* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Johannes Berg @ 2009-11-09 16:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Patrick McHardy; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <4AF816D3.7000304@trash.net>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 722 bytes --]
On Mon, 2009-11-09 at 14:19 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
> > Ok, cool, thanks. Do you want me to send the change removing the
> > multicast check, or would you want to do that since you audited all the
> > netlink callers?
>
> Please go ahead.
Will do.
> > Also, it's called URELEASE for unicast -- should we rename it to just
> > RELEASE?
>
> I think URELEASE is still fine since won't necessarily get called
> for sockets that are used for pure multicast reception when using
> setsockopt to bind to groups.
Oh? So on which sockets can I rely on it being used? After sending at
least one unicast message into the kernel? This seems to depend on pid
being assigned -- when is that?
johannes
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^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 4/5 RFC] TCPCT part1d: generate Responder Cookie
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers; +Cc: Eric Dumazet, Paul E. McKenney
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 807 bytes --]
Define (missing) hash message size for SHA1.
Define hashing size constants specific to TCP cookies, and add new function.
Maintain global secret values for tcp_cookie_generator().
This is a significantly revised implementation of earlier (15-year-old)
Photuris [RFC-2522] code for the KA9Q cooperative multitasking platform.
Linux RCU technique appears to be well-suited to this application, though
neither of the circular queue items are freed.
These functions will also be used in subsequent patches that implement
additional features.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
include/linux/cryptohash.h | 1 +
include/net/tcp.h | 8 +++
net/ipv4/tcp.c | 146 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 155 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1d5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 6995 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/linux/cryptohash.h b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
index c118b2a..ec78a4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/cryptohash.h
+++ b/include/linux/cryptohash.h
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
#define __CRYPTOHASH_H
#define SHA_DIGEST_WORDS 5
+#define SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES (512 /*bits*/ / 8)
#define SHA_WORKSPACE_WORDS 80
void sha_init(__u32 *buf);
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index f15924b..702fd0a 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -1474,6 +1474,14 @@ struct tcp_request_sock_ops {
#endif
};
+/* Using SHA1 for now, define some constants.
+ */
+#define COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS (SHA_DIGEST_WORDS)
+#define COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS (SHA_MESSAGE_BYTES / 4)
+#define COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS (COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS)
+
+extern int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery);
+
extern void tcp_v4_init(void);
extern void tcp_init(void);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp.c b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
index e0cfa63..3ae01bf 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp.c
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@
#include <linux/cache.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/time.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/tcp.h>
@@ -2842,6 +2843,141 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_md5_hash_key);
#endif
+/**
+ * Each Responder maintains up to two secret values concurrently for
+ * efficient secret rollover. Each secret value has 4 states:
+ *
+ * Generating. (tcp_secret_generating != tcp_secret_primary)
+ * Generates new Responder-Cookies, but not yet used for primary
+ * verification. This is a short-term state, typically lasting only
+ * one round trip time (RTT).
+ *
+ * Primary. (tcp_secret_generating == tcp_secret_primary)
+ * Used both for generation and primary verification.
+ *
+ * Retiring. (tcp_secret_retiring != tcp_secret_secondary)
+ * Used for verification, until the first failure that can be
+ * verified by the newer Generating secret. At that time, this
+ * cookie's state is changed to Secondary, and the Generating
+ * cookie's state is changed to Primary. This is a short-term state,
+ * typically lasting only one round trip time (RTT).
+ *
+ * Secondary. (tcp_secret_retiring == tcp_secret_secondary)
+ * Used for secondary verification, after primary verification
+ * failures. This state lasts no more than twice the Maximum Segment
+ * Lifetime (2MSL). Then, the secret is discarded.
+ */
+struct tcp_cookie_secret {
+ /* The secret is divided into two parts. The digest part is the
+ * equivalent of previously hashing a secret and saving the state,
+ * and serves as an initialization vector (IV). The message part
+ * serves as the trailing secret.
+ */
+ u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+ unsigned long expires;
+};
+
+#define TCP_SECRET_1MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL)
+#define TCP_SECRET_2MSL (HZ * TCP_PAWS_MSL * 2)
+#define TCP_SECRET_LIFE (HZ * 600)
+
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_one;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret tcp_secret_two;
+
+/* Essentially a circular list, without dynamic allocation. */
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_generating;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_primary;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_retiring;
+static struct tcp_cookie_secret *tcp_secret_secondary;
+
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_secret_locker);
+
+/* Select a random word in the cookie workspace.
+ */
+static inline u32 tcp_cookie_work(const u32 *ws, const int n)
+{
+ return ws[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS + ((COOKIE_MESSAGE_WORDS-1) & ws[n])];
+}
+
+/* Fill bakery[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS] with generator, updating as needed.
+ * Called in softirq context.
+ * Returns: 0 for success.
+ */
+int tcp_cookie_generator(u32 *bakery)
+{
+ unsigned long jiffy = jiffies;
+
+ if (unlikely(time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires))) {
+ spin_lock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ if (!time_after_eq(jiffy, tcp_secret_generating->expires)) {
+ /* refreshed by another */
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &tcp_secret_generating->secrets[0],
+ sizeof(tcp_secret_generating->secrets));
+ } else {
+ u32 secrets[COOKIE_WORKSPACE_WORDS];
+
+ /* still needs refreshing */
+ get_random_bytes(secrets, sizeof(secrets));
+
+ /* The first time, paranoia assumes that the
+ * randomization function isn't as strong. But,
+ * this secret initialization is delayed until
+ * the last possible moment (packet arrival).
+ * Although that time is observable, it is
+ * unpredictably variable. Mash in the most
+ * volatile clock bits available, and expire the
+ * secret extra quickly.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(tcp_secret_primary->expires ==
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires)) {
+ struct timespec tv;
+
+ getnstimeofday(&tv);
+ secrets[COOKIE_DIGEST_WORDS+0] ^=
+ (u32)tv.tv_nsec;
+
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_1MSL
+ + (0x0f & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 0));
+ } else {
+ tcp_secret_secondary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_LIFE
+ + (0xff & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 1));
+ tcp_secret_primary->expires = jiffy
+ + TCP_SECRET_2MSL
+ + (0x1f & tcp_cookie_work(secrets, 2));
+ }
+ memcpy(&tcp_secret_secondary->secrets[0],
+ &secrets[0],
+ sizeof(secrets));
+
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_generating,
+ tcp_secret_secondary);
+ rcu_assign_pointer(tcp_secret_retiring,
+ tcp_secret_primary);
+ spin_unlock_bh(&tcp_secret_locker);
+ /* Neither call_rcu() or synchronize_rcu() are needed.
+ * Retiring data is not freed. It is replaced after
+ * further (locked) pointer updates, and a quiet time
+ * (minimum 1MSL, maximum LIFE - 2MSL).
+ */
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &secrets[0],
+ sizeof(secrets));
+ }
+ } else {
+ rcu_read_lock_bh();
+ memcpy(bakery,
+ &rcu_dereference(tcp_secret_generating)->secrets[0],
+ sizeof(tcp_secret_generating->secrets));
+ rcu_read_unlock_bh();
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_cookie_generator);
+
void tcp_done(struct sock *sk)
{
if (sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_SENT || sk->sk_state == TCP_SYN_RECV)
@@ -2876,6 +3012,7 @@ void __init tcp_init(void)
struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
unsigned long nr_pages, limit;
int order, i, max_share;
+ unsigned long jiffy = jiffies;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tcp_skb_cb) > sizeof(skb->cb));
@@ -2969,6 +3106,15 @@ void __init tcp_init(void)
tcp_hashinfo.ehash_mask + 1, tcp_hashinfo.bhash_size);
tcp_register_congestion_control(&tcp_reno);
+
+ memset(&tcp_secret_one.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_one.secrets));
+ memset(&tcp_secret_two.secrets[0], 0, sizeof(tcp_secret_two.secrets));
+ tcp_secret_one.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
+ tcp_secret_two.expires = jiffy; /* past due */
+ tcp_secret_generating = &tcp_secret_one;
+ tcp_secret_primary = &tcp_secret_one;
+ tcp_secret_retiring = &tcp_secret_two;
+ tcp_secret_secondary = &tcp_secret_two;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_close);
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 2/5 RFC] TCPCT part1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2009-11-09 16:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: William Allen Simpson; +Cc: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF84248.1070103@gmail.com>
William Allen Simpson a écrit :
> Define two symbols needed in both kernel and user space.
