ /* value too small, increase to minimum */
+ return TCP_COOKIE_MIN;
+ }
+ if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > TCP_COOKIE_MAX) {
+ /* value too large, decrease to maximum */
+ return TCP_COOKIE_MAX;
+ }
+ if (0x1 & sysctl_tcp_cookie_size) {
+ /* 8-bit multiple, illegal, fix it */
+ return (u8)(sysctl_tcp_cookie_size + 0x1);
+ }
+ return (u8)sysctl_tcp_cookie_size;
+}
+
/* Write previously computed TCP options to the packet.
*
* Beware: Something in the Internet is very sensitive to the ordering of
@@ -393,17 +423,34 @@ struct tcp_out_options {
* (but it may well be that other scenarios fail similarly).
*/
static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp,
- const struct tcp_out_options *opts,
- __u8 **md5_hash) {
- if (unlikely(OPTION_MD5 & opts->options)) {
- *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
- (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
- (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) |
- TCPOLEN_MD5SIG);
- *md5_hash = (__u8 *)ptr;
+ struct tcp_out_options *opts)
+{
+ u8 options = opts->options; /* mungable copy */
+
+ /* Having both authentication and cookies for security is redundant,
+ * and there's certainly not enough room. Instead, the cookie-less
+ * extension variant is proposed.
+ *
+ * Consider the pessimal case with authentication. The options
+ * could look like:
+ * COOKIE|MD5(20) + MSS(4) + SACK|TS(12) + WSCALE(4) == 40
+ */
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_MD5 & options)) {
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION & options)) {
+ *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_COOKIE << 24) |
+ (TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE << 16) |
+ (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) |
+ TCPOLEN_MD5SIG);
+ } else {
+ *ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
+ (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
+ (TCPOPT_MD5SIG << 8) |
+ TCPOLEN_MD5SIG);
+ }
+ options &= ~OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION;
+ /* overload cookie hash location */
+ opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)ptr;
ptr += 4;
- } else {
- *md5_hash = NULL;
}
if (unlikely(opts->mss)) {
@@ -412,12 +459,13 @@ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp,
opts->mss);
}
- if (likely(OPTION_TS & opts->options)) {
- if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & opts->options)) {
+ if (likely(OPTION_TS & options)) {
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & options)) {
*ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_SACK_PERM << 24) |
(TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM << 16) |
(TCPOPT_TIMESTAMP << 8) |
TCPOLEN_TIMESTAMP);
+ options &= ~OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE;
} else {
*ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
(TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
@@ -428,15 +476,52 @@ static void tcp_options_write(__be32 *ptr, struct tcp_sock *tp,
*ptr++ = htonl(opts->tsecr);
}
- if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & opts->options &&
- !(OPTION_TS & opts->options))) {
+ /* Specification requires after timestamp, so do it now.
+ *
+ * Consider the pessimal case without authentication. The options
+ * could look like:
+ * MSS(4) + SACK|TS(12) + COOKIE(20) + WSCALE(4) == 40
+ */
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION & options)) {
+ __u8 *cookie_copy = opts->hash_location;
+ u8 cookie_size = opts->hash_size;
+
+ if (unlikely(0x1 & cookie_size)) {
+ /* 8-bit multiple, illegal, ignore */
+ cookie_size = 0;
+ } else if (likely(0x2 & cookie_size)) {
+ __u8 *p = (__u8 *)ptr;
+
+ /* 16-bit multiple */
+ *p++ = TCPOPT_COOKIE;
+ *p++ = TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE + cookie_size;
+ *p++ = *cookie_copy++;
+ *p++ = *cookie_copy++;
+ ptr++;
+ cookie_size -= 2;
+ } else {
+ /* 32-bit multiple */
+ *ptr++ = htonl(((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
+ (TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
+ (TCPOPT_COOKIE << 8) |
+ TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE) +
+ cookie_size);
+ }
+
+ if (cookie_size > 0) {
+ memcpy(ptr, cookie_copy, cookie_size);
+ ptr += (cookie_size >> 2);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_SACK_ADVERTISE & options)) {
*ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
(TCPOPT_NOP << 16) |
(TCPOPT_SACK_PERM << 8) |
TCPOLEN_SACK_PERM);
}
- if (unlikely(OPTION_WSCALE & opts->options)) {
+ if (unlikely(OPTION_WSCALE & options)) {
*ptr++ = htonl((TCPOPT_NOP << 24) |
(TCPOPT_WINDOW << 16) |
(TCPOLEN_WINDOW << 8) |
@@ -471,8 +556,12 @@ static unsigned tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcp_out_options *opts,
struct tcp_md5sig_key **md5) {
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
- unsigned size = 0;
+ struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values;
struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ unsigned size = 0;
+ u8 cookie_size = (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never && cvp != NULL)
+ ? tcp_cookie_size_check(cvp->cookie_desired)
+ : 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
*md5 = tp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, sk);
@@ -517,6 +606,53 @@ static unsigned tcp_syn_options(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
size += TCPOLEN_SACKPERM_ALIGNED;
}
+ /* Note that timestamps are required by the specification.
+ *
+ * Odd numbers of bytes are prohibited by the specification, ensuring
+ * that the cookie is 16-bit aligned, and the resulting cookie pair is
+ * 32-bit aligned.
+ */
+ if (*md5 == NULL
+ && (OPTION_TS & opts->options)
+ && cookie_size > 0) {
+ int need = TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE + cookie_size;
+ int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE - size;
+
+ if (0x2 & need) {
+ /* 32-bit multiple */
+ need += 2; /* NOPs */
+
+ if (need > remaining) {
+ /* try shrinking cookie to fit */
+ cookie_size -= 2;
+ need -= 4;
+ }
+ }
+ while (need > remaining && TCP_COOKIE_MIN <= cookie_size) {
+ cookie_size -= 4;
+ need -= 4;
+ }
+ if (TCP_COOKIE_MIN <= cookie_size) {
+ opts->options |= OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION;
+ opts->hash_location = (__u8 *)&cvp->cookie_pair[0];
+ opts->hash_size = cookie_size;
+
+ /* Remember for future incarnations. */
+ cvp->cookie_desired = cookie_size;
+
+ if (cvp->cookie_desired != cvp->cookie_pair_size) {
+ /* Currently use random bytes as a nonce,
+ * assuming these are completely unpredictable
+ * by hostile users of the same system.
+ */
+ get_random_bytes(&cvp->cookie_pair[0],
+ cookie_size);
+ cvp->cookie_pair_size = cookie_size;
+ }
+
+ size += need;
+ }
+ }
return size;
}
@@ -525,9 +661,14 @@ static unsigned tcp_synack_options(struct sock *sk,
struct request_sock *req,
unsigned mss, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct tcp_out_options *opts,
- struct tcp_md5sig_key **md5) {
- unsigned size = 0;
+ struct tcp_md5sig_key **md5,
+ struct tcp_extend_values *xvp)
+{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
+ unsigned size = 0;
+ u8 cookie_plus = (xvp != NULL && !xvp->cookie_out_never)
+ ? xvp->cookie_plus
+ : 0;
char doing_ts;
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
@@ -566,6 +707,28 @@ static unsigned tcp_synack_options(struct sock *sk,
size += TCPOLEN_SACKPERM_ALIGNED;
}
+ /* Similar rationale to tcp_syn_options() applies here, too.
+ * If the <SYN> options fit, the same options should fit now!
+ */
+ if (*md5 == NULL
+ && doing_ts
+ && cookie_plus > TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE) {
+ int need = cookie_plus; /* has TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE */
+ int remaining = MAX_TCP_OPTION_SPACE - size;
+
+ if (0x2 & need) {
+ /* 32-bit multiple */
+ need += 2; /* NOPs */
+ }
+ if (need <= remaining) {
+ opts->options |= OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION;
+ opts->hash_size = cookie_plus - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
+ size += need;
+ } else {
+ /* There's no error return, so flag it. */
+ xvp->cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
+ }
+ }
return size;
}
@@ -632,7 +795,6 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it,
struct tcp_out_options opts;
unsigned tcp_options_size, tcp_header_size;
struct tcp_md5sig_key *md5;
- __u8 *md5_hash_location;
struct tcphdr *th;
int err;
@@ -703,7 +865,7 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it,
}
}
- tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts, &md5_hash_location);
+ tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts);
if (likely((tcb->flags & TCPCB_FLAG_SYN) == 0))
TCP_ECN_send(sk, skb, tcp_header_size);
@@ -711,7 +873,7 @@ static int tcp_transmit_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, int clone_it,
/* Calculate the MD5 hash, as we have all we need now */
if (md5) {
sk->sk_route_caps &= ~NETIF_F_GSO_MASK;
- tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location,
+ tp->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location,
md5, sk, NULL, skb);
}
#endif
@@ -2235,14 +2397,14 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
struct request_values *rvp,
struct request_sock *req)
{
+ struct tcp_out_options opts;
+ struct tcp_extend_values *xvp = tcp_xv(rvp);
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
struct tcphdr *th;
- int tcp_header_size;
- struct tcp_out_options opts;
struct sk_buff *skb;
struct tcp_md5sig_key *md5;
- __u8 *md5_hash_location;
+ int tcp_header_size;
int mss;
skb = sock_wmalloc(sk, MAX_TCP_HEADER + 15, 1, GFP_ATOMIC);
@@ -2280,7 +2442,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
#endif
TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when = tcp_time_stamp;
tcp_header_size = tcp_synack_options(sk, req, mss,
- skb, &opts, &md5) +
+ skb, &opts, &md5, xvp) +
sizeof(struct tcphdr);
skb_push(skb, tcp_header_size);
@@ -2298,19 +2460,58 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
*/
tcp_init_nondata_skb(skb, tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn,
TCPCB_FLAG_SYN | TCPCB_FLAG_ACK);
+
+ if (OPTION_COOKIE_EXTENSION & opts.options) {
+ const struct tcp_cookie_values *cvp = tp->cookie_values;
+
+ if (cvp != NULL
+ && cvp->s_data_constant
+ && cvp->s_data_desired > 0) {
+ u8 *buf = skb_put(skb, cvp->s_data_desired);
+
+ /* copy data directly from the listening socket. */
+ memcpy(buf, cvp->s_data_payload, cvp->s_data_desired);
+ TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->end_seq += cvp->s_data_desired;
+ }
+
+ if (opts.hash_size > 0) {
+ __u32 workspace[SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+ u32 *mess = &xvp->cookie_bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ u32 *tail = &mess[COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS-1];
+
+ /* Secret recipe depends on the Timestamp, (future)
+ * Sequence and Acknowledgment Numbers, Initiator
+ * Cookie, and others handled by IP variant caller.
+ */
+ *tail-- ^= opts.tsval;
+ *tail-- ^= tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1;
+ *tail-- ^= TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq + 1;
+
+ /* recommended */
+ *tail-- ^= ((th->dest << 16) | th->source);
+ *tail-- ^= (u32)cvp; /* per sockopt */
+
+ sha_transform((__u32 *)&xvp->cookie_bakery[0],
+ (char *)mess,
+ &workspace[0]);
+ opts.hash_location =
+ (__u8 *)&xvp->cookie_bakery[0];
+ }
+ }
+
th->seq = htonl(TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->seq);
th->ack_seq = htonl(tcp_rsk(req)->rcv_isn + 1);
/* RFC1323: The window in SYN & SYN/ACK segments is never scaled. */
th->window = htons(min(req->rcv_wnd, 65535U));
- tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts, &md5_hash_location);
+ tcp_options_write((__be32 *)(th + 1), tp, &opts);
th->doff = (tcp_header_size >> 2);
TCP_INC_STATS(sock_net(sk), TCP_MIB_OUTSEGS);
#ifdef CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG
/* Okay, we have all we need - do the md5 hash if needed */
if (md5) {
- tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(md5_hash_location,
+ tcp_rsk(req)->af_specific->calc_md5_hash(opts.hash_location,
md5, NULL, req, skb);
}
#endif
diff --git a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
index 612fc53..a60b934 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/syncookies.c
@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ static inline int cookie_check(struct sk_buff *skb, __u32 cookie)
struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct inet6_request_sock *ireq6;
struct tcp_request_sock *treq;
@@ -171,7 +173,6 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
int mss;
struct dst_entry *dst;
__u8 rcv_wscale;
- struct tcp_options_received tcp_opt;
if (!sysctl_tcp_syncookies || !th->ack)
goto out;
@@ -254,7 +255,7 @@ struct sock *cookie_v6_check(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
/* check for timestamp cookie support */
memset(&tcp_opt, 0, sizeof(tcp_opt));
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, 0, dst);
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tcp_opt, &cryptic_value, 0, dst);
if (tcp_opt.saw_tstamp)
cookie_check_timestamp(&tcp_opt);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index b528f75..14b6a32 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1162,7 +1162,9 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_hnd_req(struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct tcp_extend_values tmp_ext;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ u8 *cryptic_value;
struct request_sock *req;
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
@@ -1206,8 +1208,53 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
tmp_opt.mss_clamp = IPV6_MIN_MTU - sizeof(struct tcphdr) - sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
tmp_opt.user_mss = tp->rx_opt.user_mss;
+ tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, &cryptic_value, 0, dst);
+
+ if (tmp_opt.cookie_plus > 0
+ && tmp_opt.saw_tstamp
+ && !tp->rx_opt.cookie_out_never
+ && (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0
+ || (tp->cookie_values != NULL
+ && tp->cookie_values->cookie_desired > 0))) {
+ u8 *c;
+ u32 *d;
+ u32 *mess = &tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS];
+ int l = tmp_opt.cookie_plus - TCPOLEN_COOKIE_BASE;
+
+ if (tcp_cookie_generator(&tmp_ext.cookie_bakery[0]) != 0)
+ goto drop_and_free;
+
+ /* Secret recipe starts with IP addresses */
+ d = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr.s6_addr32[0];
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ d = &ipv6_hdr(skb)->saddr.s6_addr32[0];
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+ *mess++ ^= *d++;
+
+ /* plus variable length Initiator Cookie */
+ c = (u8 *)mess;
+ while (l-- > 0) {
+ *c++ ^= *cryptic_value++;
+ }
- tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, dst);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
+ want_cookie = 0; /* not our kind of cookie */
+#endif
+ tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 0; /* false */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_plus = tmp_opt.cookie_plus;
+ } else if (!tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always) {
+ /* redundant indications, but ensure initialization. */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_out_never = 1; /* true */
+ tmp_ext.cookie_plus = 0;
+ } else {
+ goto drop_and_free;
+ }
+ tmp_ext.cookie_in_always = tp->rx_opt.cookie_in_always;
if (want_cookie && !tmp_opt.saw_tstamp)
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
@@ -1244,7 +1291,8 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
- if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req, NULL)
+ if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req,
+ (struct request_values *)&tmp_ext)
|| want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
@@ -1865,6 +1913,19 @@ static int tcp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
tp->af_specific = &tcp_sock_ipv6_specific;
#endif
+ /* TCP Cookie Transactions */
+ if (sysctl_tcp_cookie_size > 0) {
+ /* Default, cookies without s_data. */
+ tp->cookie_values =
+ kzalloc(sizeof(*tp->cookie_values),
+ sk->sk_allocation);
+ if (tp->cookie_values != NULL)
+ kref_init(&tp->cookie_values->kref);
+ }
+ /* Presumed zeroed, in order of appearance:
+ * cookie_in_always, cookie_out_never, extend_timestamp,
+ * s_data_constant, s_data_in, s_data_out
+ */
sk->sk_sndbuf = sysctl_tcp_wmem[1];
sk->sk_rcvbuf = sysctl_tcp_rmem[1];
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv9 0/3] vhost: a kernel-level virtio server
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2009-11-09 17:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, virtualization, kvm, linux-kernel, mingo, linux-mm, akpm
Ok, I think I've addressed all comments so far here, and it still seems
to work :). Please take a look. I basically ended up accepting all
Rusty's suggestions, except I did not get rid of avail_idx field in vq:
I don't (yet?) understand what's wrong with it, if any, and it seems
required for correct implementation of notify on empty. I tried
adding comment where it's changed to clarify the intent.
Rusty, thanks very much for the review. I didn't split the logging code
out as you indicated that it's not necessary at this point.
---
This implements vhost: a kernel-level backend for virtio,
The main motivation for this work is to reduce virtualization
overhead for virtio by removing system calls on data path,
without guest changes. For virtio-net, this removes up to
4 system calls per packet: vm exit for kick, reentry for kick,
iothread wakeup for packet, interrupt injection for packet.
This driver is pretty minimal, but it's fully functional (including
migration support interfaces), and already shows performance (especially
latency) improvement over userspace.
Some more detailed description attached to the patch itself.
The patches apply to both 2.6.32-rc6 and kvm.git. I'd like them to go
into linux-next if possible. Please comment.
Changelog from v8:
- typo in error message
- more checks for vq size (must be power of 2)
From Rusty's review:
- don't hardcode iov size
- rename no_notify disable_notify
- rearrange loop
- convert irq trigger language to signal eventfd
- make vhost_enable_notify return status
- -1 -> -1U
- get rid of kzalloc
- better comment on vail_idx
- convert vq index to vq usage
- rename ACK->SET
- merge vring addresses into a single struct
- some comments and cosmetic changes
Changelog from v7:
- Add note on RCU usage, mirroring this in vhost/vhost.h
- Fix locking typo noted by Eric Dumazet
- Fix warnings on 32 bit
Changelog from v6:
- review comments by Daniel Walker addressed
- checkpatch cleanup
- fix build on 32 bit
- maintainers entry corrected
Changelog from v5:
- tun support
- backends with virtio net header support (enables GSO, checksum etc)
- 32 bit compat fixed
- support indirect buffers, tx exit mitigation,
tx interrupt mitigation
- support write logging (allows migration without virtio ring code in userspace)
Changelog from v4:
- disable rx notification when have rx buffers
- addressed all comments from Rusty's review
- copy bugfixes from lguest commits:
ebf9a5a99c1a464afe0b4dfa64416fc8b273bc5c
e606490c440900e50ccf73a54f6fc6150ff40815
Changelog from v3:
- checkpatch fixes
Changelog from v2:
- Comments on RCU usage
- Compat ioctl support
- Make variable static
- Copied more idiomatic english from Rusty
Changes from v1:
- Move use_mm/unuse_mm from fs/aio.c to mm instead of copying.
- Reorder code to avoid need for forward declarations
- Kill a couple of debugging printks
Michael S. Tsirkin (3):
tun: export underlying socket
mm: export use_mm/unuse_mm to modules
vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server
MAINTAINERS | 9 +
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/net/tun.c | 101 ++++-
drivers/vhost/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/vhost/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/vhost/net.c | 648 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 965 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 159 ++++++++
include/linux/Kbuild | 1 +
include/linux/if_tun.h | 14 +
include/linux/miscdevice.h | 1 +
include/linux/vhost.h | 130 ++++++
mm/mmu_context.c | 3 +
14 files changed, 2027 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/net.c
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/vhost.c
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/vhost.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/vhost.h
--
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^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCHv9 1/3] tun: export underlying socket
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2009-11-09 17:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, virtualization, kvm, linux-kernel, mingo, linux-mm, akpm
In-Reply-To: <cover.1257786516.git.mst@redhat.com>
Tun device looks similar to a packet socket
in that both pass complete frames from/to userspace.
This patch fills in enough fields in the socket underlying tun driver
to support sendmsg/recvmsg operations, and message flags
MSG_TRUNC and MSG_DONTWAIT, and exports access to this socket
to modules. Regular read/write behaviour is unchanged.
This way, code using raw sockets to inject packets
into a physical device, can support injecting
packets into host network stack almost without modification.
First user of this interface will be vhost virtualization
accelerator.