>
> Remove old (somewhat incorrect) variant that wasn't used in many cases.
> Default applies to both RMSS and SMSS.
>
> Replace numeric constants with defined symbols.
>
> Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
> ---
> include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++
> include/net/tcp.h | 3 ---
> net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++--
> net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 6 +++---
> net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
> net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +-
> 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 42/75] myri10ge: declare MODULE_FIRMWARE
From: Andrew Gallatin @ 2009-11-09 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ben Hutchings; +Cc: David Miller, Brice Goglin, netdev
In-Reply-To: <1257630884.15927.442.camel@localhost>
Ben Hutchings wrote:
> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Acked-by Andrew Gallatin <gallatin@myri.com>
Thanks,
Drew
^ permalink raw reply
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 3/5 RFC] TCPCT part1c: sysctl_tcp_cookie_size, socket option TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS, functions
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1358 bytes --]
Define sysctl (tcp_cookie_size) to turn on and off the cookie option
default globally, instead of a compiled configuration option.
Define per socket option (TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS) for setting constant
data values, retrieving variable cookie values, and other facilities.
Redefine two TCP header functions to accept TCP header pointer.
When subtracting, return signed int to allow error checking.
Move inline tcp_clear_options() unchanged from net/tcp.h to linux/tcp.h,
near its corresponding struct tcp_options_received (prior to changes).
This is a straightforward re-implementation of an earlier (year-old)
patch that no longer applies cleanly, with permission of the original
author (Adam Langley). The patch was previously reviewed:
http://thread.gmane.org/gmane.linux.network/102586
These functions will also be used in subsequent patches that implement
additional features.
Requires:
TCPCT part 1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt | 8 ++++++
include/linux/tcp.h | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/net/tcp.h | 6 +---
net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c | 8 ++++++
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 8 ++++++
5 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1c5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 5589 bytes --]
diff --git a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
index a0e134d..d47c000 100644
--- a/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
+++ b/Documentation/networking/ip-sysctl.txt
@@ -164,6 +164,14 @@ tcp_congestion_control - STRING
additional choices may be available based on kernel configuration.
Default is set as part of kernel configuration.
+tcp_cookie_size - INTEGER
+ Default size of TCP Cookie Transactions (TCPCT) option, that may be
+ overridden on a per socket basis by the TCPCT socket option.
+ Values greater than the maximum (16) are interpreted as the maximum.
+ Values greater than zero and less than the minimum (8) are interpreted
+ as the minimum.
+ Default: 0 (off).
+
tcp_dsack - BOOLEAN
Allows TCP to send "duplicate" SACKs.
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index 32d7d77..57921c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -102,7 +102,9 @@ enum {
#define TCP_QUICKACK 12 /* Block/reenable quick acks */
#define TCP_CONGESTION 13 /* Congestion control algorithm */
#define TCP_MD5SIG 14 /* TCP MD5 Signature (RFC2385) */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS 15 /* TCP Cookie Transactions */
+/* for TCP_INFO socket option */
#define TCPI_OPT_TIMESTAMPS 1
#define TCPI_OPT_SACK 2
#define TCPI_OPT_WSCALE 4
@@ -174,6 +176,30 @@ struct tcp_md5sig {
__u8 tcpm_key[TCP_MD5SIG_MAXKEYLEN]; /* key (binary) */
};
+/* for TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS (TCPCT) socket option */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_MAX 16 /* 128-bits */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_MIN 8 /* 64-bits */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_PAIR_SIZE (2*TCP_COOKIE_MAX)
+
+/* Flags for both getsockopt and setsockopt */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_IN_ALWAYS (1 << 0) /* Discard SYN without cookie */
+#define TCP_COOKIE_OUT_NEVER (1 << 1) /* Prohibit outgoing cookies,
+ * supercedes everything. */
+
+/* Flags for getsockopt */
+#define TCP_S_DATA_IN (1 << 2) /* Was data received? */
+#define TCP_S_DATA_OUT (1 << 3) /* Was data sent? */
+
+/* TCP_COOKIE_TRANSACTIONS data */
+struct tcp_cookie_transactions {
+ __u16 tcpct_flags; /* see above */
+ __u8 __tcpct_pad1; /* zero */
+ __u8 tcpct_cookie_desired; /* bytes */
+ __u16 tcpct_s_data_desired; /* bytes of variable data */
+ __u16 tcpct_used; /* bytes in value */
+ __u8 tcpct_value[TCP_MSS_DEFAULT];
+};
+
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
@@ -197,6 +223,17 @@ static inline unsigned int tcp_optlen(const struct sk_buff *skb)
return (tcp_hdr(skb)->doff - 5) * 4;
}
+static inline unsigned int tcp_header_len_th(const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ return th->doff * 4;
+}
+
+/* When doff is bad, this could be negative. */
+static inline int tcp_option_len_th(const struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+ return (int)(th->doff * 4) - sizeof(*th);
+}
+
/* This defines a selective acknowledgement block. */
struct tcp_sack_block_wire {
__be32 start_seq;
@@ -227,6 +264,11 @@ struct tcp_options_received {
u16 mss_clamp; /* Maximal mss, negotiated at connection setup */
};
+static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt)
+{
+ rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
+}
+
/* This is the max number of SACKS that we'll generate and process. It's safe
* to increse this, although since:
* size = TCPOLEN_SACK_BASE_ALIGNED (4) + n * TCPOLEN_SACK_PERBLOCK (8)
@@ -435,6 +477,6 @@ static inline struct tcp_timewait_sock *tcp_twsk(const struct sock *sk)
return (struct tcp_timewait_sock *)sk;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* __KERNEL__ */
#endif /* _LINUX_TCP_H */
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index a413e9f..f15924b 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -234,6 +234,7 @@ extern int sysctl_tcp_base_mss;
extern int sysctl_tcp_workaround_signed_windows;
extern int sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle;
extern int sysctl_tcp_max_ssthresh;
+extern int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size;
extern atomic_t tcp_memory_allocated;
extern struct percpu_counter tcp_sockets_allocated;
@@ -340,11 +341,6 @@ static inline void tcp_dec_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk,
extern void tcp_enter_quickack_mode(struct sock *sk);
-static inline void tcp_clear_options(struct tcp_options_received *rx_opt)
-{
- rx_opt->tstamp_ok = rx_opt->sack_ok = rx_opt->wscale_ok = rx_opt->snd_wscale = 0;
-}
-
#define TCP_ECN_OK 1
#define TCP_ECN_QUEUE_CWR 2
#define TCP_ECN_DEMAND_CWR 4
diff --git a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
index 2dcf04d..3422c54 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/sysctl_net_ipv4.c
@@ -714,6 +714,14 @@ static struct ctl_table ipv4_table[] = {
},
{
.ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
+ .procname = "tcp_cookie_size",
+ .data = &sysctl_tcp_cookie_size,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec
+ },
+ {
+ .ctl_name = CTL_UNNUMBERED,
.procname = "udp_mem",
.data = &sysctl_udp_mem,
.maxlen = sizeof(sysctl_udp_mem),
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 784e6ee..492ccdd 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -59,6 +59,14 @@ int sysctl_tcp_base_mss __read_mostly = 512;
/* By default, RFC2861 behavior. */
int sysctl_tcp_slow_start_after_idle __read_mostly = 1;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+/* By default, let the user enable it. */
+int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size __read_mostly = 0;
+#else
+int sysctl_tcp_cookie_size __read_mostly = TCP_COOKIE_MAX;
+#endif
+
+
/* Account for new data that has been sent to the network. */
static void tcp_event_new_data_sent(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 2/5 RFC] TCPCT part1b: TCP_MSS_DEFAULT, TCP_MSS_DESIRED
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 556 bytes --]
Define two symbols needed in both kernel and user space.
Remove old (somewhat incorrect) variant that wasn't used in many cases.
Default applies to both RMSS and SMSS.