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Acked-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
---
drivers/net/tun.c | 101 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
include/linux/if_tun.h | 14 +++++++
2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/tun.c b/drivers/net/tun.c
index 4fdfa2a..18f8876 100644
--- a/drivers/net/tun.c
+++ b/drivers/net/tun.c
@@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ static int tun_attach(struct tun_struct *tun, struct file *file)
err = 0;
tfile->tun = tun;
tun->tfile = tfile;
+ tun->socket.file = file;
dev_hold(tun->dev);
sock_hold(tun->socket.sk);
atomic_inc(&tfile->count);
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ static void __tun_detach(struct tun_struct *tun)
/* Detach from net device */
netif_tx_lock_bh(tun->dev);
tun->tfile = NULL;
+ tun->socket.file = NULL;
netif_tx_unlock_bh(tun->dev);
/* Drop read queue */
@@ -387,7 +389,8 @@ static netdev_tx_t tun_net_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
/* Notify and wake up reader process */
if (tun->flags & TUN_FASYNC)
kill_fasync(&tun->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_IN);
- wake_up_interruptible(&tun->socket.wait);
+ wake_up_interruptible_poll(&tun->socket.wait, POLLIN |
+ POLLRDNORM | POLLRDBAND);
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
drop:
@@ -743,7 +746,7 @@ static __inline__ ssize_t tun_put_user(struct tun_struct *tun,
len = min_t(int, skb->len, len);
skb_copy_datagram_const_iovec(skb, 0, iv, total, len);
- total += len;
+ total += skb->len;
tun->dev->stats.tx_packets++;
tun->dev->stats.tx_bytes += len;
@@ -751,34 +754,23 @@ static __inline__ ssize_t tun_put_user(struct tun_struct *tun,
return total;
}
-static ssize_t tun_chr_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
- unsigned long count, loff_t pos)
+static ssize_t tun_do_read(struct tun_struct *tun,
+ struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
+ ssize_t len, int noblock)
{
- struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
- struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
- struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
DECLARE_WAITQUEUE(wait, current);
struct sk_buff *skb;
- ssize_t len, ret = 0;
-
- if (!tun)
- return -EBADFD;
+ ssize_t ret = 0;
DBG(KERN_INFO "%s: tun_chr_read\n", tun->dev->name);
- len = iov_length(iv, count);
- if (len < 0) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
- }
-
add_wait_queue(&tun->socket.wait, &wait);
while (len) {
current->state = TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE;
/* Read frames from the queue */
if (!(skb=skb_dequeue(&tun->socket.sk->sk_receive_queue))) {
- if (file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK) {
+ if (noblock) {
ret = -EAGAIN;
break;
}
@@ -805,6 +797,27 @@ static ssize_t tun_chr_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
current->state = TASK_RUNNING;
remove_wait_queue(&tun->socket.wait, &wait);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static ssize_t tun_chr_aio_read(struct kiocb *iocb, const struct iovec *iv,
+ unsigned long count, loff_t pos)
+{
+ struct file *file = iocb->ki_filp;
+ struct tun_file *tfile = file->private_data;
+ struct tun_struct *tun = __tun_get(tfile);
+ ssize_t len, ret;
+
+ if (!tun)
+ return -EBADFD;
+ len = iov_length(iv, count);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ ret = tun_do_read(tun, iocb, iv, len, file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+ ret = min_t(ssize_t, ret, len);
out:
tun_put(tun);
return ret;
@@ -847,7 +860,8 @@ static void tun_sock_write_space(struct sock *sk)
return;
if (sk->sk_sleep && waitqueue_active(sk->sk_sleep))
- wake_up_interruptible_sync(sk->sk_sleep);
+ wake_up_interruptible_sync_poll(sk->sk_sleep, POLLOUT |
+ POLLWRNORM | POLLWRBAND);
tun = container_of(sk, struct tun_sock, sk)->tun;
kill_fasync(&tun->fasync, SIGIO, POLL_OUT);
@@ -858,6 +872,37 @@ static void tun_sock_destruct(struct sock *sk)
free_netdev(container_of(sk, struct tun_sock, sk)->tun->dev);
}
+static int tun_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len)
+{
+ struct tun_struct *tun = container_of(sock, struct tun_struct, socket);
+ return tun_get_user(tun, m->msg_iov, total_len,
+ m->msg_flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+}
+
+static int tun_recvmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct socket *sock,
+ struct msghdr *m, size_t total_len,
+ int flags)
+{
+ struct tun_struct *tun = container_of(sock, struct tun_struct, socket);
+ int ret;
+ if (flags & ~(MSG_DONTWAIT|MSG_TRUNC))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ ret = tun_do_read(tun, iocb, m->msg_iov, total_len,
+ flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+ if (ret > total_len) {
+ m->msg_flags |= MSG_TRUNC;
+ ret = flags & MSG_TRUNC ? ret : total_len;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Ops structure to mimic raw sockets with tun */
+static const struct proto_ops tun_socket_ops = {
+ .sendmsg = tun_sendmsg,
+ .recvmsg = tun_recvmsg,
+};
+
static struct proto tun_proto = {
.name = "tun",
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
@@ -986,6 +1031,7 @@ static int tun_set_iff(struct net *net, struct file *file, struct ifreq *ifr)
goto err_free_dev;
init_waitqueue_head(&tun->socket.wait);
+ tun->socket.ops = &tun_socket_ops;
sock_init_data(&tun->socket, sk);
sk->sk_write_space = tun_sock_write_space;
sk->sk_sndbuf = INT_MAX;
@@ -1489,6 +1535,23 @@ static void tun_cleanup(void)
rtnl_link_unregister(&tun_link_ops);
}
+/* Get an underlying socket object from tun file. Returns error unless file is
+ * attached to a device. The returned object works like a packet socket, it
+ * can be used for sock_sendmsg/sock_recvmsg. The caller is responsible for
+ * holding a reference to the file for as long as the socket is in use. */
+struct socket *tun_get_socket(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tun_struct *tun;
+ if (file->f_op != &tun_fops)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ tun = tun_get(file);
+ if (!tun)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBADFD);
+ tun_put(tun);
+ return &tun->socket;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tun_get_socket);
+
module_init(tun_init);
module_exit(tun_cleanup);
MODULE_DESCRIPTION(DRV_DESCRIPTION);
diff --git a/include/linux/if_tun.h b/include/linux/if_tun.h
index 3f5fd52..404abe0 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_tun.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_tun.h
@@ -86,4 +86,18 @@ struct tun_filter {
__u8 addr[0][ETH_ALEN];
};
+#ifdef __KERNEL__
+#if defined(CONFIG_TUN) || defined(CONFIG_TUN_MODULE)
+struct socket *tun_get_socket(struct file *);
+#else
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+struct file;
+struct socket;
+static inline struct socket *tun_get_socket(struct file *f)
+{
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TUN */
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* __IF_TUN_H */
--
1.6.5.2.143.g8cc62
--
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^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv9 2/3] mm: export use_mm/unuse_mm to modules
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2009-11-09 17:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, virtualization, kvm, linux-kernel, mingo, linux-mm, akpm
In-Reply-To: <cover.1257786516.git.mst@redhat.com>
vhost net module wants to do copy to/from user from a kernel thread,
which needs use_mm. Export it to modules.
Acked-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
mm/mmu_context.c | 3 +++
1 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/mmu_context.c b/mm/mmu_context.c
index ded9081..0777654 100644
--- a/mm/mmu_context.c
+++ b/mm/mmu_context.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
@@ -37,6 +38,7 @@ void use_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
if (active_mm != mm)
mmdrop(active_mm);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(use_mm);
/*
* unuse_mm
@@ -56,3 +58,4 @@ void unuse_mm(struct mm_struct *mm)
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, tsk);
task_unlock(tsk);
}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unuse_mm);
--
1.6.5.2.143.g8cc62
--
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^ permalink raw reply related
* [PATCHv9 3/3] vhost_net: a kernel-level virtio server
From: Michael S. Tsirkin @ 2009-11-09 17:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, virtualization, kvm, linux-kernel, mingo, linux-mm, akpm
In-Reply-To: <cover.1257786516.git.mst@redhat.com>
What it is: vhost net is a character device that can be used to reduce
the number of system calls involved in virtio networking.
Existing virtio net code is used in the guest without modification.
There's similarity with vringfd, with some differences and reduced scope
- uses eventfd for signalling
- structures can be moved around in memory at any time (good for
migration, bug work-arounds in userspace)
- write logging is supported (good for migration)
- support memory table and not just an offset (needed for kvm)
common virtio related code has been put in a separate file vhost.c and
can be made into a separate module if/when more backends appear. I used
Rusty's lguest.c as the source for developing this part : this supplied
me with witty comments I wouldn't be able to write myself.
What it is not: vhost net is not a bus, and not a generic new system
call. No assumptions are made on how guest performs hypercalls.
Userspace hypervisors are supported as well as kvm.
How it works: Basically, we connect virtio frontend (configured by
userspace) to a backend. The backend could be a network device, or a tap
device. Backend is also configured by userspace, including vlan/mac
etc.
Status: This works for me, and I haven't see any crashes.
Compared to userspace, people reported improved latency (as I save up to
4 system calls per packet), as well as better bandwidth and CPU
utilization.
Features that I plan to look at in the future:
- mergeable buffers
- zero copy
- scalability tuning: figure out the best threading model to use
Note on RCU usage (this is also documented in vhost.h, near
private_pointer which is the value protected by this variant of RCU):
what is happening is that the rcu_dereference() is being used in a
workqueue item. The role of rcu_read_lock() is taken on by the start of
execution of the workqueue item, of rcu_read_unlock() by the end of
execution of the workqueue item, and of synchronize_rcu() by
flush_workqueue()/flush_work(). In the future we might need to apply
some gcc attribute or sparse annotation to the function passed to
INIT_WORK(). Paul's ack below is for this RCU usage.
Acked-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Acked-by: "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 9 +
arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 1 +
drivers/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/vhost/Kconfig | 11 +
drivers/vhost/Makefile | 2 +
drivers/vhost/net.c | 648 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/vhost/vhost.c | 965 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
drivers/vhost/vhost.h | 159 ++++++++
include/linux/Kbuild | 1 +
include/linux/miscdevice.h | 1 +
include/linux/vhost.h | 130 ++++++
11 files changed, 1928 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/Kconfig
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/Makefile
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/net.c
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/vhost.c
create mode 100644 drivers/vhost/vhost.h
create mode 100644 include/linux/vhost.h
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index a1a2ace..7d4bfa2 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -5636,6 +5636,15 @@ S: Maintained
F: Documentation/filesystems/vfat.txt
F: fs/fat/
+VIRTIO HOST (VHOST)
+M: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
+L: kvm@vger.kernel.org
+L: virtualization@lists.osdl.org
+L: netdev@vger.kernel.org
+S: Maintained
+F: drivers/vhost/
+F: include/linux/vhost.h
+
VIA RHINE NETWORK DRIVER
M: Roger Luethi <rl@hellgate.ch>
S: Maintained
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
index b84e571..94f44d9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ config KVM_AMD
# OK, it's a little counter-intuitive to do this, but it puts it neatly under
# the virtualization menu.
+source drivers/vhost/Kconfig
source drivers/lguest/Kconfig
source drivers/virtio/Kconfig
diff --git a/drivers/Makefile b/drivers/Makefile
index 6ee53c7..81e3659 100644
--- a/drivers/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/Makefile
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_HID) += hid/
obj-$(CONFIG_PPC_PS3) += ps3/
obj-$(CONFIG_OF) += of/
obj-$(CONFIG_SSB) += ssb/
+obj-$(CONFIG_VHOST_NET) += vhost/
obj-$(CONFIG_VIRTIO) += virtio/
obj-$(CONFIG_VLYNQ) += vlynq/
obj-$(CONFIG_STAGING) += staging/
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/Kconfig b/drivers/vhost/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9f409f4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vhost/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+config VHOST_NET
+ tristate "Host kernel accelerator for virtio net (EXPERIMENTAL)"
+ depends on NET && EVENTFD && EXPERIMENTAL
+ ---help---
+ This kernel module can be loaded in host kernel to accelerate
+ guest networking with virtio_net. Not to be confused with virtio_net
+ module itself which needs to be loaded in guest kernel.
+
+ To compile this driver as a module, choose M here: the module will
+ be called vhost_net.
+
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/Makefile b/drivers/vhost/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72dd020
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vhost/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+obj-$(CONFIG_VHOST_NET) += vhost_net.o
+vhost_net-y := vhost.o net.o
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/net.c b/drivers/vhost/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..22d5fef
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vhost/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,648 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Author: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2.
+ *
+ * virtio-net server in host kernel.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/compat.h>
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+#include <linux/vhost.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_net.h>
+#include <linux/mmu_context.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/if_packet.h>
+#include <linux/if_arp.h>
+#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "vhost.h"
+
+/* Max number of bytes transferred before requeueing the job.
+ * Using this limit prevents one virtqueue from starving others. */
+#define VHOST_NET_WEIGHT 0x80000
+
+enum {
+ VHOST_NET_VQ_RX = 0,
+ VHOST_NET_VQ_TX = 1,
+ VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX = 2,
+};
+
+enum vhost_net_poll_state {
+ VHOST_NET_POLL_DISABLED = 0,
+ VHOST_NET_POLL_STARTED = 1,
+ VHOST_NET_POLL_STOPPED = 2,
+};
+
+struct vhost_net {
+ struct vhost_dev dev;
+ struct vhost_virtqueue vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX];
+ struct vhost_poll poll[VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX];
+ /* Tells us whether we are polling a socket for TX.
+ * We only do this when socket buffer fills up.
+ * Protected by tx vq lock. */
+ enum vhost_net_poll_state tx_poll_state;
+};
+
+/* Pop first len bytes from iovec. Return number of segments used. */
+static int move_iovec_hdr(struct iovec *from, struct iovec *to,
+ size_t len, int iov_count)
+{
+ int seg = 0;
+ size_t size;
+ while (len && seg < iov_count) {
+ size = min(from->iov_len, len);
+ to->iov_base = from->iov_base;
+ to->iov_len = size;
+ from->iov_len -= size;
+ from->iov_base += size;
+ len -= size;
+ ++from;
+ ++to;
+ ++seg;
+ }
+ return seg;
+}
+
+/* Caller must have TX VQ lock */
+static void tx_poll_stop(struct vhost_net *net)
+{
+ if (likely(net->tx_poll_state != VHOST_NET_POLL_STARTED))
+ return;
+ vhost_poll_stop(net->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX);
+ net->tx_poll_state = VHOST_NET_POLL_STOPPED;
+}
+
+/* Caller must have TX VQ lock */
+static void tx_poll_start(struct vhost_net *net, struct socket *sock)
+{
+ if (unlikely(net->tx_poll_state != VHOST_NET_POLL_STOPPED))
+ return;
+ vhost_poll_start(net->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX, sock->file);
+ net->tx_poll_state = VHOST_NET_POLL_STARTED;
+}
+
+/* Expects to be always run from workqueue - which acts as
+ * read-size critical section for our kind of RCU. */
+static void handle_tx(struct vhost_net *net)
+{
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &net->dev.vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX];
+ unsigned head, out, in, s;
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_name = NULL,
+ .msg_namelen = 0,
+ .msg_control = NULL,
+ .msg_controllen = 0,
+ .msg_iov = vq->iov,
+ .msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
+ };
+ size_t len, total_len = 0;
+ int err, wmem;
+ size_t hdr_size;
+ struct socket *sock = rcu_dereference(vq->private_data);
+ if (!sock)
+ return;
+
+ wmem = atomic_read(&sock->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
+ if (wmem >= sock->sk->sk_sndbuf)
+ return;
+
+ use_mm(net->dev.mm);
+ mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
+ vhost_disable_notify(vq);
+
+ if (wmem < sock->sk->sk_sndbuf * 2)
+ tx_poll_stop(net);
+ hdr_size = vq->hdr_size;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ head = vhost_get_vq_desc(&net->dev, vq, vq->iov,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov),
+ &out, &in,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ /* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us they refilled. */
+ if (head == vq->num) {
+ wmem = atomic_read(&sock->sk->sk_wmem_alloc);
+ if (wmem >= sock->sk->sk_sndbuf * 3 / 4) {
+ tx_poll_start(net, sock);
+ set_bit(SOCK_ASYNC_NOSPACE, &sock->flags);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(vq))) {
+ vhost_disable_notify(vq);
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ if (in) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Unexpected descriptor format for TX: "
+ "out %d, int %d\n", out, in);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Skip header. TODO: support TSO. */
+ s = move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, vq->hdr, hdr_size, out);
+ msg.msg_iovlen = out;
+ len = iov_length(vq->iov, out);
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (!len) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Unexpected header len for TX: "
+ "%zd expected %zd\n",
+ iov_length(vq->hdr, s), hdr_size);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* TODO: Check specific error and bomb out unless ENOBUFS? */
+ err = sock->ops->sendmsg(NULL, sock, &msg, len);
+ if (unlikely(err < 0)) {
+ vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq);
+ tx_poll_start(net, sock);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (err != len)
+ pr_err("Truncated TX packet: "
+ " len %d != %zd\n", err, len);
+ vhost_add_used_and_signal(&net->dev, vq, head, 0);
+ total_len += len;
+ if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
+ vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+ unuse_mm(net->dev.mm);
+}
+
+/* Expects to be always run from workqueue - which acts as
+ * read-size critical section for our kind of RCU. */
+static void handle_rx(struct vhost_net *net)
+{
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq = &net->dev.vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX];
+ unsigned head, out, in, log, s;
+ struct vhost_log *vq_log;
+ struct msghdr msg = {
+ .msg_name = NULL,
+ .msg_namelen = 0,
+ .msg_control = NULL, /* FIXME: get and handle RX aux data. */
+ .msg_controllen = 0,
+ .msg_iov = vq->iov,
+ .msg_flags = MSG_DONTWAIT,
+ };
+
+ struct virtio_net_hdr hdr = {
+ .flags = 0,
+ .gso_type = VIRTIO_NET_HDR_GSO_NONE
+ };
+
+ size_t len, total_len = 0;
+ int err;
+ size_t hdr_size;
+ struct socket *sock = rcu_dereference(vq->private_data);
+ if (!sock || skb_queue_empty(&sock->sk->sk_receive_queue))
+ return;
+
+ use_mm(net->dev.mm);
+ mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
+ vhost_disable_notify(vq);
+ hdr_size = vq->hdr_size;
+
+ vq_log = unlikely(vhost_has_feature(&net->dev, VHOST_F_LOG_ALL)) ?
+ vq->log : NULL;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ head = vhost_get_vq_desc(&net->dev, vq, vq->iov,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(vq->iov),
+ &out, &in,
+ vq_log, &log);
+ /* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
+ if (head == vq->num) {
+ if (unlikely(vhost_enable_notify(vq))) {
+ /* They have slipped one in as we were
+ * doing that: check again. */
+ vhost_disable_notify(vq);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Nothing new? Wait for eventfd to tell us
+ * they refilled. */
+ break;
+ }
+ /* We don't need to be notified again. */
+ if (out) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Unexpected descriptor format for RX: "
+ "out %d, int %d\n",
+ out, in);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Skip header. TODO: support TSO/mergeable rx buffers. */
+ s = move_iovec_hdr(vq->iov, vq->hdr, hdr_size, in);
+ msg.msg_iovlen = in;
+ len = iov_length(vq->iov, in);
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (!len) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Unexpected header len for RX: "
+ "%zd expected %zd\n",
+ iov_length(vq->hdr, s), hdr_size);
+ break;
+ }
+ err = sock->ops->recvmsg(NULL, sock, &msg,
+ len, MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_TRUNC);
+ /* TODO: Check specific error and bomb out unless EAGAIN? */
+ if (err < 0) {
+ vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq);
+ break;
+ }
+ /* TODO: Should check and handle checksum. */
+ if (err > len) {
+ pr_err("Discarded truncated rx packet: "
+ " len %d > %zd\n", err, len);
+ vhost_discard_vq_desc(vq);
+ continue;
+ }
+ len = err;
+ err = memcpy_toiovec(vq->hdr, (unsigned char *)&hdr, hdr_size);
+ if (err) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Unable to write vnet_hdr at addr %p: %d\n",
+ vq->iov->iov_base, err);
+ break;
+ }
+ len += hdr_size;
+ vhost_add_used_and_signal(&net->dev, vq, head, len);
+ if (unlikely(vq_log))
+ vhost_log_write(vq, vq_log, log, len);
+ total_len += len;
+ if (unlikely(total_len >= VHOST_NET_WEIGHT)) {
+ vhost_poll_queue(&vq->poll);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+ unuse_mm(net->dev.mm);
+}
+
+static void handle_tx_kick(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
+ struct vhost_net *net;
+ vq = container_of(work, struct vhost_virtqueue, poll.work);
+ net = container_of(vq->dev, struct vhost_net, dev);
+ handle_tx(net);
+}
+
+static void handle_rx_kick(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
+ struct vhost_net *net;
+ vq = container_of(work, struct vhost_virtqueue, poll.work);
+ net = container_of(vq->dev, struct vhost_net, dev);
+ handle_rx(net);
+}
+
+static void handle_tx_net(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct vhost_net *net;
+ net = container_of(work, struct vhost_net, poll[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].work);
+ handle_tx(net);
+}
+
+static void handle_rx_net(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct vhost_net *net;
+ net = container_of(work, struct vhost_net, poll[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX].work);
+ handle_rx(net);
+}
+
+static int vhost_net_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
+{
+ struct vhost_net *n = kmalloc(sizeof *n, GFP_KERNEL);
+ int r;
+ if (!n)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ f->private_data = n;
+ n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_TX].handle_kick = handle_tx_kick;
+ n->vqs[VHOST_NET_VQ_RX].handle_kick = handle_rx_kick;
+ r = vhost_dev_init(&n->dev, n->vqs, VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ kfree(n);
+ return r;
+ }
+
+ vhost_poll_init(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX, handle_tx_net, POLLOUT);
+ vhost_poll_init(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_RX, handle_rx_net, POLLIN);
+ n->tx_poll_state = VHOST_NET_POLL_DISABLED;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_disable_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ if (!vq->private_data)
+ return;
+ if (vq == n->vqs + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX) {
+ tx_poll_stop(n);
+ n->tx_poll_state = VHOST_NET_POLL_DISABLED;
+ } else
+ vhost_poll_stop(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_RX);
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_enable_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ struct socket *sock = vq->private_data;
+ if (!sock)
+ return;
+ if (vq == n->vqs + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX) {
+ n->tx_poll_state = VHOST_NET_POLL_STOPPED;
+ tx_poll_start(n, sock);
+ } else
+ vhost_poll_start(n->poll + VHOST_NET_VQ_RX, sock->file);
+}
+
+static struct socket *vhost_net_stop_vq(struct vhost_net *n,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ struct socket *sock;
+
+ mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
+ sock = vq->private_data;
+ vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, NULL);
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+ return sock;
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_stop(struct vhost_net *n, struct socket **tx_sock,
+ struct socket **rx_sock)
+{
+ *tx_sock = vhost_net_stop_vq(n, n->vqs + VHOST_NET_VQ_TX);
+ *rx_sock = vhost_net_stop_vq(n, n->vqs + VHOST_NET_VQ_RX);
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_flush_vq(struct vhost_net *n, int index)
+{
+ vhost_poll_flush(n->poll + index);
+ vhost_poll_flush(&n->dev.vqs[index].poll);
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_flush(struct vhost_net *n)
+{
+ vhost_net_flush_vq(n, VHOST_NET_VQ_TX);
+ vhost_net_flush_vq(n, VHOST_NET_VQ_RX);
+}
+
+static int vhost_net_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *f)
+{
+ struct vhost_net *n = f->private_data;
+ struct socket *tx_sock;
+ struct socket *rx_sock;
+
+ vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock);
+ vhost_net_flush(n);
+ vhost_dev_cleanup(&n->dev);
+ if (tx_sock)
+ fput(tx_sock->file);
+ if (rx_sock)
+ fput(rx_sock->file);
+ /* We do an extra flush before freeing memory,
+ * since jobs can re-queue themselves. */
+ vhost_net_flush(n);
+ kfree(n);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct socket *get_raw_socket(int fd)
+{
+ struct {
+ struct sockaddr_ll sa;
+ char buf[MAX_ADDR_LEN];
+ } uaddr;
+ int uaddr_len = sizeof uaddr, r;
+ struct socket *sock = sockfd_lookup(fd, &r);
+ if (!sock)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSOCK);
+
+ /* Parameter checking */
+ if (sock->sk->sk_type != SOCK_RAW) {
+ r = -ESOCKTNOSUPPORT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ r = sock->ops->getname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&uaddr.sa,
+ &uaddr_len, 0);
+ if (r)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (uaddr.sa.sll_family != AF_PACKET) {
+ r = -EPFNOSUPPORT;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ return sock;
+err:
+ fput(sock->file);
+ return ERR_PTR(r);
+}
+
+static struct socket *get_tun_socket(int fd)
+{
+ struct file *file = fget(fd);
+ struct socket *sock;
+ if (!file)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EBADF);
+ sock = tun_get_socket(file);
+ if (IS_ERR(sock))
+ fput(file);
+ return sock;
+}
+
+static struct socket *get_socket(int fd)
+{
+ struct socket *sock;
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return NULL;
+ sock = get_raw_socket(fd);
+ if (!IS_ERR(sock))
+ return sock;
+ sock = get_tun_socket(fd);
+ if (!IS_ERR(sock))
+ return sock;
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOTSOCK);
+}
+
+static long vhost_net_set_backend(struct vhost_net *n, unsigned index, int fd)
+{
+ struct socket *sock, *oldsock;
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
+ int r;
+
+ mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ r = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
+ if (r)
+ goto err;
+
+ if (index >= VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX) {
+ r = -ENOBUFS;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ vq = n->vqs + index;
+ mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
+ sock = get_socket(fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(sock)) {
+ r = PTR_ERR(sock);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* start polling new socket */
+ oldsock = vq->private_data;
+ if (sock == oldsock)
+ goto done;
+
+ vhost_net_disable_vq(n, vq);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(vq->private_data, sock);
+ vhost_net_enable_vq(n, vq);
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+done:
+ mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ if (oldsock) {
+ vhost_net_flush_vq(n, index);
+ fput(oldsock->file);
+ }
+ return r;
+err:
+ mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static long vhost_net_reset_owner(struct vhost_net *n)
+{
+ struct socket *tx_sock = NULL;
+ struct socket *rx_sock = NULL;
+ long err;
+ mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ err = vhost_dev_check_owner(&n->dev);
+ if (err)
+ goto done;
+ vhost_net_stop(n, &tx_sock, &rx_sock);
+ vhost_net_flush(n);
+ err = vhost_dev_reset_owner(&n->dev);
+done:
+ mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ if (tx_sock)
+ fput(tx_sock->file);
+ if (rx_sock)
+ fput(rx_sock->file);
+ return err;
+}
+
+static void vhost_net_set_features(struct vhost_net *n, u64 features)
+{
+ size_t hdr_size = features & (1 << VHOST_NET_F_VIRTIO_NET_HDR) ?