Replace numeric constants with defined symbols.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
---
include/linux/tcp.h | 6 ++++++
include/net/tcp.h | 3 ---
net/ipv4/tcp_input.c | 4 ++--
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 6 +++---
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1b5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 4017 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/linux/tcp.h b/include/linux/tcp.h
index eeecb85..32d7d77 100644
--- a/include/linux/tcp.h
+++ b/include/linux/tcp.h
@@ -81,6 +81,12 @@ enum {
TCP_DATA_OFFSET = __cpu_to_be32(0xF0000000)
};
+/*
+ * TCP general constants
+ */
+#define TCP_MSS_DEFAULT 536U /* IPv4 (RFC1122, RFC2581) */
+#define TCP_MSS_DESIRED 1220U /* IPv6 (tunneled), EDNS0 (RFC3226) */
+
/* TCP socket options */
#define TCP_NODELAY 1 /* Turn off Nagle's algorithm. */
#define TCP_MAXSEG 2 /* Limit MSS */
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index 25bf3ba..a413e9f 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -62,9 +62,6 @@ extern void tcp_time_wait(struct sock *sk, int state, int timeo);
/* Minimal accepted MSS. It is (60+60+8) - (20+20). */
#define TCP_MIN_MSS 88U
-/* Minimal RCV_MSS. */
-#define TCP_MIN_RCVMSS 536U
-
/* The least MTU to use for probing */
#define TCP_BASE_MSS 512
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
index be0c5bf..cc306ac 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_input.c
@@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ static void tcp_measure_rcv_mss(struct sock *sk, const struct sk_buff *skb)
* "len" is invariant segment length, including TCP header.
*/
len += skb->data - skb_transport_header(skb);
- if (len >= TCP_MIN_RCVMSS + sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
+ if (len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + sizeof(struct tcphdr) ||
/* If PSH is not set, packet should be
* full sized, provided peer TCP is not badly broken.
* This observation (if it is correct 8)) allows
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ void tcp_initialize_rcv_mss(struct sock *sk)
unsigned int hint = min_t(unsigned int, tp->advmss, tp->mss_cache);
hint = min(hint, tp->rcv_wnd / 2);
- hint = min(hint, TCP_MIN_RCVMSS);
+ hint = min(hint, TCP_MSS_DEFAULT);
hint = max(hint, TCP_MIN_MSS);
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ack.rcv_mss = hint;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index f83ac91..0718fde 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ int tcp_v4_connect(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *uaddr, int addr_len)
if (inet->opt)
inet_csk(sk)->icsk_ext_hdr_len = inet->opt->optlen;
- tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = 536;
+ tp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
/* Socket identity is still unknown (sport may be zero).
* However we set state to SYN-SENT and not releasing socket
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
goto drop_and_free;
tcp_clear_options(&tmp_opt);
- tmp_opt.mss_clamp = 536;
+ tmp_opt.mss_clamp = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tmp_opt.user_mss = tcp_sk(sk)->rx_opt.user_mss;
tcp_parse_options(skb, &tmp_opt, 0, dst);
@@ -1818,7 +1818,7 @@ static int tcp_v4_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
- tp->mss_cache = 536;
+ tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sysctl_tcp_reordering;
icsk->icsk_ca_ops = &tcp_init_congestion_ops;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index fb68bab..7a42990 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -476,7 +476,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_create_openreq_child(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
if (newtp->af_specific->md5_lookup(sk, newsk))
newtp->tcp_header_len += TCPOLEN_MD5SIG_ALIGNED;
#endif
- if (skb->len >= TCP_MIN_RCVMSS+newtp->tcp_header_len)
+ if (skb->len >= TCP_MSS_DEFAULT + newtp->tcp_header_len)
newicsk->icsk_ack.last_seg_size = skb->len - newtp->tcp_header_len;
newtp->rx_opt.mss_clamp = req->mss;
TCP_ECN_openreq_child(newtp, req);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 6951827..b528f75 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -1849,7 +1849,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_init_sock(struct sock *sk)
*/
tp->snd_ssthresh = TCP_INFINITE_SSTHRESH;
tp->snd_cwnd_clamp = ~0;
- tp->mss_cache = 536;
+ tp->mss_cache = TCP_MSS_DEFAULT;
tp->reordering = sysctl_tcp_reordering;
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 4/4] bnx2x: version 1.52.1-4
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index ab552d3..06ffa7d 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -56,8 +56,8 @@
#include "bnx2x_init_ops.h"
#include "bnx2x_dump.h"
-#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "1.52.1-3"
-#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "2009/11/05"
+#define DRV_MODULE_VERSION "1.52.1-4"
+#define DRV_MODULE_RELDATE "2009/11/09"
#define BNX2X_BC_VER 0x040200
#include <linux/firmware.h>
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 3/4] bnx2x: Change coalescing granularity to 4us
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x.h | 2 +-
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 13 +++++++------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x.h b/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
index c3b32f7..928942b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x.h
@@ -1191,7 +1191,7 @@ static inline u32 reg_poll(struct bnx2x *bp, u32 reg, u32 expected, int ms,
#define MAX_SP_DESC_CNT (SP_DESC_CNT - 1)
-#define BNX2X_BTR 3
+#define BNX2X_BTR 1
#define MAX_SPQ_PENDING 8
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index a8ebd46..ab552d3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -4920,21 +4920,21 @@ static void bnx2x_update_coalesce(struct bnx2x *bp)
REG_WR8(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_TIMEOUT_U_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
U_SB_ETH_RX_CQ_INDEX),
- bp->rx_ticks/12);
+ bp->rx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR));
REG_WR16(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_DISABLE_U_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
U_SB_ETH_RX_CQ_INDEX),
- (bp->rx_ticks/12) ? 0 : 1);
+ (bp->rx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR)) ? 0 : 1);
/* HC_INDEX_C_ETH_TX_CQ_CONS */
REG_WR8(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_TIMEOUT_C_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
C_SB_ETH_TX_CQ_INDEX),
- bp->tx_ticks/12);
+ bp->tx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR));
REG_WR16(bp, BAR_CSTRORM_INTMEM +
CSTORM_SB_HC_DISABLE_C_OFFSET(port, sb_id,
C_SB_ETH_TX_CQ_INDEX),
- (bp->tx_ticks/12) ? 0 : 1);
+ (bp->tx_ticks/(4 * BNX2X_BTR)) ? 0 : 1);
}
}
@@ -9008,8 +9008,9 @@ static int __devinit bnx2x_init_bp(struct bnx2x *bp)
bp->rx_csum = 1;
- bp->tx_ticks = 50;
- bp->rx_ticks = 25;
+ /* make sure that the numbers are in the right granularity */
+ bp->tx_ticks = (50 / (4 * BNX2X_BTR)) * (4 * BNX2X_BTR);
+ bp->rx_ticks = (25 / (4 * BNX2X_BTR)) * (4 * BNX2X_BTR);
timer_interval = (CHIP_REV_IS_SLOW(bp) ? 5*HZ : HZ);
bp->current_interval = (poll ? poll : timer_interval);
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 2/4] bnx2x: Remove misleading error print
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Failing to allocate MSI-X vectors is not an error and should not be printed as
such
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 5 -----
1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index 856ca38..a8ebd46 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -7478,11 +7478,6 @@ static int bnx2x_set_int_mode(struct bnx2x *bp)
rc = bnx2x_enable_msix(bp);
if (rc) {
/* failed to enable MSI-X */
- if (bp->multi_mode)
- BNX2X_ERR("Multi requested but failed to "
- "enable MSI-X (rx %d tx %d), "
- "set number of queues to 1\n",
- bp->num_rx_queues, bp->num_tx_queues);
bp->num_rx_queues = 1;
bp->num_tx_queues = 1;
}
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next 1/4] bnx2x: GSO implies CSUM offload
From: Eilon Greenstein @ 2009-11-09 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev
Making sure that whenever the FW/HW is configured for GSO, it is also configured
to CSUM offload
Signed-off-by: Eilon Greenstein <eilong@broadcom.com>
---
drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c | 4 ++--
1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
index 61974b7..856ca38 100644
--- a/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/bnx2x_main.c
@@ -11121,10 +11121,10 @@ static inline u32 bnx2x_xmit_type(struct bnx2x *bp, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV4)
- rc |= XMIT_GSO_V4;
+ rc |= (XMIT_GSO_V4 | XMIT_CSUM_V4 | XMIT_CSUM_TCP);
else if (skb_shinfo(skb)->gso_type & SKB_GSO_TCPV6)
- rc |= XMIT_GSO_V6;
+ rc |= (XMIT_GSO_V6 | XMIT_CSUM_TCP | XMIT_CSUM_V6);
return rc;
}
--
1.5.4.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 1/5 RFC] TCPCT part 1a: add request_values parameter for sending SYNACK
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
In-Reply-To: <4AF83E2D.1050401@gmail.com>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1000 bytes --]
Add optional function parameters associated with sending SYNACK.
These parameters are not needed after sending SYNACK, and are not
used for retransmission. Avoids extending struct tcp_request_sock,
and avoids allocating kernel memory.
Also affects DCCP as it uses common struct request_sock_ops,
but this parameter is currently reserved for future use.
Signed-off-by: William.Allen.Simpson@gmail.com
Acked-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
---
include/net/request_sock.h | 8 +++++++-
include/net/tcp.h | 1 +
net/dccp/ipv4.c | 5 +++--
net/dccp/ipv6.c | 5 +++--
net/dccp/minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c | 17 ++++++++++-------
net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c | 2 +-
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 +
net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c | 28 +++++++++++++---------------
10 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
[-- Attachment #2: TCPCT+1a5.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 8638 bytes --]
diff --git a/include/net/request_sock.h b/include/net/request_sock.h
index c719084..c9b50eb 100644
--- a/include/net/request_sock.h
+++ b/include/net/request_sock.h
@@ -27,13 +27,19 @@ struct sk_buff;
struct dst_entry;
struct proto;
+/* empty to "strongly type" an otherwise void parameter.
+ */
+struct request_values {
+};
+
struct request_sock_ops {
int family;
int obj_size;
struct kmem_cache *slab;
char *slab_name;
int (*rtx_syn_ack)(struct sock *sk,
- struct request_sock *req);
+ struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp);
void (*send_ack)(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct request_sock *req);
void (*send_reset)(struct sock *sk,
diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h
index bf20f88..25bf3ba 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp.h
@@ -443,6 +443,7 @@ extern int tcp_connect(struct sock *sk);
extern struct sk_buff * tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk,
struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp,
struct request_sock *req);
extern int tcp_disconnect(struct sock *sk, int flags);
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv4.c b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
index 2423a08..efbcfdc 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv4.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv4.c
@@ -477,7 +477,8 @@ static struct dst_entry* dccp_v4_route_skb(struct net *net, struct sock *sk,
return &rt->u.dst;
}
-static int dccp_v4_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int dccp_v4_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rv_unused)
{
int err = -1;
struct sk_buff *skb;
@@ -626,7 +627,7 @@ int dccp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
dreq->dreq_iss = dccp_v4_init_sequence(skb);
dreq->dreq_service = service;
- if (dccp_v4_send_response(sk, req))
+ if (dccp_v4_send_response(sk, req, NULL))
goto drop_and_free;
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, DCCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/dccp/ipv6.c b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
index 50ea91a..6574215 100644
--- a/net/dccp/ipv6.c
+++ b/net/dccp/ipv6.c
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ out:
}
-static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int dccp_v6_send_response(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rv_unused)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *ireq6 = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
@@ -468,7 +469,7 @@ static int dccp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
dreq->dreq_iss = dccp_v6_init_sequence(skb);
dreq->dreq_service = service;
- if (dccp_v6_send_response(sk, req))
+ if (dccp_v6_send_response(sk, req, NULL))
goto drop_and_free;
inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, DCCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/dccp/minisocks.c b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
index 5ca49ce..af226a0 100644
--- a/net/dccp/minisocks.c
+++ b/net/dccp/minisocks.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ struct sock *dccp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* counter (backoff, monitored by dccp_response_timer).
*/
req->retrans++;
- req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req);
+ req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req, NULL);
}
/* Network Duplicate, discard packet */
return NULL;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
index 26fb50e..ad098d6 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ void inet_csk_reqsk_queue_prune(struct sock *parent,
&expire, &resend);
if (!expire &&
(!resend ||
- !req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req) ||
+ !req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(parent, req, NULL) ||
inet_rsk(req)->acked)) {
unsigned long timeo;
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
index 657ae33..f83ac91 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c
@@ -743,7 +743,8 @@ static void tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* socket.
*/
static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
- struct dst_entry *dst)
+ struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
const struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
int err = -1;
@@ -753,7 +754,7 @@ static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
if (!dst && (dst = inet_csk_route_req(sk, req)) == NULL)
return -1;
- skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req);
+ skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, rvp, req);
if (skb) {
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
@@ -774,9 +775,10 @@ static int __tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
return err;
}
-static int tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int tcp_v4_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
- return __tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, NULL);
+ return __tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, NULL, rvp);
}
/*
@@ -1211,13 +1213,13 @@ static struct timewait_sock_ops tcp_timewait_sock_ops = {
int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
- struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct request_sock *req;
+ struct inet_request_sock *ireq;
+ struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
__be32 saddr = ip_hdr(skb)->saddr;
__be32 daddr = ip_hdr(skb)->daddr;
__u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
- struct dst_entry *dst = NULL;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
@@ -1337,7 +1339,8 @@ int tcp_v4_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
- if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst) || want_cookie)
+ if (__tcp_v4_send_synack(sk, req, dst, NULL)
+ || want_cookie)
goto drop_and_free;
inet_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
index a9d34e2..fb68bab 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c
@@ -537,7 +537,7 @@ struct sock *tcp_check_req(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
* Enforce "SYN-ACK" according to figure 8, figure 6
* of RFC793, fixed by RFC1122.
*/
- req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req);
+ req->rsk_ops->rtx_syn_ack(sk, req, NULL);
return NULL;
}
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 616c686..784e6ee 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2224,6 +2224,7 @@ int tcp_send_synack(struct sock *sk)
/* Prepare a SYN-ACK. */
struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
+ struct request_values *rvp,
struct request_sock *req)
{
struct inet_request_sock *ireq = inet_rsk(req);
diff --git a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
index 696a22f..6951827 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c
@@ -461,7 +461,8 @@ out:
}
-static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
+static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req,
+ struct request_values *rvp)
{
struct inet6_request_sock *treq = inet6_rsk(req);
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
@@ -499,7 +500,7 @@ static int tcp_v6_send_synack(struct sock *sk, struct request_sock *req)
if ((err = xfrm_lookup(sock_net(sk), &dst, &fl, sk, 0)) < 0)
goto done;
- skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, req);
+ skb = tcp_make_synack(sk, dst, rvp, req);
if (skb) {
struct tcphdr *th = tcp_hdr(skb);
@@ -1161,13 +1162,13 @@ static struct sock *tcp_v6_hnd_req(struct sock *sk,struct sk_buff *skb)
*/
static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
+ struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
+ struct request_sock *req;
struct inet6_request_sock *treq;
struct ipv6_pinfo *np = inet6_sk(sk);
- struct tcp_options_received tmp_opt;
struct tcp_sock *tp = tcp_sk(sk);
- struct request_sock *req = NULL;
- __u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
struct dst_entry *dst = __sk_dst_get(sk);
+ __u32 isn = TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->when;
#ifdef CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES
int want_cookie = 0;
#else
@@ -1239,23 +1240,20 @@ static int tcp_v6_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
isn = tcp_v6_init_sequence(skb);
}
-
tcp_rsk(req)->snt_isn = isn;
security_inet_conn_request(sk, skb, req);
- if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req))
- goto drop;
+ if (tcp_v6_send_synack(sk, req, NULL)
+ || want_cookie)
+ goto drop_and_free;
- if (!want_cookie) {
- inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
- return 0;
- }
+ inet6_csk_reqsk_queue_hash_add(sk, req, TCP_TIMEOUT_INIT);
+ return 0;
+drop_and_free:
+ reqsk_free(req);
drop:
- if (req)
- reqsk_free(req);
-
return 0; /* don't send reset */
}
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* [net-next-2.6 PATCH v5 0/5 RFC] TCPCT part1: cookie option exchange
From: William Allen Simpson @ 2009-11-09 16:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Linux Kernel Network Developers
I'm torn at the moment, as the net-next tree modules don't compile today.