+ sizeof(struct virtio_net_hdr) : 0;
+ int i;
+ mutex_lock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ n->dev.acked_features = features;
+ smp_wmb();
+ for (i = 0; i < VHOST_NET_VQ_MAX; ++i) {
+ mutex_lock(&n->vqs[i].mutex);
+ n->vqs[i].hdr_size = hdr_size;
+ mutex_unlock(&n->vqs[i].mutex);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&n->dev.mutex);
+ vhost_net_flush(n);
+}
+
+static long vhost_net_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct vhost_net *n = f->private_data;
+ void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+ u32 __user *featurep = argp;
+ struct vhost_vring_file backend;
+ u64 features;
+ int r;
+ switch (ioctl) {
+ case VHOST_NET_SET_BACKEND:
+ r = copy_from_user(&backend, argp, sizeof backend);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ return vhost_net_set_backend(n, backend.index, backend.fd);
+ case VHOST_GET_FEATURES:
+ features = VHOST_FEATURES;
+ return put_user(features, featurep);
+ case VHOST_SET_FEATURES:
+ r = get_user(features, featurep);
+ /* No features for now */
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (features & ~VHOST_FEATURES)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ vhost_net_set_features(n, features);
+ return 0;
+ case VHOST_RESET_OWNER:
+ return vhost_net_reset_owner(n);
+ default:
+ r = vhost_dev_ioctl(&n->dev, ioctl, arg);
+ vhost_net_flush(n);
+ return r;
+ }
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+static long vhost_net_compat_ioctl(struct file *f, unsigned int ioctl,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ return vhost_net_ioctl(f, ioctl, (unsigned long)compat_ptr(arg));
+}
+#endif
+
+const static struct file_operations vhost_net_fops = {
+ .owner = THIS_MODULE,
+ .release = vhost_net_release,
+ .unlocked_ioctl = vhost_net_ioctl,
+#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
+ .compat_ioctl = vhost_net_compat_ioctl,
+#endif
+ .open = vhost_net_open,
+};
+
+static struct miscdevice vhost_net_misc = {
+ VHOST_NET_MINOR,
+ "vhost-net",
+ &vhost_net_fops,
+};
+
+int vhost_net_init(void)
+{
+ int r = vhost_init();
+ if (r)
+ goto err_init;
+ r = misc_register(&vhost_net_misc);
+ if (r)
+ goto err_reg;
+ return 0;
+err_reg:
+ vhost_cleanup();
+err_init:
+ return r;
+
+}
+module_init(vhost_net_init);
+
+void vhost_net_exit(void)
+{
+ misc_deregister(&vhost_net_misc);
+ vhost_cleanup();
+}
+module_exit(vhost_net_exit);
+
+MODULE_VERSION("0.0.1");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Michael S. Tsirkin");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Host kernel accelerator for virtio net");
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.c b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..97233d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.c
@@ -0,0 +1,965 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2009 Red Hat, Inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Rusty Russell IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Inspiration, some code, and most witty comments come from
+ * Documentation/lguest/lguest.c, by Rusty Russell
+ *
+ * This work is licensed under the terms of the GNU GPL, version 2.
+ *
+ * Generic code for virtio server in host kernel.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+#include <linux/vhost.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_net.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/highmem.h>
+
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/if_packet.h>
+#include <linux/if_arp.h>
+
+#include <net/sock.h>
+
+#include "vhost.h"
+
+enum {
+ VHOST_MEMORY_MAX_NREGIONS = 64,
+ VHOST_MEMORY_F_LOG = 0x1,
+};
+
+static struct workqueue_struct *vhost_workqueue;
+
+static void vhost_poll_func(struct file *file, wait_queue_head_t *wqh,
+ poll_table *pt)
+{
+ struct vhost_poll *poll;
+ poll = container_of(pt, struct vhost_poll, table);
+
+ poll->wqh = wqh;
+ add_wait_queue(wqh, &poll->wait);
+}
+
+static int vhost_poll_wakeup(wait_queue_t *wait, unsigned mode, int sync,
+ void *key)
+{
+ struct vhost_poll *poll;
+ poll = container_of(wait, struct vhost_poll, wait);
+ if (!((unsigned long)key & poll->mask))
+ return 0;
+
+ queue_work(vhost_workqueue, &poll->work);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Init poll structure */
+void vhost_poll_init(struct vhost_poll *poll, work_func_t func,
+ unsigned long mask)
+{
+ INIT_WORK(&poll->work, func);
+ init_waitqueue_func_entry(&poll->wait, vhost_poll_wakeup);
+ init_poll_funcptr(&poll->table, vhost_poll_func);
+ poll->mask = mask;
+}
+
+/* Start polling a file. We add ourselves to file's wait queue. The caller must
+ * keep a reference to a file until after vhost_poll_stop is called. */
+void vhost_poll_start(struct vhost_poll *poll, struct file *file)
+{
+ unsigned long mask;
+ mask = file->f_op->poll(file, &poll->table);
+ if (mask)
+ vhost_poll_wakeup(&poll->wait, 0, 0, (void *)mask);
+}
+
+/* Stop polling a file. After this function returns, it becomes safe to drop the
+ * file reference. You must also flush afterwards. */
+void vhost_poll_stop(struct vhost_poll *poll)
+{
+ remove_wait_queue(poll->wqh, &poll->wait);
+}
+
+/* Flush any work that has been scheduled. When calling this, don't hold any
+ * locks that are also used by the callback. */
+void vhost_poll_flush(struct vhost_poll *poll)
+{
+ flush_work(&poll->work);
+}
+
+void vhost_poll_queue(struct vhost_poll *poll)
+{
+ queue_work(vhost_workqueue, &poll->work);
+}
+
+static void vhost_vq_reset(struct vhost_dev *dev,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ vq->num = 1;
+ vq->desc = NULL;
+ vq->avail = NULL;
+ vq->used = NULL;
+ vq->last_avail_idx = 0;
+ vq->avail_idx = 0;
+ vq->last_used_idx = 0;
+ vq->used_flags = 0;
+ vq->used_flags = 0;
+ vq->log_used = false;
+ vq->log_addr = -1ull;
+ vq->hdr_size = 0;
+ vq->private_data = NULL;
+ vq->log_base = NULL;
+ vq->error_ctx = NULL;
+ vq->error = NULL;
+ vq->kick = NULL;
+ vq->call_ctx = NULL;
+ vq->call = NULL;
+}
+
+long vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *dev,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vqs, int nvqs)
+{
+ int i;
+ dev->vqs = vqs;
+ dev->nvqs = nvqs;
+ mutex_init(&dev->mutex);
+ dev->log_ctx = NULL;
+ dev->log_file = NULL;
+ dev->memory = NULL;
+ dev->mm = NULL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
+ dev->vqs[i].dev = dev;
+ mutex_init(&dev->vqs[i].mutex);
+ vhost_vq_reset(dev, dev->vqs + i);
+ if (dev->vqs[i].handle_kick)
+ vhost_poll_init(&dev->vqs[i].poll,
+ dev->vqs[i].handle_kick,
+ POLLIN);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Caller should have device mutex */
+long vhost_dev_check_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev)
+{
+ /* Are you the owner? If not, I don't think you mean to do that */
+ return dev->mm == current->mm ? 0 : -EPERM;
+}
+
+/* Caller should have device mutex */
+static long vhost_dev_set_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev)
+{
+ /* Is there an owner already? */
+ if (dev->mm)
+ return -EBUSY;
+ /* No owner, become one */
+ dev->mm = get_task_mm(current);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Caller should have device mutex */
+long vhost_dev_reset_owner(struct vhost_dev *dev)
+{
+ struct vhost_memory *memory;
+
+ /* Restore memory to default 1:1 mapping. */
+ memory = kmalloc(offsetof(struct vhost_memory, regions) +
+ 2 * sizeof *memory->regions, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!memory)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ vhost_dev_cleanup(dev);
+
+ memory->nregions = 2;
+ memory->regions[0].guest_phys_addr = 1;
+ memory->regions[0].userspace_addr = 1;
+ memory->regions[0].memory_size = ~0ULL;
+ memory->regions[1].guest_phys_addr = 0;
+ memory->regions[1].userspace_addr = 0;
+ memory->regions[1].memory_size = 1;
+ dev->memory = memory;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Caller should have device mutex */
+void vhost_dev_cleanup(struct vhost_dev *dev)
+{
+ int i;
+ for (i = 0; i < dev->nvqs; ++i) {
+ if (dev->vqs[i].kick && dev->vqs[i].handle_kick) {
+ vhost_poll_stop(&dev->vqs[i].poll);
+ vhost_poll_flush(&dev->vqs[i].poll);
+ }
+ if (dev->vqs[i].error_ctx)
+ eventfd_ctx_put(dev->vqs[i].error_ctx);
+ if (dev->vqs[i].error)
+ fput(dev->vqs[i].error);
+ if (dev->vqs[i].kick)
+ fput(dev->vqs[i].kick);
+ if (dev->vqs[i].call_ctx)
+ eventfd_ctx_put(dev->vqs[i].call_ctx);