Although 'make vmlinux' compiles this successfully, it is not tested.
Keep in mind that earlier variants were extensively tested. But at least
this helps move the review comment process along....
Updated to patch cleanly with recent commits.
Changes from previous version:
* swapped conditional tests, requested by Eric and Joe.
* separate patch for constant cleanup, requested by Ilpo.
* added hash generation of Responder Cookie with RCU locking.
* shuffled a few bits to save another byte of tcp socket space.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: Libertas related kernel crash
From: Daniel Mack @ 2009-11-09 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, libertas-dev; +Cc: linux-kernel, Michael Hirsch
In-Reply-To: <20091105120549.GQ14091@buzzloop.caiaq.de>
On Thu, Nov 05, 2009 at 01:05:49PM +0100, Daniel Mack wrote:
> On an ARM (PXA300) embdedded platform with a libertas chip connected via
> SDIO, we happen to see the kernel Ooops below once in a while.
>
> Any pointer on where to dig?
Some more input on this. Oopses similar to the one below are likely
triggered when switching from Ad-hoc to managed mode multiple times in a
row, and something seems corrupt the memory badly. I've searched for the
obvious (double frees, out-of-bound writes etc), but I couldn't find
anything yet. It is, however, related to the wireless core and/or the
libertas driver.
Any ideas, anyone?
Daniel
> [ 2659.715112] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 00000001
> [ 2659.723164] pgd = c5ca8000
> [ 2659.725846] [00000001] *pgd=a5cbc031, *pte=00000000, *ppte=00000000
> [ 2659.732062] Internal error: Oops: 13 [#4]
> [ 2659.736041] last sysfs file: /sys/devices/platform/pxa2xx-mci.0/mmc_host/mmc0/mmc0:0001/mmc0:0001:1/net/wlan0/address
> [ 2659.746573] Modules linked in: eeti_ts libertas_sdio pxamci ds2760_battery w1_ds2760 wire
> [ 2659.754698] CPU: 0 Tainted: G D (2.6.32-rc6 #1)
> [ 2659.760255] PC is at kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90
> [ 2659.764774] LR is at inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c
> [ 2659.769876] pc : [<c00a28d8>] lr : [<c02a4b24>] psr: 20000093
> [ 2659.769887] sp : c5c27d88 ip : c78ae4a0 fp : 00006e49
> [ 2659.781279] r10: 00008928 r9 : c04fcfac r8 : c0532148
> [ 2659.786466] r7 : 00000020 r6 : 00000020 r5 : 60000013 r4 : 00000001
> [ 2659.792945] r3 : 00000000 r2 : c78ae4a0 r1 : 00000020 r0 : c04d42e4
> [ 2659.799427] Flags: nzCv IRQs off FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment user
> [ 2659.806602] Control: 0000397f Table: a5ca8018 DAC: 00000015
> [ 2659.812304] Process p0-renderer (pid: 1527, stack limit = 0xc5c26278)
> [ 2659.818697] Stack: (0xc5c27d88 to 0xc5c28000)
> [ 2659.823029] 7d80: c5cc5300 c5cb1000 c5c18800 c78ae4a0 00008928 00008928
> [ 2659.831155] 7da0: 00000001 c02a4b24 c2388c2e 00000000 c7eb6200 c02a4c8c c02a4200 c2388c2d
> [ 2659.839287] 7dc0: c04fcfac 00000000 0000ee48 00008000 fb0ca8c0 c7eb6200 c04fcfac 00000000
> [ 2659.847412] 7de0: 000038e5 fb0ca8c0 fb0ca8c0 c7eb6200 00000000 c02a4e28 c02a40e4 00000000
> [ 2659.855543] 7e00: 00000000 00000000 00000000 c02b99d4 00000001 00000000 c5c27f08 00000000
> [ 2659.863669] 7e20: c5c7b500 000005a8 00000000 00000000 000200da c5c7b500 c0069a74 c5c27e3c
> [ 2659.871802] 7e40: c5c27e3c c0049fdc be96a8fc c0275d70 c5c27e88 00000006 00000005 00000001
> [ 2659.879933] 7e60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 fb0ca8c0 1d0ca8c0 00000000 00000000 00000000
> [ 2659.888057] 7e80: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000006 38e50000 00000000 c7ff6e00
> [ 2659.896183] 7ea0: 000063f8 c5c27f08 00000010 c7eb6200 c5c27f08 c00440c4 c5c26000 c76cd2c0
> [ 2659.904314] 7ec0: 00000802 c02c4f70 0000c1ff 00000001 00000000 00000000 00000000 00045108
> [ 2659.912441] 7ee0: 00000010 c76cd2c0 00045108 00000010 c5c27f08 c00440c4 c5c26000 40343800
> [ 2659.920573] 7f00: 00044440 c0276888 38e50002 fb0ca8c0 00000000 00000000 000063f8 00000000
> [ 2659.928698] 7f20: 00000000 be96a858 c5c27f48 000450c0 000000c5 c00440c4 c5c26000 40343800
> [ 2659.936829] 7f40: 00044440 c00a9864 000063f8 00000000 00000005 c047c1ff 00000001 00000000
> [ 2659.944952] 7f60: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000003
> [ 2659.953078] 7f80: 00000000 c7b5aa00 00000000 00000000 00000000 00046cb8 00045108 40370ef8
> [ 2659.961203] 7fa0: 0000011b c0043f40 00046cb8 00045108 0000000a 00045108 00000010 0000001c
> [ 2659.969328] 7fc0: 00046cb8 00045108 40370ef8 0000011b 00000000 00043178 40343800 00044440
> [ 2659.977451] 7fe0: 40371050 be96a968 4035b3c8 40790638 60000010 0000000a 00000000 00000000
> [ 2659.985599] [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90) from [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c)
> [ 2659.995296] [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c) from [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280)
> [ 2660.005415] [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280) from [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50)
> [ 2660.015034] [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50) from [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420)
> [ 2660.024211] [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420) from [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c)
> [ 2660.033653] [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c) from [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90)
> [ 2660.042662] [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90) from [<c0043f40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
> [ 2660.051228] Code: e5904080 e5907090 e3540000 1590308c (17943103) [ 2660.057440] ---[ end trace 416b23b4578ffa42 ]---
> [ 2660.062021] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
> [ 2660.068400] [<c00486cc>] (unwind_backtrace+0x0/0xdc) from [<c0351758>] (panic+0x34/0x120)
> [ 2660.076555] [<c0351758>] (panic+0x34/0x120) from [<c004758c>] (die+0x14c/0x178)
> [ 2660.083823] [<c004758c>] (die+0x14c/0x178) from [<c0049900>] (__do_kernel_fault+0x68/0x80)
> [ 2660.092060] [<c0049900>] (__do_kernel_fault+0x68/0x80) from [<c004b678>] (do_alignment+0x59c/0x700)
> [ 2660.101067] [<c004b678>] (do_alignment+0x59c/0x700) from [<c00432c8>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x94)
> [ 2660.109649] [<c00432c8>] (do_DataAbort+0x34/0x94) from [<c0043acc>] (__dabt_svc+0x4c/0x60)
> [ 2660.117874] Exception stack(0xc5c27d40 to 0xc5c27d88)
> [ 2660.122898] 7d40: c04d42e4 00000020 c78ae4a0 00000000 00000001 60000013 00000020 00000020
> [ 2660.131046] 7d60: c0532148 c04fcfac 00008928 00006e49 c78ae4a0 c5c27d88 c02a4b24 c00a28d8
> [ 2660.139189] 7d80: 20000093 ffffffff
> [ 2660.142673] [<c0043acc>] (__dabt_svc+0x4c/0x60) from [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90)
> [ 2660.151265] [<c00a28d8>] (kmem_cache_alloc+0x30/0x90) from [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c)
> [ 2660.160998] [<c02a4b24>] (inet_bind_bucket_create+0x18/0x5c) from [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280)
> [ 2660.171148] [<c02a4c8c>] (__inet_hash_connect+0x124/0x280) from [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50)
> [ 2660.180780] [<c02a4e28>] (inet_hash_connect+0x40/0x50) from [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420)
> [ 2660.189971] [<c02b99d4>] (tcp_v4_connect+0x2a8/0x420) from [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c)
> [ 2660.199424] [<c02c4f70>] (inet_stream_connect+0xac/0x26c) from [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90)
> [ 2660.208443] [<c0276888>] (sys_connect+0x6c/0x90) from [<c0043f40>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x28)
>
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 0/8 net-next-2.6] udp: optimisations
From: Octavian Purdila @ 2009-11-09 15:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Dumazet; +Cc: David Miller, netdev, lgrijincu
In-Reply-To: <4AF7AA94.6090909@gmail.com>
On Monday 09 November 2009 07:37:24 you wrote:
> David Miller a écrit :
> > Looks great, all applied, thanks Eric.
>
> Thanks David, I'll make the remaining patches too.
>
> > I would even go so far as to say that the cutoff to the second hash
> > table should be even lower than 10, like maybe 4 or 5.
>
> Probably, but we want to avoid the secondary way if possible,
> as this path might have to traverse two different chains.
>
> (total of three cache line accesses to only take a look at chains
> head/count)
>
> Maybe we can change the heuristic to take into account this like that :
>
> if (hslot->count > 4) {
> ...
> if (hslot->count < hslot2->count * 2)
> goto begin_primary_hash_lookup;
>
> This is tuning, and needs benchmarking.
>
Eric, thanks a lot !
Lucian is currently testing it on our setup and once we iron out some IPv6
issues we are seeing he will follow up with some numbers.
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH] xfrm: SAD entries do not expire correctly after suspend-resume
From: Herbert Xu @ 2009-11-09 15:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Yury Polyanskiy; +Cc: netdev, davem, peterz, yoshfuji, tglx, mingo
In-Reply-To: <20091108211249.2ecdfd38@penta.localdomain>
Yury Polyanskiy <ypolyans@princeton.edu> wrote:
>
> This fixes the following bug in the current implementation of
> net/xfrm: SAD entries timeouts do not count the time spent by the machine
> in the suspended state. This leads to the connectivity problems because
> after resuming local machine thinks that the SAD entry is still valid, while
> it has already been expired on the remote server.
>
> The cause of this is very simple: the timeouts in the net/xfrm are bound to
> the old mod_timer() timers. This patch reassigns them to the
> CLOCK_REALTIME hrtimer.
>
> I have been using this version of the patch for a few months on my
> machines without any problems. Also run a few stress tests w/o any
> issues.
>
> This version of the patch uses tasklet_hrtimer by Peter Zijlstra
> (commit 9ba5f0).
>
> This patch is against 2.6.31.4. Please CC me.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yury Polyanskiy <polyanskiy@gmail.com>
Thanks for the patch.
However, I have some reservations as to whether this is the ideal
situation. Unless I'm mistaken, this patch may cause IPsec SAs
to expire if the system clock was out of sync prior to IPsec startup
and is subsequently resynced by ntpdate or similar.
For example, it's quite common for clocks to be out-of-sync by
10 hours in Australia due to time zone issues with BIOS clocks.
So potentially ntpdate could move the clock forward by 10 hours
or more on bootup thus causing IPsec SAs to expire prematurely
with this patch.
This shouldn't really be a problem in itself except that there
are some dodgy IPsec gateways out there that refuse to reestablish
IPsec SAs if the interval between two successive connections is
too small. This could render the SA inoperable for hours.
So the upshot of all this is that we definitely want the effect
of this patch for suspend/resume, but it would be great if we can
avoid it for settimeofday(2).
Cheers,
--
Visit Openswan at http://www.openswan.org/
Email: Herbert Xu ~{PmV>HI~} <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Home Page: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/
PGP Key: http://gondor.apana.org.au/~herbert/pubkey.txt
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next-2.6] udp: bind() optimisation
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2009-11-09 15:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David S. Miller
Cc: Linux Netdev List, Lucian Adrian Grijincu, Octavian Purdila
UDP bind() can be O(N^2) in some pathological cases.
Thanks to secondary hash tables, we can make it O(N)
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/udp.h | 6 +++
include/net/udp.h | 3 +
net/ipv4/udp.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
net/ipv6/udp.c | 14 ++++----
4 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/udp.h b/include/linux/udp.h
index 59f0ddf..03f72a2 100644
--- a/include/linux/udp.h
+++ b/include/linux/udp.h
@@ -88,6 +88,12 @@ static inline struct udp_sock *udp_sk(const struct sock *sk)
return (struct udp_sock *)sk;
}
+#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry(__sk, node, list) \
+ hlist_nulls_for_each_entry(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
+
+#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
+ hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
+
#define IS_UDPLITE(__sk) (udp_sk(__sk)->pcflag)
#endif
diff --git a/include/net/udp.h b/include/net/udp.h
index af41850..5348d80 100644
--- a/include/net/udp.h
+++ b/include/net/udp.h
@@ -158,7 +158,8 @@ static inline void udp_lib_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)
}
extern int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
- int (*)(const struct sock*,const struct sock*));
+ int (*)(const struct sock *,const struct sock *),
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr);
/* net/ipv4/udp.c */
extern int udp_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
diff --git a/net/ipv4/udp.c b/net/ipv4/udp.c
index d73e917..1eaf575 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/udp.c
@@ -152,16 +152,49 @@ static int udp_lib_lport_inuse(struct net *net, __u16 num,
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Note: we still hold spinlock of primary hash chain, so no other writer
+ * can insert/delete a socket with local_port == num
+ */
+static int udp_lib_lport_inuse2(struct net *net, __u16 num,
+ struct udp_hslot *hslot2,
+ struct sock *sk,
+ int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
+ const struct sock *sk2))
+{
+ struct sock *sk2;
+ struct hlist_nulls_node *node;
+ int res = 0;
+
+ spin_lock(&hslot2->lock);
+ udp_portaddr_for_each_entry(sk2, node, &hslot2->head)
+ if (net_eq(sock_net(sk2), net) &&
+ sk2 != sk &&
+ (udp_sk(sk2)->udp_port_hash == num) &&
+ (!sk2->sk_reuse || !sk->sk_reuse) &&
+ (!sk2->sk_bound_dev_if || !sk->sk_bound_dev_if
+ || sk2->sk_bound_dev_if == sk->sk_bound_dev_if) &&
+ (*saddr_comp)(sk, sk2)) {
+ res = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ spin_unlock(&hslot2->lock);
+ return res;
+}
+
/**
* udp_lib_get_port - UDP/-Lite port lookup for IPv4 and IPv6
*
* @sk: socket struct in question
* @snum: port number to look up
* @saddr_comp: AF-dependent comparison of bound local IP addresses
+ * @hash2_nulladdr: AF-dependant hash value in secondary hash chains,
+ * with NULL address
*/
int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
int (*saddr_comp)(const struct sock *sk1,
- const struct sock *sk2))
+ const struct sock *sk2),
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr)
{
struct udp_hslot *hslot, *hslot2;
struct udp_table *udptable = sk->sk_prot->h.udp_table;
@@ -210,6 +243,30 @@ int udp_lib_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum,
} else {
hslot = udp_hashslot(udptable, net, snum);
spin_lock_bh(&hslot->lock);
+ if (hslot->count > 10) {
+ int exist;
+ unsigned int slot2 = udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash ^ snum;
+
+ slot2 &= udptable->mask;
+ hash2_nulladdr &= udptable->mask;
+
+ hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, slot2);
+ if (hslot->count < hslot2->count)
+ goto scan_primary_hash;
+
+ exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
+ sk, saddr_comp);
+ if (!exist && (hash2_nulladdr != slot2)) {
+ hslot2 = udp_hashslot2(udptable, hash2_nulladdr);
+ exist = udp_lib_lport_inuse2(net, snum, hslot2,
+ sk, saddr_comp);
+ }
+ if (exist)
+ goto fail_unlock;
+ else
+ goto found;
+ }
+scan_primary_hash:
if (udp_lib_lport_inuse(net, snum, hslot, NULL, sk,
saddr_comp, 0))
goto fail_unlock;
@@ -255,12 +312,14 @@ static unsigned int udp4_portaddr_hash(struct net *net, __be32 saddr,
int udp_v4_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr =
+ udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), INADDR_ANY, snum);
+ unsigned int hash2_partial =
+ udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr, 0);
+
/* precompute partial secondary hash */
- udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash =
- udp4_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk),
- inet_sk(sk)->inet_rcv_saddr,
- 0);
- return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal);
+ udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash = hash2_partial;
+ return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv4_rcv_saddr_equal, hash2_nulladdr);
}
static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net, __be32 saddr,
@@ -336,8 +395,6 @@ static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
return score;
}
-#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
- hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
/* called with read_rcu_lock() */
static struct sock *udp4_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
diff --git a/net/ipv6/udp.c b/net/ipv6/udp.c
index 2915e1d..f4c85b2 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/udp.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/udp.c