+ if (dev->vqs[i].call)
+ fput(dev->vqs[i].call);
+ vhost_vq_reset(dev, dev->vqs + i);
+ }
+ if (dev->log_ctx)
+ eventfd_ctx_put(dev->log_ctx);
+ dev->log_ctx = NULL;
+ if (dev->log_file)
+ fput(dev->log_file);
+ dev->log_file = NULL;
+ /* No one will access memory at this point */
+ kfree(dev->memory);
+ dev->memory = NULL;
+ if (dev->mm)
+ mmput(dev->mm);
+ dev->mm = NULL;
+}
+
+static long vhost_set_memory(struct vhost_dev *d, struct vhost_memory __user *m)
+{
+ struct vhost_memory mem, *newmem, *oldmem;
+ unsigned long size = offsetof(struct vhost_memory, regions);
+ long r;
+ r = copy_from_user(&mem, m, size);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ if (mem.padding)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ if (mem.nregions > VHOST_MEMORY_MAX_NREGIONS)
+ return -E2BIG;
+ newmem = kmalloc(size + mem.nregions * sizeof *m->regions, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!newmem)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(newmem, &mem, size);
+ r = copy_from_user(newmem->regions, m->regions,
+ mem.nregions * sizeof *m->regions);
+ if (r) {
+ kfree(newmem);
+ return r;
+ }
+ oldmem = d->memory;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(d->memory, newmem);
+ synchronize_rcu();
+ kfree(oldmem);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int init_used(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
+ struct vring_used __user *used)
+{
+ int r = put_user(vq->used_flags, &used->flags);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ return get_user(vq->last_used_idx, &used->idx);
+}
+
+static long vhost_set_vring(struct vhost_dev *d, int ioctl, void __user *argp)
+{
+ struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL,
+ *pollstart = NULL, *pollstop = NULL;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ u32 __user *idxp = argp;
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq;
+ struct vhost_vring_state s;
+ struct vhost_vring_file f;
+ struct vhost_vring_addr a;
+ u32 idx;
+ long r;
+
+ r = get_user(idx, idxp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (idx > d->nvqs)
+ return -ENOBUFS;
+
+ vq = d->vqs + idx;
+
+ mutex_lock(&vq->mutex);
+
+ switch (ioctl) {
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM:
+ r = copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ if (!s.num || s.num > 0xffff || (s.num & (s.num - 1))) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ vq->num = s.num;
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE:
+ r = copy_from_user(&s, argp, sizeof s);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ if (s.num > 0xffff) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ vq->last_avail_idx = s.num;
+ /* Forget the cached index value. */
+ vq->avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
+ break;
+ case VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE:
+ s.index = idx;
+ s.num = vq->last_avail_idx;
+ r = copy_to_user(argp, &s, sizeof s);
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR:
+ r = copy_from_user(&a, argp, sizeof a);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ if (a.flags & ~(0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG)) {
+ r = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((u64)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr != a.desc_user_addr ||
+ (u64)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr != a.used_user_addr ||
+ (u64)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr != a.avail_user_addr) {
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ if ((a.avail_user_addr & (sizeof *vq->avail->ring - 1)) ||
+ (a.used_user_addr & (sizeof *vq->used->ring - 1)) ||
+ (a.log_guest_addr & (sizeof *vq->used->ring - 1))) {
+ r = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ }
+ r = init_used(vq, (struct vring_used __user *)a.used_user_addr);
+ if (r)
+ break;
+ vq->log_used = !!(a.flags & (0x1 << VHOST_VRING_F_LOG));
+ vq->desc = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.desc_user_addr;
+ vq->avail = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.avail_user_addr;
+ vq->log_addr = a.log_guest_addr;
+ vq->used = (void __user *)(unsigned long)a.used_user_addr;
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK:
+ r = copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(eventfp))
+ return PTR_ERR(eventfp);
+ if (eventfp != vq->kick) {
+ pollstop = filep = vq->kick;
+ pollstart = vq->kick = eventfp;
+ } else
+ filep = eventfp;
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL:
+ r = copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(eventfp))
+ return PTR_ERR(eventfp);
+ if (eventfp != vq->call) {
+ filep = vq->call;
+ ctx = vq->call_ctx;
+ vq->call = eventfp;
+ vq->call_ctx = eventfp ?
+ eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
+ } else
+ filep = eventfp;
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR:
+ r = copy_from_user(&f, argp, sizeof f);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ eventfp = f.fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(f.fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(eventfp))
+ return PTR_ERR(eventfp);
+ if (eventfp != vq->error) {
+ filep = vq->error;
+ vq->error = eventfp;
+ ctx = vq->error_ctx;
+ vq->error_ctx = eventfp ?
+ eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
+ } else
+ filep = eventfp;
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = -ENOIOCTLCMD;
+ }
+
+ if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
+ vhost_poll_stop(&vq->poll);
+
+ if (ctx)
+ eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
+ if (filep)
+ fput(filep);
+
+ if (pollstart && vq->handle_kick)
+ vhost_poll_start(&vq->poll, vq->kick);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&vq->mutex);
+
+ if (pollstop && vq->handle_kick)
+ vhost_poll_flush(&vq->poll);
+ return r;
+}
+
+long vhost_dev_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *d, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg)
+{
+ void __user *argp = (void __user *)arg;
+ struct file *eventfp, *filep = NULL;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ u64 p;
+ long r;
+ int i, fd;
+
+ mutex_lock(&d->mutex);
+ /* If you are not the owner, you can become one */
+ if (ioctl == VHOST_SET_OWNER) {
+ r = vhost_dev_set_owner(d);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* You must be the owner to do anything else */
+ r = vhost_dev_check_owner(d);
+ if (r)
+ goto done;
+
+ switch (ioctl) {
+ case VHOST_SET_MEM_TABLE:
+ r = vhost_set_memory(d, argp);
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_LOG_BASE:
+ r = copy_from_user(&p, argp, sizeof p);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ if ((u64)(unsigned long)p != p) {
+ r = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) {
+ mutex_lock(&d->vqs[i].mutex);
+ d->vqs[i].log_base = (void __user *)(unsigned long)p;
+ mutex_unlock(&d->vqs[i].mutex);
+ }
+ break;
+ case VHOST_SET_LOG_FD:
+ r = get_user(fd, (int __user *)argp);
+ if (r < 0)
+ break;
+ eventfp = fd == -1 ? NULL : eventfd_fget(fd);
+ if (IS_ERR(eventfp)) {
+ r = PTR_ERR(eventfp);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (eventfp != d->log_file) {
+ filep = d->log_file;
+ ctx = d->log_ctx;
+ d->log_ctx = eventfp ?
+ eventfd_ctx_fileget(eventfp) : NULL;
+ } else
+ filep = eventfp;
+ for (i = 0; i < d->nvqs; ++i) {
+ mutex_lock(&d->vqs[i].mutex);
+ d->vqs[i].log_ctx = d->log_ctx;
+ mutex_unlock(&d->vqs[i].mutex);
+ }
+ if (ctx)
+ eventfd_ctx_put(ctx);
+ if (filep)
+ fput(filep);
+ break;
+ default:
+ r = vhost_set_vring(d, ioctl, argp);
+ break;
+ }
+done:
+ mutex_unlock(&d->mutex);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static const struct vhost_memory_region *find_region(struct vhost_memory *mem,
+ __u64 addr, __u32 len)
+{
+ struct vhost_memory_region *reg;
+ int i;
+ /* linear search is not brilliant, but we really have on the order of 6
+ * regions in practice */
+ for (i = 0; i < mem->nregions; ++i) {
+ reg = mem->regions + i;
+ if (reg->guest_phys_addr <= addr &&
+ reg->guest_phys_addr + reg->memory_size - 1 >= addr)
+ return reg;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* TODO: This is really inefficient. We need something like get_user()
+ * (instruction directly accesses the data, with an exception table entry
+ * returning -EFAULT). See Documentation/x86/exception-tables.txt.