@@ -100,12 +100,14 @@ static unsigned int udp6_portaddr_hash(struct net *net,
int udp_v6_get_port(struct sock *sk, unsigned short snum)
{
+ unsigned int hash2_nulladdr =
+ udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), &in6addr_any, snum);
+ unsigned int hash2_partial =
+ udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk), &inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr, 0);
+
/* precompute partial secondary hash */
- udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash =
- udp6_portaddr_hash(sock_net(sk),
- &inet6_sk(sk)->rcv_saddr,
- 0);
- return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal);
+ udp_sk(sk)->udp_portaddr_hash = hash2_partial;
+ return udp_lib_get_port(sk, snum, ipv6_rcv_saddr_equal, hash2_nulladdr);
}
static inline int compute_score(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
@@ -181,8 +183,6 @@ static inline int compute_score2(struct sock *sk, struct net *net,
return score;
}
-#define udp_portaddr_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list) \
- hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu(__sk, node, list, __sk_common.skc_portaddr_node)
/* called with read_rcu_lock() */
static struct sock *udp6_lib_lookup2(struct net *net,
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH 1/3] net: TCP thin-stream detection
From: Andreas Petlund @ 2009-11-09 15:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Ilpo Järvinen
Cc: Arnd Hannemann, William Allen Simpson, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, shemminger@vyatta.com,
davem@davemloft.net
In-Reply-To: <alpine.DEB.2.00.0911051536200.7024@wel-95.cs.helsinki.fi>
Ilpo Järvinen wrote:
> On Thu, 5 Nov 2009, Andreas Petlund wrote:
>
>> Arnd Hannemann wrote:
>>> One example: Consider standard NewReno non-SACK enabled flow:
>>> For some reasons two data packets get reordered.
>>> The TCP sender will produce a dupACK and an ACK.
>>> The dupACK will trigger (because of your logic) a spurious retransmit.
>>> The spurious retransmit will trigger a dupACK.
>>> This dupACK will again trigger a spurious retransmit.
>>> And this game will continue, unless a packet is dropped by coincidence.
>> Such an effect will be extremely rare. It will depend on the application
>> producing an extremely even flow of packets with just the right
>> interarrival time, and also on reordering of data (which also will
>> happen very seldom when the number of packets in flight are so low).
>> Even though it can happen, the data flow will progress (with spurious
>> retransmissions). The effect will stop as soon as the application sends
>> more than 4 segments in an RTT (which will disable the thin-stream
>> modifications) or less than 1 (which will cause all segments to be
>> successfully ACKed), or if, as you say, a packet is dropped.
>
> I'd simply workaround this problem by requiring SACK to be enabled for
> such a connection. This is reinforced by the fact that small windowed
> transfers want it certainly to be on anyway to get the best out of ACK
> flow even if there were some ACK losses.
>
Thanks. I will revise the patches based on all the feedback I have gotten
and get back to the list with a new version when I have done some more
testing.
Best regards,
Andreas
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH 2/2] net/compat_ioctl: support SIOCWANDEV
From: Krzysztof Halasa @ 2009-11-09 14:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Arnd Bergmann; +Cc: David Miller, Daniel Walker, linux-kernel, hch, netdev
In-Reply-To: <200911082239.24698.arnd@arndb.de>
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de> writes:
> This adds compat_ioctl support for SIOCWANDEV, which has
> always been missing.
It looks good, can't test at the moment.
--
Krzysztof Halasa
^ permalink raw reply
* RE: PATCH: Network Device Naming mechanism and policy
From: Narendra_K @ 2009-11-09 14:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: md, Matt_Domsch
Cc: bryan, dannf, bhutchings, netdev, linux-hotplug, Jordan_Hargrave,
Charles_Rose, Sandeep_K_Shandilya
In-Reply-To: <20091106223524.GA27121@bongo.bofh.it>
>> > As a distribution developer I highly value solutions like
>this which
>> > do not require patching every application which deals with
>interface
>> > names and then teaching users about aliases which only
>work in some
>> > places and are unknown to the kernel.
>> Fair enough - but would you object if we changed the naming scheme
>> from eth%d to something else?
>I suppose that this would depend on what else. :-) Since you
>want radical changes I recommend that you design the new
>persistent naming infrastructure in a way that will allow root
>to choose to use the classic naming scheme, or many users will
>scream a lot and at least some distributions will do it anyway.
>I also expect that providing choice at the beginning of
>development may lead to more acceptance later if and when the
>new scheme will have proved itself to be superior (at least in
>some situations).
>You have tought about this for a long time and if so far you
>have not found a solution which is widely considered superior
>then I doubt that one will appear soon. Providing your
>favourite naming scheme as an optional add on will immediately
>benefit those who like it and greatly reduce opposition from
>those who do not.
In that way, I suppose char device node solution fits the scheme
perfectly. It doesn't change or interfere with the kernel's default
naming scheme (ethN) in any way. Also, the applications continue to work
the way they did and in addition to supporting traditional names, they
would also support pathnames. Whether all the user space applications
need to be patched can be discussed and debated. But, we can patch
applications like, installers and firewall code, which when don't see
determinism ("eth0 mapping to integrated port 1"), fail and cause very
high impact could be patched. Since users are already familiar with
pathnames like /dev/disk/by-id{label, uuid}, I suppose it might not be
very difficult to get used to pathnames like
/dev/netdev/by-chassis-label/Embedded_NIC_1. Would that be acceptable ?
With regards,
Narendra K
^ permalink raw reply
* [PATCH net-next] Phonet: allocate and copy for pipe TX without sock lock
From: Rémi Denis-Courmont @ 2009-11-09 14:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev; +Cc: Rémi Denis-Courmont
From: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Rémi Denis-Courmont <remi.denis-courmont@nokia.com>
---
net/phonet/pep.c | 29 ++++++++++++-----------------
1 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/phonet/pep.c b/net/phonet/pep.c
index cbaa1d6..bdc17bd 100644
--- a/net/phonet/pep.c
+++ b/net/phonet/pep.c
@@ -843,7 +843,7 @@ static int pep_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
struct msghdr *msg, size_t len)
{
struct pep_sock *pn = pep_sk(sk);
- struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+ struct sk_buff *skb;
long timeo;
int flags = msg->msg_flags;
int err, done;
@@ -851,6 +851,16 @@ static int pep_sendmsg(struct kiocb *iocb, struct sock *sk,
if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_OOB || !(msg->msg_flags & MSG_EOR))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, MAX_PNPIPE_HEADER + len,
+ flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
+ if (!skb)
+ return -ENOBUFS;
+
+ skb_reserve(skb, MAX_PHONET_HEADER + 3);
+ err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
+ if (err < 0)
+ goto outfree;
+
lock_sock(sk);
timeo = sock_sndtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
if ((1 << sk->sk_state) & (TCPF_LISTEN|TCPF_CLOSE)) {
@@ -894,28 +904,13 @@ disabled:
goto disabled;
}
- if (!skb) {
- skb = sock_alloc_send_skb(sk, MAX_PNPIPE_HEADER + len,
- flags & MSG_DONTWAIT, &err);
- if (skb == NULL)
- goto out;
- skb_reserve(skb, MAX_PHONET_HEADER + 3);
-
- if (sk->sk_state != TCP_ESTABLISHED ||
- !atomic_read(&pn->tx_credits))
- goto disabled; /* sock_alloc_send_skb might sleep */
- }
-
- err = memcpy_fromiovec(skb_put(skb, len), msg->msg_iov, len);
- if (err < 0)
- goto out;
-
err = pipe_skb_send(sk, skb);
if (err >= 0)
err = len; /* success! */
skb = NULL;
out:
release_sock(sk);
+outfree:
kfree_skb(skb);
return err;
}
--
1.6.3.3
^ permalink raw reply related
* Re: [PATCH RFC] gianfar: Do not call skb recycling with disabled IRQs
From: Anton Vorontsov @ 2009-11-09 13:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller
Cc: jdl, linuxppc-dev, jason.wessel, afleming, netdev, buytenh,
shemminger
In-Reply-To: <20091108.010848.116517157.davem@davemloft.net>
On Sun, Nov 08, 2009 at 01:08:48AM -0800, David Miller wrote:
> From: Anton Vorontsov <avorontsov@ru.mvista.com>
> Date: Thu, 5 Nov 2009 19:57:38 +0300
>
> > But that basically means that with skb recycling we can't safely
> > use KGDBoE, though we can add something like this:
>
> Please stop adding special logic only to your driver to handle these
> things.