+ */
+static int set_bit_to_user(int nr, void __user *addr)
+{
+ unsigned long log = (unsigned long)addr;
+ struct page *page;
+ void *base;
+ int bit = nr + (log % PAGE_SIZE) * 8;
+ int r;
+ r = get_user_pages_fast(log, 1, 1, &page);
+ if (r)
+ return r;
+ base = kmap_atomic(page, KM_USER0);
+ set_bit(bit, base);
+ kunmap_atomic(base, KM_USER0);
+ set_page_dirty_lock(page);
+ put_page(page);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int log_write(void __user *log_base,
+ u64 write_address, u64 write_length)
+{
+ int r;
+ if (!write_length)
+ return 0;
+ write_address /= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
+ for (;;) {
+ u64 base = (u64)(unsigned long)log_base;
+ u64 log = base + write_address / 8;
+ int bit = write_address % 8;
+ if ((u64)(unsigned long)log != log)
+ return -EFAULT;
+ r = set_bit_to_user(bit, (void __user *)(unsigned long)log);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (write_length <= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE)
+ break;
+ write_length -= VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
+ write_address += VHOST_PAGE_SIZE;
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+int vhost_log_write(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vhost_log *log,
+ unsigned int log_num, u64 len)
+{
+ int i, r;
+
+ /* Make sure data written is seen before log. */
+ wmb();
+ for (i = 0; i < log_num; ++i) {
+ u64 l = min(log[i].len, len);
+ r = log_write(vq->log_base, log[i].addr, l);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ len -= l;
+ if (!len)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (vq->log_ctx)
+ eventfd_signal(vq->log_ctx, 1);
+ /* Length written exceeds what we have stored. This is a bug. */
+ BUG();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int translate_desc(struct vhost_dev *dev, u64 addr, u32 len,
+ struct iovec iov[], int iov_size)
+{
+ const struct vhost_memory_region *reg;
+ struct vhost_memory *mem;
+ struct iovec *_iov;
+ u64 s = 0;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+
+ mem = rcu_dereference(dev->memory);
+ while ((u64)len > s) {
+ u64 size;
+ if (ret >= iov_size) {
+ ret = -ENOBUFS;
+ break;
+ }
+ reg = find_region(mem, addr, len);
+ if (!reg) {
+ ret = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ _iov = iov + ret;
+ size = reg->memory_size - addr + reg->guest_phys_addr;
+ _iov->iov_len = min((u64)len, size);
+ _iov->iov_base = (void *)(unsigned long)
+ (reg->userspace_addr + addr - reg->guest_phys_addr);
+ s += size;
+ addr += size;
+ ++ret;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Each buffer in the virtqueues is actually a chain of descriptors. This
+ * function returns the next descriptor in the chain,
+ * or -1U if we're at the end. */
+static unsigned next_desc(struct vring_desc *desc)
+{
+ unsigned int next;
+
+ /* If this descriptor says it doesn't chain, we're done. */
+ if (!(desc->flags & VRING_DESC_F_NEXT))
+ return -1U;
+
+ /* Check they're not leading us off end of descriptors. */
+ next = desc->next;
+ /* Make sure compiler knows to grab that: we don't want it changing! */
+ /* We will use the result as an index in an array, so most
+ * architectures only need a compiler barrier here. */
+ read_barrier_depends();
+
+ return next;
+}
+
+static unsigned get_indirect(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
+ struct iovec iov[], unsigned int iov_size,
+ unsigned int *out_num, unsigned int *in_num,
+ struct vhost_log *log, unsigned int *log_num,
+ struct vring_desc *indirect)
+{
+ struct vring_desc desc;
+ unsigned int i = 0, count, found = 0;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (indirect->len % sizeof desc) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Invalid length in indirect descriptor: "
+ "len 0x%llx not multiple of 0x%zx\n",
+ (unsigned long long)indirect->len,
+ sizeof desc);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = translate_desc(dev, indirect->addr, indirect->len, vq->indirect,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(vq->indirect));
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d in indirect.\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* We will use the result as an address to read from, so most
+ * architectures only need a compiler barrier here. */
+ read_barrier_depends();
+
+ count = indirect->len / sizeof desc;
+ /* Buffers are chained via a 16 bit next field, so
+ * we can have at most 2^16 of these. */
+ if (count > USHORT_MAX + 1) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Indirect buffer length too big: %d\n",
+ indirect->len);
+ return -E2BIG;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ unsigned iov_count = *in_num + *out_num;
+ if (++found > count) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Loop detected: last one at %u "
+ "indirect size %u\n",
+ i, count);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (memcpy_fromiovec((unsigned char *)&desc, vq->indirect,
+ sizeof desc)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed indirect descriptor: idx %d, %zx\n",
+ i, (size_t)indirect->addr + i * sizeof desc);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_INDIRECT) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Nested indirect descriptor: idx %d, %zx\n",
+ i, (size_t)indirect->addr + i * sizeof desc);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ ret = translate_desc(dev, desc.addr, desc.len, iov + iov_count,
+ iov_size - iov_count);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d indirect idx %d\n",
+ ret, i);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ /* If this is an input descriptor, increment that count. */
+ if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_WRITE) {
+ *in_num += ret;
+ if (unlikely(log)) {
+ log[*log_num].addr = desc.addr;
+ log[*log_num].len = desc.len;
+ ++*log_num;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* If it's an output descriptor, they're all supposed
+ * to come before any input descriptors. */
+ if (*in_num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Indirect descriptor "
+ "has out after in: idx %d\n", i);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ *out_num += ret;
+ }
+ } while ((i = next_desc(&desc)) != -1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This looks in the virtqueue and for the first available buffer, and converts
+ * it to an iovec for convenient access. Since descriptors consist of some
+ * number of output then some number of input descriptors, it's actually two
+ * iovecs, but we pack them into one and note how many of each there were.
+ *
+ * This function returns the descriptor number found, or vq->num (which
+ * is never a valid descriptor number) if none was found. */
+unsigned vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
+ struct iovec iov[], unsigned int iov_size,
+ unsigned int *out_num, unsigned int *in_num,
+ struct vhost_log *log, unsigned int *log_num)
+{
+ struct vring_desc desc;
+ unsigned int i, head, found = 0;
+ u16 last_avail_idx;
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Check it isn't doing very strange things with descriptor numbers. */
+ last_avail_idx = vq->last_avail_idx;
+ if (get_user(vq->avail_idx, &vq->avail->idx)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to access avail idx at %p\n",
+ &vq->avail->idx);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+
+ if ((u16)(vq->avail_idx - last_avail_idx) > vq->num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Guest moved used index from %u to %u",
+ last_avail_idx, vq->avail_idx);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+
+ /* If there's nothing new since last we looked, return invalid. */
+ if (vq->avail_idx == last_avail_idx)
+ return vq->num;
+
+ /* Only get avail ring entries after they have been exposed by guest. */
+ rmb();
+
+ /* Grab the next descriptor number they're advertising, and increment
+ * the index we've seen. */
+ if (get_user(head, &vq->avail->ring[last_avail_idx % vq->num])) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to read head: idx %d address %p\n",
+ last_avail_idx,
+ &vq->avail->ring[last_avail_idx % vq->num]);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+
+ /* If their number is silly, that's an error. */
+ if (head >= vq->num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Guest says index %u > %u is available",
+ head, vq->num);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+
+ /* When we start there are none of either input nor output. */
+ *out_num = *in_num = 0;
+ if (unlikely(log))
+ *log_num = 0;
+
+ i = head;
+ do {
+ unsigned iov_count = *in_num + *out_num;
+ if (i >= vq->num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Desc index is %u > %u, head = %u",
+ i, vq->num, head);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ if (++found > vq->num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Loop detected: last one at %u "
+ "vq size %u head %u\n",
+ i, vq->num, head);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ ret = copy_from_user(&desc, vq->desc + i, sizeof desc);
+ if (ret) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to get descriptor: idx %d addr %p\n",
+ i, vq->desc + i);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_INDIRECT) {
+ ret = get_indirect(dev, vq, iov, iov_size,
+ out_num, in_num,
+ log, log_num, &desc);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failure detected "
+ "in indirect descriptor at idx %d\n", i);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ret = translate_desc(dev, desc.addr, desc.len, iov + iov_count,
+ iov_size - iov_count);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Translation failure %d descriptor idx %d\n",
+ ret, i);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ if (desc.flags & VRING_DESC_F_WRITE) {
+ /* If this is an input descriptor,
+ * increment that count. */
+ *in_num += ret;
+ if (unlikely(log)) {
+ log[*log_num].addr = desc.addr;
+ log[*log_num].len = desc.len;
+ ++*log_num;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* If it's an output descriptor, they're all supposed
+ * to come before any input descriptors. */
+ if (*in_num) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Descriptor has out after in: "
+ "idx %d\n", i);
+ return vq->num;
+ }
+ *out_num += ret;
+ }
+ } while ((i = next_desc(&desc)) != -1);
+
+ /* On success, increment avail index. */
+ vq->last_avail_idx++;
+ return head;
+}
+
+/* Reverse the effect of vhost_get_vq_desc. Useful for error handling. */
+void vhost_discard_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ vq->last_avail_idx--;
+}
+
+/* After we've used one of their buffers, we tell them about it. We'll then
+ * want to notify the guest, using eventfd. */
+int vhost_add_used(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, unsigned int head, int len)
+{
+ struct vring_used_elem *used;
+
+ /* The virtqueue contains a ring of used buffers. Get a pointer to the
+ * next entry in that used ring. */
+ used = &vq->used->ring[vq->last_used_idx % vq->num];
+ if (put_user(head, &used->id)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to write used id");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ if (put_user(len, &used->len)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to write used len");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ /* Make sure buffer is written before we update index. */
+ wmb();
+ if (put_user(vq->last_used_idx + 1, &vq->used->idx)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to increment used idx");
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ if (unlikely(vq->log_used)) {
+ /* Make sure data is seen before log. */
+ wmb();
+ log_write(vq->log_base, vq->log_addr + sizeof *vq->used->ring *
+ (vq->last_used_idx % vq->num),
+ sizeof *vq->used->ring);
+ log_write(vq->log_base, vq->log_addr, sizeof *vq->used->ring);
+ if (vq->log_ctx)
+ eventfd_signal(vq->log_ctx, 1);
+ }
+ vq->last_used_idx++;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* This actually signals the guest, using eventfd. */
+void vhost_signal(struct vhost_dev *dev, struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ __u16 flags = 0;
+ if (get_user(flags, &vq->avail->flags)) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to get flags");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /* If they don't want an interrupt, don't signal, unless empty. */
+ if ((flags & VRING_AVAIL_F_NO_INTERRUPT) &&
+ (vq->avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx ||
+ !vhost_has_feature(dev, VIRTIO_F_NOTIFY_ON_EMPTY)))
+ return;
+
+ /* Signal the Guest tell them we used something up. */
+ if (vq->call_ctx)
+ eventfd_signal(vq->call_ctx, 1);
+}
+
+/* And here's the combo meal deal. Supersize me! */
+void vhost_add_used_and_signal(struct vhost_dev *dev,
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vq,
+ unsigned int head, int len)
+{
+ vhost_add_used(vq, head, len);
+ vhost_signal(dev, vq);
+}
+
+/* OK, now we need to know about added descriptors. */
+bool vhost_enable_notify(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ u16 avail_idx;
+ int r;
+ if (!(vq->used_flags & VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY))
+ return false;
+ vq->used_flags &= ~VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY;
+ r = put_user(vq->used_flags, &vq->used->flags);
+ if (r) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to enable notification at %p: %d\n",
+ &vq->used->flags, r);
+ return false;
+ }
+ /* They could have slipped one in as we were doing that: make
+ * sure it's written, then check again. */
+ mb();
+ r = get_user(avail_idx, &vq->avail->idx);
+ if (r) {
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to check avail idx at %p: %d\n",
+ &vq->avail->idx, r);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return avail_idx != vq->last_avail_idx;
+}
+
+/* We don't need to be notified again. */
+void vhost_disable_notify(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq)
+{
+ int r;
+ if (vq->used_flags & VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY)
+ return;
+ vq->used_flags |= VRING_USED_F_NO_NOTIFY;
+ r = put_user(vq->used_flags, &vq->used->flags);
+ if (r)
+ vq_err(vq, "Failed to enable notification at %p: %d\n",
+ &vq->used->flags, r);
+}
+
+int vhost_init(void)
+{
+ vhost_workqueue = create_singlethread_workqueue("vhost");
+ if (!vhost_workqueue)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void vhost_cleanup(void)
+{
+ destroy_workqueue(vhost_workqueue);
+}
diff --git a/drivers/vhost/vhost.h b/drivers/vhost/vhost.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d1f0453
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/vhost/vhost.h
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+#ifndef _VHOST_H
+#define _VHOST_H
+
+#include <linux/eventfd.h>
+#include <linux/vhost.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <linux/poll.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <linux/uio.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_ring.h>
+
+struct vhost_device;
+
+enum {
+ /* Enough place for all fragments, head, and virtio net header. */
+ VHOST_NET_MAX_SG = MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 2,
+};
+
+/* Poll a file (eventfd or socket) */
+/* Note: there's nothing vhost specific about this structure. */
+struct vhost_poll {
+ poll_table table;
+ wait_queue_head_t *wqh;
+ wait_queue_t wait;
+ /* struct which will handle all actual work. */
+ struct work_struct work;
+ unsigned long mask;
+};
+
+void vhost_poll_init(struct vhost_poll *poll, work_func_t func,
+ unsigned long mask);
+void vhost_poll_start(struct vhost_poll *poll, struct file *file);
+void vhost_poll_stop(struct vhost_poll *poll);
+void vhost_poll_flush(struct vhost_poll *poll);
+void vhost_poll_queue(struct vhost_poll *poll);
+
+struct vhost_log {
+ u64 addr;
+ u64 len;
+};
+
+/* The virtqueue structure describes a queue attached to a device. */
+struct vhost_virtqueue {
+ struct vhost_dev *dev;
+
+ /* The actual ring of buffers. */
+ struct mutex mutex;
+ unsigned int num;
+ struct vring_desc __user *desc;
+ struct vring_avail __user *avail;
+ struct vring_used __user *used;
+ struct file *kick;
+ struct file *call;
+ struct file *error;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *call_ctx;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *error_ctx;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *log_ctx;
+
+ struct vhost_poll poll;
+
+ /* The routine to call when the Guest pings us, or timeout. */
+ work_func_t handle_kick;
+
+ /* Last available index we saw. */
+ u16 last_avail_idx;
+
+ /* Caches available index value from user. */
+ u16 avail_idx;
+
+ /* Last index we used. */
+ u16 last_used_idx;
+
+ /* Used flags */
+ u16 used_flags;
+
+ /* Log writes to used structure. */
+ bool log_used;
+ u64 log_addr;
+
+ struct iovec indirect[VHOST_NET_MAX_SG];
+ struct iovec iov[VHOST_NET_MAX_SG];
+ struct iovec hdr[VHOST_NET_MAX_SG];
+ size_t hdr_size;
+ /* We use a kind of RCU to access private pointer.
+ * All readers access it from workqueue, which makes it possible to
+ * flush the workqueue instead of synchronize_rcu. Therefore readers do
+ * not need to call rcu_read_lock/rcu_read_unlock: the beginning of
+ * work item execution acts instead of rcu_read_lock() and the end of
+ * work item execution acts instead of rcu_read_lock().
+ * Writers use virtqueue mutex. */
+ void *private_data;
+ /* Log write descriptors */
+ void __user *log_base;
+ struct vhost_log log[VHOST_NET_MAX_SG];
+};
+
+struct vhost_dev {
+ /* Readers use RCU to access memory table pointer
+ * log base pointer and features.
+ * Writers use mutex below.*/
+ struct vhost_memory *memory;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct mutex mutex;
+ unsigned acked_features;
+ struct vhost_virtqueue *vqs;
+ int nvqs;
+ struct file *log_file;
+ struct eventfd_ctx *log_ctx;
+};
+
+long vhost_dev_init(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue *vqs, int nvqs);
+long vhost_dev_check_owner(struct vhost_dev *);
+long vhost_dev_reset_owner(struct vhost_dev *);
+void vhost_dev_cleanup(struct vhost_dev *);
+long vhost_dev_ioctl(struct vhost_dev *, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long arg);
+
+unsigned vhost_get_vq_desc(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue *,
+ struct iovec iov[], unsigned int iov_count,
+ unsigned int *out_num, unsigned int *in_num,
+ struct vhost_log *log, unsigned int *log_num);
+void vhost_discard_vq_desc(struct vhost_virtqueue *);
+
+int vhost_add_used(struct vhost_virtqueue *, unsigned int head, int len);
+void vhost_signal(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue *);
+void vhost_add_used_and_signal(struct vhost_dev *, struct vhost_virtqueue *,
+ unsigned int head, int len);
+void vhost_disable_notify(struct vhost_virtqueue *);
+bool vhost_enable_notify(struct vhost_virtqueue *);
+
+int vhost_log_write(struct vhost_virtqueue *vq, struct vhost_log *log,
+ unsigned int log_num, u64 len);
+
+int vhost_init(void);
+void vhost_cleanup(void);
+
+#define vq_err(vq, fmt, ...) do { \
+ pr_debug(pr_fmt(fmt), ##__VA_ARGS__); \
+ if ((vq)->error_ctx) \
+ eventfd_signal((vq)->error_ctx, 1);\
+ } while (0)
+
+enum {
+ VHOST_FEATURES = (1 << VIRTIO_F_NOTIFY_ON_EMPTY) |
+ (1 << VIRTIO_RING_F_INDIRECT_DESC) |
+ (1 << VHOST_F_LOG_ALL) |
+ (1 << VHOST_NET_F_VIRTIO_NET_HDR),
+};
+
+static inline int vhost_has_feature(struct vhost_dev *dev, int bit)
+{
+ unsigned acked_features = rcu_dereference(dev->acked_features);
+ return acked_features & (1 << bit);
+}
+
+#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/Kbuild b/include/linux/Kbuild
index 1feed71..e210194 100644
--- a/include/linux/Kbuild
+++ b/include/linux/Kbuild
@@ -361,6 +361,7 @@ unifdef-y += uio.h
unifdef-y += unistd.h
unifdef-y += usbdevice_fs.h
unifdef-y += utsname.h
+unifdef-y += vhost.h
unifdef-y += videodev2.h
unifdef-y += videodev.h
unifdef-y += virtio_config.h
diff --git a/include/linux/miscdevice.h b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
index adaf3c1..8b5f7cc 100644
--- a/include/linux/miscdevice.h
+++ b/include/linux/miscdevice.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#define HPET_MINOR 228
#define FUSE_MINOR 229
#define KVM_MINOR 232
+#define VHOST_NET_MINOR 233
#define MISC_DYNAMIC_MINOR 255
struct device;
diff --git a/include/linux/vhost.h b/include/linux/vhost.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e847f1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/linux/vhost.h
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_VHOST_H
+#define _LINUX_VHOST_H
+/* Userspace interface for in-kernel virtio accelerators. */
+
+/* vhost is used to reduce the number of system calls involved in virtio.
+ *
+ * Existing virtio net code is used in the guest without modification.
+ *
+ * This header includes interface used by userspace hypervisor for
+ * device configuration.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/compiler.h>
+#include <linux/ioctl.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_config.h>
+#include <linux/virtio_ring.h>
+
+struct vhost_vring_state {
+ unsigned int index;
+ unsigned int num;
+};
+
+struct vhost_vring_file {
+ unsigned int index;
+ int fd; /* Pass -1 to unbind from file. */
+
+};
+
+struct vhost_vring_addr {
+ unsigned int index;
+ /* Option flags. */
+ unsigned int flags;
+ /* Flag values: */
+ /* Whether log address is valid. If set enables logging. */
+#define VHOST_VRING_F_LOG 0
+
+ /* Start of array of descriptors (virtually contiguous) */
+ __u64 desc_user_addr;
+ /* Used structure address. Must be 32 bit aligned */
+ __u64 used_user_addr;
+ /* Available structure address. Must be 16 bit aligned */
+ __u64 avail_user_addr;
+ /* Logging support. */
+ /* Log writes to used structure, at offset calculated from specified
+ * address. Address must be 32 bit aligned. */
+ __u64 log_guest_addr;
+};
+
+struct vhost_memory_region {
+ __u64 guest_phys_addr;
+ __u64 memory_size; /* bytes */
+ __u64 userspace_addr;
+ __u64 flags_padding; /* No flags are currently specified. */
+};
+
+/* All region addresses and sizes must be 4K aligned. */
+#define VHOST_PAGE_SIZE 0x1000
+
+struct vhost_memory {
+ __u32 nregions;
+ __u32 padding;
+ struct vhost_memory_region regions[0];
+};
+
+/* ioctls */
+
+#define VHOST_VIRTIO 0xAF
+
+/* Features bitmask for forward compatibility. Transport bits are used for
+ * vhost specific features. */
+#define VHOST_GET_FEATURES _IOR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x00, __u64)
+#define VHOST_SET_FEATURES _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x00, __u64)
+
+/* Set current process as the (exclusive) owner of this file descriptor. This
+ * must be called before any other vhost command. Further calls to
+ * VHOST_OWNER_SET fail until VHOST_OWNER_RESET is called. */
+#define VHOST_SET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x01)
+/* Give up ownership, and reset the device to default values.
+ * Allows subsequent call to VHOST_OWNER_SET to succeed. */
+#define VHOST_RESET_OWNER _IO(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x02)
+
+/* Set up/modify memory layout */
+#define VHOST_SET_MEM_TABLE _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x03, struct vhost_memory)
+
+/* Write logging setup. */
+/* Memory writes can optionally be logged by setting bit at an offset
+ * (calculated from the physical address) from specified log base.
+ * The bit is set using an atomic 32 bit operation. */
+/* Set base address for logging. */
+#define VHOST_SET_LOG_BASE _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x04, __u64)
+/* Specify an eventfd file descriptor to signal on log write. */
+#define VHOST_SET_LOG_FD _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x07, int)
+
+/* Ring setup. */
+/* Set number of descriptors in ring. This parameter can not
+ * be modified while ring is running (bound to a device). */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_NUM _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x10, struct vhost_vring_state)
+/* Set addresses for the ring. */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_ADDR _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x11, struct vhost_vring_addr)
+/* Base value where queue looks for available descriptors */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_BASE _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x12, struct vhost_vring_state)
+/* Get accessor: reads index, writes value in num */
+#define VHOST_GET_VRING_BASE _IOWR(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x12, struct vhost_vring_state)
+
+/* The following ioctls use eventfd file descriptors to signal and poll
+ * for events. */
+
+/* Set eventfd to poll for added buffers */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_KICK _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x20, struct vhost_vring_file)
+/* Set eventfd to signal when buffers have beed used */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_CALL _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x21, struct vhost_vring_file)
+/* Set eventfd to signal an error */
+#define VHOST_SET_VRING_ERR _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x22, struct vhost_vring_file)
+
+/* VHOST_NET specific defines */
+
+/* Attach virtio net ring to a raw socket, or tap device.
+ * The socket must be already bound to an ethernet device, this device will be
+ * used for transmit. Pass fd -1 to unbind from the socket and the transmit
+ * device. This can be used to stop the ring (e.g. for migration). */
+#define VHOST_NET_SET_BACKEND _IOW(VHOST_VIRTIO, 0x30, struct vhost_vring_file)
+
+/* Feature bits */
+/* Log all write descriptors. Can be changed while device is active. */
+#define VHOST_F_LOG_ALL 26
+/* vhost-net should add virtio_net_hdr for RX, and strip for TX packets. */
+#define VHOST_NET_F_VIRTIO_NET_HDR 27
+
+#endif
--
1.6.5.2.143.g8cc62
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