>
> Either it's a non-issue, or it's going to potentially be an issue for
> everyone using skb_recycle_check() in a NAPI driver, right?
>
> So why not add the "in_interrupt()" or whatever check to
> skb_recycle_check() and if the context is unsuitable return false (0)
> ok?
I think the check is needed, yes. But if we add just that check,
then we'll never do skb recycling in the tx path (since gianfar
always grabs irqsave spinlock during tx ring cleanup, so the check
will always return false).
So we must add the check to keep polling with disabled IRQs safe,
but we also should get rid of irqsave spinlock in the gianfar
driver (to make the skb recycling actually work in most cases).
Thanks!
--
Anton Vorontsov
email: cbouatmailru@gmail.com
irc://irc.freenode.net/bd2
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [PATCH RFC] gianfar: Make polling safe with IRQs disabled
From: Anton Vorontsov @ 2009-11-09 13:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: David Miller; +Cc: afleming, jason.wessel, netdev, linuxppc-dev
In-Reply-To: <20091108.010533.212571001.davem@davemloft.net>
On Sun, Nov 08, 2009 at 01:05:33AM -0800, David Miller wrote:
...
> > When using KGDBoE, gianfar driver spits 'Interrupt problem' messages,
> > which appears to be a legitimate warning, i.e. we may end up calling
> > netif_receive_skb() or vlan_hwaccel_receive_skb() with IRQs disabled.
> >
> > This patch reworks the RX path so that if netpoll is enabled (the
> > only case when the driver don't know from what context the polling
> > may be called), we check whether IRQs are disabled, and if so we
> > fall back to safe variants of skb receiving functions.
>
> This is bogus, I'll tell you why.
>
> When you go into netif_receive_skb() we have a special check,
> "if (netpoll_receive_skb(..." that takes care of all of the
> details concerning doing a ->poll() from IRQ disabled context
> via netpoll.
>
> So this code you're adding should not be necessary.
>
> Or, explain to me why no other driver needs special logic in their
> ->poll() handler like this and does not run into any kinds of netpoll
> problems :-)
Hm, I was confused by the following note:
/**
* netif_receive_skb - process receive buffer from network
* @skb: buffer to process
...
* This function may only be called from softirq context and interrupts
* should be enabled.
Looking into the code though, I can indeed see that there
are netpoll checks, and __netpoll_rx() is actually called with
irqs disabled. So, in the end it appears that we should just
remove the 'Interrupt problem' message.
Thanks!
--
Anton Vorontsov
email: cbouatmailru@gmail.com
irc://irc.freenode.net/bd2
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Patrick McHardy @ 2009-11-09 13:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <1257771787.29454.173.camel@johannes.local>
Johannes Berg wrote:
> On Mon, 2009-11-09 at 13:59 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
>
>>> Thanks for the explanation. I think we'd need the second condition
>>> removed, I don't see a reason to force a socket to not also have
>>> multicast RX if it's used for any of the purposes we're looking at this
>>> for. Guess we need to audit the callees to determine whether that's ok.
>> I've already done that. Its currently only used by netfilter
>> for which this change also makes sense.
>
> Cool, I arrived at that conclusion too, it seemed that it would
> currently be somewhat strangely broken if you could add multicast groups
> to those sockets used there. Not sure if you can though.
I don't see anything preventing it.
>>> Can you quickly explain the difference between release and destruct?
>> release is called when the socket is closed, destruct is called
>> once all references are gone. I think with the synchonous processing
>> done nowadays they shouldn't make any difference, but release
>> should be fine in either case.
>
> Ok, cool, thanks. Do you want me to send the change removing the
> multicast check, or would you want to do that since you audited all the
> netlink callers?
Please go ahead.
> Also, it's called URELEASE for unicast -- should we rename it to just
> RELEASE?
I think URELEASE is still fine since won't necessarily get called
for sockets that are used for pure multicast reception when using
setsockopt to bind to groups. I also have a cleanup patch removing
unneccessary nlk->pid checks from netfilter which would clash with
a rename :)
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Johannes Berg @ 2009-11-09 13:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Patrick McHardy; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <4AF8122F.9060807@trash.net>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1239 bytes --]
On Mon, 2009-11-09 at 13:59 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
> > Thanks for the explanation. I think we'd need the second condition
> > removed, I don't see a reason to force a socket to not also have
> > multicast RX if it's used for any of the purposes we're looking at this
> > for. Guess we need to audit the callees to determine whether that's ok.
>
> I've already done that. Its currently only used by netfilter
> for which this change also makes sense.
Cool, I arrived at that conclusion too, it seemed that it would
currently be somewhat strangely broken if you could add multicast groups
to those sockets used there. Not sure if you can though.
> > Can you quickly explain the difference between release and destruct?
>
> release is called when the socket is closed, destruct is called
> once all references are gone. I think with the synchonous processing
> done nowadays they shouldn't make any difference, but release
> should be fine in either case.
Ok, cool, thanks. Do you want me to send the change removing the
multicast check, or would you want to do that since you audited all the
netlink callers?
Also, it's called URELEASE for unicast -- should we rename it to just
RELEASE?
johannes
[-- Attachment #2: This is a digitally signed message part --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 801 bytes --]
^ permalink raw reply
* Re: [RFC] netlink: add socket destruction notification
From: Patrick McHardy @ 2009-11-09 12:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Johannes Berg; +Cc: netdev, Jouni Malinen, Thomas Graf
In-Reply-To: <1257762132.29454.161.camel@johannes.local>
Johannes Berg wrote:
> On Fri, 2009-11-06 at 16:37 +0100, Patrick McHardy wrote:
>
>>>> This seems pretty similar to the NETLINK_URELEASE notifier invoked
>>>> in netlink_release(). Wouldn't that one work as well?
>>> Hmm, it does seem similar, thanks for pointing it out. What exactly does
>>> the condition
>>> if (nlk->pid && !nlk->subscriptions) {
>>>
>>> mean though?
>> nlk->pid is non-zero for bound sockets, which is basically any
>> non-kernel socket which has either sent a message or explicitly
>> called bind(). nlk->subscriptions is zero for sockets not bound
>> to multicast groups.
>>
>> So effectively it invokes the notifier for all bound unicast
>> userspace sockets. Not sure why it doesn't invoke the notifier
>> for sockets that are used for both unicast and multicast
>> reception. If that is a problem I think the second condition
>> could be removed.
>
> Thanks for the explanation. I think we'd need the second condition
> removed, I don't see a reason to force a socket to not also have
> multicast RX if it's used for any of the purposes we're looking at this
> for. Guess we need to audit the callees to determine whether that's ok.
I've already done that. Its currently only used by netfilter
for which this change also makes sense.
> Can you quickly explain the difference between release and destruct?
release is called when the socket is closed, destruct is called
once all references are gone. I think with the synchonous processing
done nowadays they shouldn't make any difference, but release
should be fine in either case.
^ permalink raw reply
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